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A Behavioural and Cognitive Neuroscience Investigation of Deceptive Communication 
Chun-Wei Hsu 
ABSTRACT 
There is a rich literature on how people tell lies and detect them in others, but the 
underlying mechanisms are still poorly understood. The first aim of this thesis was to 
elucidate key cognitive and neural processes underlying cued (i.e., instructed) and 
uncued lies. The second aim, based on recent research suggesting a link between 
dishonesty and creativity, was to determine whether creative cognition contributes to 
deceptive communication. 
In a first behavioural study, performance on generating and detecting lies was 
measured in a socially interactive setting involving cued and uncued lies. Results of a 
multiple regression analysis showed that creativity predicted lying generation ability: 
more creative individuals were better liars than less creative people. In contrast, the 
ability to detect lies showed no association with creativity measures, suggesting that 
generating and detecting lies are distinct abilities.  
A second event-related potential (ERP) study investigated the neural mechanisms 
underlying the generation of uncued lies using a novel bluffing paradigm where 
participants lied at will. Results showed no stimulus-locked differences between uncued 
lies and truths, suggesting that decision processes leading to both required comparable 
cognitive resources. Once the uncued decision has been made, it requires strategic 
monitoring to keep track of the responses in order to maximize the gains regardless of 
whether the outcome is a lie or the truth as indexed by no response-locked differences 
between uncued lies and truths.  
Finally, parallel functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and ERP studies 
were conducted to determine the role of creativity in countermeasure use in a concealed 
information paradigm requiring cued lying. Results showed that countermeasures 
degraded the neural signatures of deception and more so for more creative individuals. 
This work advances understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying deception as well as their dependence on individual differences in creative 
cognition.   
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Deception 
 Deception is a social behaviour defined as a deliberate attempt to convince 
someone of something the liar believes is untrue (Vrij & Ganis, 2014). DePaulo, Kashy, 
Kirkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996) have shown that deception is a common behaviour, 
with people reporting that they tell lies in one out of every four social interactions.  
 Although deception is frequent in daily life, the majority of lies are social lies 
(DePaulo et al., 1996) told in order to maintain a good relationship with others, to avoid 
awkward situations or discussions, or to avoid damaging a person’s confidence and 
self-esteem. For example, you would say, “The steak was awesome” instead of “The 
steak was very tough” to your mother although she overcooked it. However, sometimes 
lies can cause serious negative consequences and we would like to detect them. For 
example, in a crime event, the police detective wants to know whether the suspect’s 
alibi is true or not. At a country’s border, customs officers want to know whether 
travelers are using fake identity information. During a job interview, an employer wants 
to know whether the candidate is as capable as he/she claims. Detecting these sorts of 
	 2 
lies successfully would benefit not only individuals but also society. Therefore, 
researchers have been investigating how people tell lies and how to detect lies in others 
from both theoretical and applied angles. The theoretical angle focuses on general 
mechanisms and processes underlying deception, e.g., theory of mind, working memory, 
inhibition, mental management, etc. In contrast, the applied angle aims at developing 
methods to detect lies and at examining the validity of these methods. It is important to 
keep an eye on both perspectives because applications must rely on theories and 
theories may be further improved by taking into account insights generated by 
applications.  
This introduction will review cognitive mechanisms and neural processes 
underlying deceptive communication and how this knowledge is applied to deception 
paradigms. This thesis aims at touching upon both theoretical and applied ends of the 
deception research spectrum by investigating cognitive and neural processes underlying 
deception using a variety of behavioral and neuroimaging methodologies, and 
examining the validity of lie detection methods.  
 
Deception and Cognitive Processes 
  Deception is a task that usually requires effortful executive processes, such as 
	 3 
inhibition, working memory, and so on (Gombos, 2006). Successful deceit requires 
multiple cognitive processes. For example, a liar must take the other person’s thoughts 
into consideration (theory of mind) to construct a new scenario (the lie) while 
maintaining actual information (the truth) in mind. Furthermore, the liar also has to 
ensure self-consistency by keeping track of follow-up conversations based on lies that 
have already been told. Developmental studies have provided evidence that several 
cognitive functions are necessary to deliver a false message successfully. For example, 
Theory of mind is a key social ability for an individual to be able to deceive (e.g., 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and 3-year-old children have difficulty deceiving compared 
with 4- or 5-year-old children (e.g., Peskin, 1992) because theory of mind abilities 
emerge around age 4. In addition to the acquisition of specific abilities for lying, 
deceptive ability in children is closely related to the maturity of executive functioning, 
especially inhibition (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998; Hala & Russell, 2001). For 
example, a study has shown that inhibiting a truthful response is an essential ability for 
children to be able to deceive (Carlson et al., 1998). In sum, research on deception and 
on the development of deceptive abilities suggests that social and executive control 
processes play a central role in performing deception.  
 
	 4 
Neurocognitive approach  
 In the past decade, researchers have begun to explore the neurocognitive basis of 
deception with the aim of understanding the connection between deceptive mental states 
and brain activity. Johnson (2014) reviewed a few dozen neurocognitive studies of 
deception and proposed three main categories of cognitive processes underlying 
deception: working memory, long-term memory, and executive/cognitive control 
processes.  
Working memory, a central executive function with limited capacity, is 
responsible for maintaining and manipulating information, which are important for 
decision-making and for selecting goal-directed behaviors. It plays a vital role in 
carrying out deception, including integrating past memory with current information and 
fabricating self-consistent deceptive scenarios. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) is the most relevant brain areas for working memory and this region has also 
been found to be involved in deception (Abe et al., 2008; Abe et al., 2006; Bhatt et al., 
2009; Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2003; Ito et al., 2012; Ito et 
al., 2011; Lee et al., 2009; Nunez, Casey, Egner, Hare, & Hirsch, 2005; Spence et al., 
2001).  
Most lies are about past events or knowledge stored in long-term memory. 
	 5 
Episodic and semantic memories are the most relevant to generate lies because they are 
consciously accessible sources about one’s past and general knowledge. For example, in 
a crime situation, a suspect may lie about crime events and about memories related to 
the crime. Most neurocognitive studies of deception have used episodic, 
autobiographical or personal semantic memories as concealed information or as the 
stimuli for lying. For example, Ganis et al., (2003) obtained detailed information about 
participants’ actual experiences in the past week as stimuli and found that the lies 
elicited additional activity in a number of brain areas involving in episodic memory 
retrieval, e.g., bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, and right 
precuneus.  
 Executive and cognitive control processes are also key for generating deceptive 
responses. Inhibiting a prepotent truthful response and making a deceptive response 
require executive functions to select and control actions, resolve response conflicts, and 
generate a response. During deception, a variety of executive processes that rely on 
different neural circuits act together. For example, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
plays an essential role in response monitoring and error detection. Several event-related 
potential (ERP) studies have found that instructed lies elicit a significantly larger medial 
frontal negativity (MFN), an ERP component peaking about 70 ms after a response 
	 6 
(Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004, 2005). The neural generators of the MFN have been 
localized to the ACC and adjacent cortex (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Johnson et al., 
2004; Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2001), which has been linked to response conflict 
monitoring (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Johnson et al., 2004; Mathalon et al., 2003; 
Vidal, Hasbroucq, Grapperon, & Bonnet, 2000).  
 Vrij and Ganis (2014) proposed a similar classification, with three classes of neural 
processes engaged during deception based on fMRI studies: cognitive control, 
memory-related, and social cognitive processes. As already mentioned, cognitive 
control processes are required to sustain the higher complexity of generating lies, 
including working memory, conflict monitoring, and response inhibition. 
Memory-related processes reflect the fact that lies and truths are ultimately based on 
stored memories. Finally, successful deception requires one to keep track of the 
perspective of the other person. As mentioned previously, a broad network of brain 
regions relevant to executive and memory-related functions is found in deception 
studies, including large portions of the prefrontal cortex, ACC and inferior parietal 
lobule (IPL). Recently, more interactive experimental paradigms have been used where 
participants had to take into account the perspective of a person and make a 
self-determined decision to deceive the other. Lisofsky, Kazzer, Heekeren, and Prehn 
	 7 
(2014) performed a quantitative meta-analysis in which the studies were divided into 
two categories, i.e., social-interactive and non-interactive deception studies. 
Social-interactive studies showed stronger activation in the right temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ)/angular gyrus and the bilateral temporal pole (TP) than non-interactive 
deception. These results indicated that in addition to executive processes, perspective 
taking, theory of mind and moral reasoning processes also play an important role in 
deception. This meta-analysis also pointed out that social cognitive aspects should be 
taken into account when developing experimental paradigms for deception research.  
The first two studies in this thesis included this socio-cognitive element in the 
experimental tasks, so as to be able to study deception situations closer to real life. By 
increasing the ecological validity of the paradigms, we were able to investigate some of 
the cognitive and neural processes underlying deception in socially interactive settings.  
 
Deception cannot be measured directly 
 Deception originates from mental states, which are not directly observable. Thus, 
lie detection relies on an indirect route, that is, on a set of measureable variables that are 
correlated with deceptive mental states. For example, as deception usually requires 
greater cognitive resources than truth telling, much literature has shown that some 
	 8 
behavioral cues associated with cognitive effort correlate with generating lies. The first 
meta-analysis of behavioural deceptive cues, Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal 
(1981) indicated that deceptive speech is associated with more speech hesitations, pupil 
dilations and fewer hand movements. Ekman (2009) reported that facial expressions are 
associated with deceit. These facial displays (micro expressions) are associated with 
emotional or behavioral inhibition due to being deceptive. Vrij and Mann (2001) 
examined videotaped interviews with a convicted murderer and the murderer’s behavior 
showed more gaze aversion, longer pauses, and slower and more frequent speech 
disturbances while lying compared with truth telling. These behavioral cues were 
attributed to greater cognitive load during deceptive responses.  
 Several variables have been investigated for lie detection in the literature. Vrij and 
Ganis (2014) summarized four general approaches to detect lies, which are non-verbal 
behaviors, verbal behaviors, physiological responses, and brain /neural activity. Unlike 
Pinocchio’s growing nose, no unique response has been found to be robustly associated 
with deception. Such lack of robust associations is due in part to the fact that i) 
non-deceptive mental states may also correlate with these variables, resulting in 
false-positives (i.e., innocent individuals incorrectly classified as deceptive), and ii) 
deceptive mental states may correlate with other variables that we are not measuring, 
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resulting in false-negatives (i.e., deceptive individuals incorrectly classified as innocent). 
These are the reasons why detecting deception is difficult and why the accuracy of the 
lie-detecting methods is not perfect and requires more examinations. This introduction 
will focus on the neural signatures of deception measured by electroencephalography 
(EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) as these two methods are 
used in Studies 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Paradigms used to examine deception 
 In the last two decades, researchers have begun to study directly the brain, where 
deception ultimately begins. The goals have been both to establish neurocognitive 
theories of deceptive processes and to develop better methods for detecting deception 
using a variety of paradigms. The paradigms can be broadly classified into two 
categories. The first category aims at revealing the brain-behavior relationships 
underlying deception. The second category aims to detect the presence of guilty 
knowledge in a person’s memory. The following sections will review these two 
categories separately.  
Paradigms to investigate the neurocognitive processes underlying deception 
 To understand the cognitive and neural correlates of deception and to develop 
	 10 
general theories of deception, a number of neuroimaging studies employed paradigms to 
elicit cognitive processes associated with deceptive responses (e.g., Ganis & Keenan, 
2009; Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003; Johnson et al., 2004, 2005; Lisofsky et al., 
2014; for reviews: Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008). A paradigm type referred 
to as “instructed lies” (it is also called “cued lies” in the current thesis) was used in 
many earlier neuroimaging studies where participants were instructed to lie about 
specific statements according to a cue. In this type of experimental setting, lying 
requires simply reversing responses, e.g., responding “no” for “yes”. Therefore, there 
has been much discussion about the validity of this type of paradigms because lies are 
not instructed in a real life. As the main feature of deception is to deliberately induce a 
false belief, more sophisticated types of deception paradigm involving spontaneous lies 
(it is also called “uncued lies” in the current thesis) have been considered. The 
following two sections will introduce paradigms using cued and uncued lies, 
respectively.  
Instructed/cued lies 
 Recently, a few studies have investigated deception using paradigms grounded in 
the cognitive approach (Suchotzki, Crombez, Smulders, Meijer, & Verschuere, 2015). 
The fundamental idea is that lying is cognitively more demanding than telling the truth 
	 11 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006). Generating a deceptive 
response is a complex process, as it requires: (a) retrieving information associated with 
truthful and deceptive responses from memory, (b) maintaining both truthful and 
deceptive information in working memory, (c) inhibiting prepotent truthful responses, 
and (d) monitoring and controlling one’s behavior to avoid revealing deceptive 
intentions (Ganis & Keenan, 2009; Vrij et al., 2006).  
To elicit deceptive responses, a number of fMRI studies instructed participants 
to answer incorrectly in one condition and to tell the truth in another. For example, in 
the Sheffield Lie test developed by Spence et al. (2001), participants were presented 
with autobiographical events and instructed to lie or tell the truth depending on a cue 
with simple yes/no responses. Nunez et al. (2005) instructed participants to lie about 
autobiographical (e.g., “Do you own a laptop computer?”) and non-autobiographical 
events (e.g., “Is a laptop computer portable?”), and compared the differences between 
these two types of lies. Kozel et al. (2005) created a mock-crime scenario where they 
instructed participants to “steal” a watch or ring and place it among their personal 
belongings in a locker. Subsequently, participants were asked questions about whether 
they took the item or not, which they had to deny.  
Despite the variety of deception paradigms, Christ, Van Essen, Watson, 
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Brubaker, and McDermott (2009) identified brain regions consistently showing 
deception-related activity across studies by utilizing an activation likelihood estimate 
(ALE) meta-analysis. These regions included bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(VLPFC), bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), bilateral anterior insula, 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and bilateral inferior parietal lobule (IPL). To examine 
which cognitive processes are involved deception, they also compared the results of the 
deception meta-analysis with those of separate meta-analyses for three main executive 
control processes: working memory (e.g., keeping truth active while formulating a 
deceptive response), inhibitory control (e.g., inhibiting a truthful response), and task 
switching (e.g., switching between truthful and deceptive responses on different 
questions). The results showed that working memory plays a critical role in deception as 
deception-related regions in left DLPFC, right anterior PFC and right posterior parietal 
cortex were uniquely associated with working memory compared with inhibitory 
control and task switching. This type of work provides evidence about some of the 
neurocognitive basis of deception.  
 ERPs have also been used to study the cognitive processes underlying deception as 
they emphasize the temporal characteristics of the cognitive processes involved in 
deception. For example, Fang, Liu, and Shen (2003) instructed participants to 
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deceptively deny having knowledge of familiar target faces, and to truthfully admit 
having knowledge of other familiar faces. In the study by Dong, Wu, and Lu (2010), 
participants were asked to evaluate the attractiveness of facial photos according to 
difference cues (i.e., truthfulness or deceptiveness). Johnson et al. (2004, 2005) 
instructed participants to make truthful and deceptive responses about old (remembered) 
and new (perceived) stimuli where participants had to sometimes correctly and 
sometimes incorrectly indicate recognition of old stimuli. In a study by Johnson, 
Henkell, Simon, and Zhu (2008), participants made truthful and directed lie (i.e., press 
opposite of the truth) responses about their attitudes towards moral issues (either 
strongly agreed or disagreed).  
Consistent with the idea that deception requires additional executive processes, 
even simple instructed lies (reversing responses) produced a pattern of ERP activity that 
differed from that of truthful responses. There are specific ERP components that 
previous studies have discussed. For example, the Contingent Negative-going Variation 
(CNV; Brunia, van Boxtel, & Böcker, 2012; Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, McCallum, & 
Winter, 1964) is a slow negative brain potential occurring after a cue and before a 
stimulus which is regarded as indexing a process of anticipation and response 
preparation. An enhanced CNV has been reported for lying compared to truth telling 
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(Dong et al., 2010; Fang et al., 2003; Suchotzki, et al., 2015) and this CNV deception 
effect has been interpreted as an indication of increased cognitive load for lying 
compared to truth telling. The fronto-central N200 is another negative-going component 
occurring between 200 and 350 ms after stimulus onset. It has been considered to reflect 
the engagement of executive control processes, especially those related to conflict 
detection (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). An increased 
fronto-central N200 has been found for lying compared to truth telling, as lying comes 
with increased response conflict and conflict inhibition (Hu, Wu, & Fu, 2011; Suchotzki 
et al., 2015; Wu, Hu, & Fu, 2009). A positive-going component, the P300, occurring 
between 300 and 800 ms after stimulus onset is found mostly over parietal scalp sites 
(Sutton, Braren, Zubin, & John, 1965). The P300 has been mostly studied in concealed 
information oddball paradigms where a larger P300 usually reflects the increased 
engagement of attention and memory processes for infrequent novel or salient stimuli 
(Polich, 2012). The P300 has also been considered as an indication of cognitive load 
(Isreal, Chesney, Wickens, & Donchin, 1980; Kramer, Wickens, & Donchin, 1985; 
Wickens, Kramer, Vanasse, & Donchin, 1983) and its amplitude is inversely related to 
the level of cognitive load. Consistent with this idea, previous deception studies have 
found a decreased P300 for lying compared to truth telling, as lying enhances cognitive 
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load (Hu et al., 2011; Suchotzki et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2009).  
 A family of response-locked ERP components has also attracted attention in 
deception research, as deception requires continuously monitoring actions for 
conflicting response tendencies and errors (i.e., tactical monitoring) (e.g., Botvinick, 
Nystrom, Fissell, Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Carter et al., 1998), and sometimes it requires 
the use of long-term (i.e., strategic) monitoring processes to ensure that the selected 
responses meet one’s plans and goals (Johnson et al., 2003, 2004, 2008). For example, 
the Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN; also referred to as Correct Response Negativity, 
CRN) is a fronto-central negative component that occurs between within 100 ms after 
an incorrect response (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, Hoormann, & Blanke, 1991, 1995; 
Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993). Some studies have shown that the 
MFN is generated in or near the ACC (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Johnson et al., 
2004; Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2001), a brain region involved in response monitoring 
and conflict detection (e.g., Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Johnson et al., 2004; Turken & 
Swick, 1999; Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2001; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). Deceptive 
responses have been found to elicit a larger MFN than truthful responses, which has 
been attributed to stronger strategic/response monitoring demands for lying (Dong et al., 
2010; Johnson et al., 2004, 2005, 2008; Kireev, Pakhomov, & Medvedev, 2008). 
	 16 
Another component, the pre-response positivity (PRP), unfolding between 250 and 350 
prior to the response, has been found to be reduced for self-generated lies compared to 
directed lies, as self-generated lies require more strategic monitoring to be successful 
(Johnson et al., 2008). The parietal Late Positive Component (LPC), between 400 ms 
prior to and 100 ms after a response, provides a sensitive index of how processing 
resources are allocated between two simultaneously performed tasks (Johnson, 1993, 
1998). In deception studies, a smaller LPC has been found for deceptive than for 
truthful responses (Johnson et al., 2003, 2005, 2008), because processing resources are 
allocated to secondary task (i.e., generating a lie) while holding the information of 
primary task (i.e., the truth). In sum, these ERP components index a variety of executive 
processes (e.g., conflict detection, response monitoring) and their modulation by 
deception manipulation provides evidence that deception is associated with increased 
cognitive load to control and coordinate the selection and execution of a non-default 
action.   
 These fMRI and ERP studies have shown the neurocognitive basis of deception 
using instructed/cued lie paradigms, focusing on executive control processes. However, 
these deception paradigms did not necessarily elicit the same processes that more 
ecological paradigms would as in real-world settings deception is a deliberate act that is 
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intended to induce a false belief and mislead another person.  
Spontaneous/uncued lies 
 With the increasing popularity of neuroimaging techniques to investigate deception, 
there has also been increased discussion about the validity of the deception paradigms 
employed in this field. Instructing participants to lie in one condition and to tell the truth 
in another condition does not fully satisfy the definition of deception — intentionally 
misleading another person. To simulate real life deception in the laboratory, Abe, 
Suzuki, Mori, Itoh, and Fujii (2007) were one of the first groups that tried to address the 
issue of “instructed lies” by introducing a clever twist to their experimental protocol. In 
their paradigm, participants received two contradictory instructions from two 
experimenters where experimenter 2 secretly asked the participants to deceive the 
experimenter 1 by answering questions with opposite responses to those told the 
experimenter 1 when experimenter 1 was not present. However, the issue of “instructed 
lies” was still unsolved because participants were just instructed to follow a different set 
of rules.   
 To make the experimental paradigms more ecologically valid, some authors 
attempted to include “uncued lies” in their studies. For example, Spence, 
Kaylor-Hughes, Farrow, and Wilkinson (2008) requested participants to write down 
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their true events (embarrassing autobiographical episodes) that a typical person would 
probably have wished to concealed from others and participants were free to choose 
when to tell the truth or to lie. The results showed that VLPFC was associated with 
lying compared with truth telling. This paradigm captured real-world deception by 
granting participants choices to lie or tell the truth about these embarrassing events. 
However, there are other aspects of deception that are important as deception is also 
socially rooted and its processing is modified by moral perception (Sip et al., 2008). In 
other words, to execute a deceptive act depends on the existence or expectation of 
interactive consequences and no harm would come without such consequences.  
 Recently, a few fMRI studies have recognized that deception involves a social 
dimension and considered the pragmatics of social interaction into their experimental 
designs. Baumgartner, Fischbacher, Feierabend, Lutz, and Fehr (2009) used a trust 
game where participants made a promise whether they were going to give back money 
to an interactive partner and then kept or broke the promise. Their findings revealed that 
breaking a promise was associated with increased activation in the DLPFC, ACC and 
amygdala. The authors suggested that the dishonest act involves an emotional conflict 
due to the suppression of the honest response. Sip et al. (2010) developed a laboratory 
version of the dice game where participants decided whether or when to attempt to 
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deceive their opponent, and whether or when to accuse them of deception. The results 
showed that both truthful and deceptive responses were associated with activity in 
fronto-polar cortex (BA 10) while deceptive responses were associated with greater 
activity in the premotor and parietal cortex. In another study by Sip et al. (2012) the 
paradigm created a context in which deceptive responses could be confronted by the 
opponent because in real-life the cost of being caught can be enormous in terms of loss 
of money, reputation, or trust. Their findings suggest that deception depends upon an 
effort-based affective-motivational network (e.g., subgenual ACC) rather than merely 
higher-level cognitive processes and the decision to deceive is affected by the potential 
risk of social confrontation rather than the claim itself.  
 More ecologically valid and interactive experimental paradigms seem to yield 
different neural networks from what previous studies have found using instructed lies. 
To investigate the influence of these socio-cognitive elements on the neural networks 
underlying deception, Lisofsky et al. (2014) performed a quantitative meta-analysis 
combining the data from 416 participants across 22 fMRI and two PET studies. These 
studies were divided into social interactive and non-interactive deception categories 
based on the description of the experimental paradigm. The results showed that social 
interactive deception was associated with greater activation in the dorsal ACC, the right 
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temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)/angular gyrus, and the bilateral temporal pole (TP) than 
non-interaction deception. Activity in dorsal ACC has been found in dilemmatic moral 
reasoning (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). The TPJ has been 
associated with theory of mind processes where people integrate socially significant 
information and infer the mental state of others (e.g., Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe, 
Moran, Scholz, & Gabrieli, 2006) while the TP has been consistently found to be 
associated with moral judgment and social cognition (for a review, see Olson, Plotzker, 
& Ezzyat, 2007). Thus, instead of a neural network involved in executive control 
processes (for a review, see Christ et al., 2009), this meta-analysis demonstrated the 
critical role of theory of mind, perspective taking, moral reasoning and conflict 
processes in socially interactive deception studies.   
 A few ERP studies have also developed tasks to characterize the 
electrophysiological signature of spontaneous/uncued deception. Instead of the ERP 
components mentioned in the previous section, another component related to moral 
conflict was found in a more ecologically valid paradigm. Panasiti et al. (2014) 
implemented a two-card (i.e., winning card and losing card) game, in which an 
opponent (OP) had to pick one of the two covered cards and the participants had to 
communicate the outcome of the choice to the OP because the OP was not able to see 
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the outcome of the choice. Participants were completely free to decide whether to lie or 
not to the OP and the winner took money from the other player. This paradigm captured 
two important components of deception, willful decision and social interaction. Instead 
of supporting the consensus that deception is cognitively more demanding than truth 
telling, this study suggested that spontaneous deception, as opposed to instructed lies, 
might not mandate additional cognitive workload by showing neither P300 nor N200 
differences between lying and telling the truth. Interestingly, the study found a 
reduction in the Bereitschaftspotential (BP) for lying compared with truth telling. The 
BP is a volitional movement marker modulated by low-level variables, such as motor 
parameters, or by high-level cognitive variable, such as decision-making based on the 
mental computation of the trade-off between morality and reward. Panasiti et al. (2014) 
attributed this reduced BP to moral conflict as lying took the reward from the opponent. 
This paradigm close to real life successfully elicited moral emotions (e.g., guilty and 
shame) in deception demonstrating that it is important to use ecologically valid 
paradigms to approach realistic deception. However, there was still one component of 
deception missing in this paradigm — there was no risk or punishment if participants 
lied. In other words, participants would never be caught when they made deceptive 
responses. This thesis developed a card game paradigm in Study 2 that involved the 
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elements of deception mentioned above to examine the electrophysiological signature of 
spontaneous/uncued deception.  
Paradigms to detect guilty knowledge – Concealed Information Test  
 These paradigms were developed during the second half of the 20th century using 
physiological measures for detecting deception, primarily in crime cases. Lykken (1959) 
initially developed the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) based on the idea that a 
perpetrator possesses specific crime information that an innocent person does not. Both 
guilty and innocent people provide the same behavioral response by denying having 
such information, but the perpetrator lies when doing so. Thus, it is a form of deception 
related to cued lies for those individuals with guilty knowledge.  
Recently, the GKT has been referred to as the Concealed Information Test (CIT; 
see Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011). The CIT utilizes a series of 
multiple-choice questions, in which a critical item (often referred to as the probe) is 
presented together with some neutral/control items (often referred to as irrelevant items). 
These control items are chosen to be of a similar type as the probe so that an innocent 
person would not be able to discriminate them from the probe (Lykken, 1998). Thus, 
the relevant item (i.e., probe) is significant only for guilty individuals. In addition, there 
is a target item where examinees have to press a “Yes” button. The reason to have the 
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target item is to ensure that the examinees do not simply press a “No” button mindlessly 
throughout the study.  
For example, in a murder case, the suspects could be asked, “Was the murder 
weapon a knife? Was the murder weapon a gun? Was the murder weapon a rope?” 
Although a guilty person denies having such knowledge by answering no to all these 
questions, orienting responses (ORs) still occur. The OR is a set of physiological and 
behavioral reactions that reflect attentional processes (e.g., Dawson, Filion, & Schell, 
1989; Filion, Dawson, Schell, & Hazlett, 1991; Siddle & Spinks, 1992), and are elicited 
by novel stimulus or by any change of stimulation (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Sokolov, 1963). 
Traditionally, the ORs are indexed by autonomic nervous system (ANS) measures, such 
as increased skin conductance response (SCR), respiration suppression and heart rate 
deceleration (for reviews, Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Meijer, Selle, Elber, & Ben‐
Shakhar, 2014). In more recent years, neuroimaging measures have frequently been 
employed to examine concealed information (e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Ganis, 
Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit, & Schendan, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 1988). The following 
two sections will focus on ERP and fMRI, respectively.  
CIT paradigms in ERP studies  
 Event-related potential (ERP) studies using the 3-stimulus CIT paradigm just 
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described have used mostly the amplitude of the P300 component as a robust index of 
recognition of concealed knowledge, with the probe showing a larger P300 than the 
irrelevant items (e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Ganis, Bridges, Hsu, & Schendan, 
2016; see Meijer et al., 2014 for reviews; Rosenfeld, Soskins, Bosh, & Ryan, 2004). 
The P300, a positive brain potential that occurs between 300 and 800 ms after stimulus 
onset was first described by Sutton et al. (1965). Typically, the P300 component is 
found in oddball paradigms, for example when detecting a rare stimulus (e.g., high pitch 
tone) interspersed in a series of standard stimuli (e.g., low pitch tones).  
This neural index is based on the fact that the amplitude of the P300 is inversely 
related to the perceived category probabilities of a stimulus (see Johnson, 1988 for 
reviews). In the CIT paradigm, the relevant guilty knowledge item (i.e., probe) is 
random and infrequent (normally 16.7%) compared with other irrelevant items (66.7%). 
The idea is that, if a person possesses the guilty knowledge, the infrequent probe item 
will be highly salient, and it will automatically stand out from the rest of the irrelevant 
items and elicit a larger P300. Conversely, if a person has no knowledge of the guilty 
information, the probe will be treated like the irrelevant items and elicit the similar 
amplitude of P300 as irrelevant items do. Although some habituation effects on the 
P300 have been found (Polich, 1989), the P300 does not habituate as fast as the skin 
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conductance response (SCR) (Elton, Schandry, & Sparrer, 1983; Rushby & Barry, 
2009). This allows for repeating each stimulus many times, resulting in a better 
signal-to-noise ratio than autonomic nervous system (ANS) measures (Meijer et al., 
2014).  
 With regard to the accuracy of the ERP method, Meijer et al. (2014) conducted a 
meta-analysis on the validity of the CIT and found that the P300 has the largest effect 
size (Cohen's d, 1.89) compared with other three measures, i.e., skin conductance 
response (1.55), respiration line length (1.11) and heart rate (0.89). This review study 
concluded that P300 is a highly valid measure for detecting concealed information.  
CIT paradigms in fMRI studies  
  Compared with ERP studies, a relatively small number of fMRI studies have been 
conducted so far using the CIT paradigm and the designs varied in different studies. 
Langleben et al. (2002) and Phan et al. (2005) used the same card stimuli but found 
slightly different patterns of results. Langleben et al. (2002) found stronger activations 
in the medial prefrontal cortex (medPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
sensorimotor areas in the left hemisphere including the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), but 
no activation was found in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC). Using the same 
stimuli but unlike the previous study, Phan et al. (2005) counterbalanced the probe and 
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irrelevant cards across participants. Stronger activation was found in the dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex (not including the ACC), VLPFC, right superior temporal sulcus and 
IPL for the probe compared with irrelevant cards. Both studies interpreted these 
activated brain regions as reflecting increased engagement of response monitoring and 
inhibition processes during deception. Another two fMRI studies (Gamer, Bauermann, 
Stoeter, & Vossel, 2007; Gamer, Klimecki, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2009) used 
the CIT protocol with cards and bank notes as stimuli. No counterbalancing of stimuli 
across participants was applied. They found more activation in the right insula and 
adjacent inferior frontal cortex (IFG) and the right middle cingulate gyrus for probe than 
irrelevant items. No differences were found in the ACC. However, these results can be 
confounded by differential intrinsic properties of probe and irrelevant items, since there 
was no counterbalancing of stimuli between participants. Furthermore, no control group 
with uninformed participants was used in these studies. In this thesis, proper 
counterbalancing of stimuli and a control condition with uninformed participants were 
used (see Study 3 and 4).  
 In another study, Nose, Murai, and Taira (2009) used a CIT paradigm based on 
playing cards and included a control group with no concealed knowledge. Compared 
with irrelevant items, the probe showed stronger activation in the bilateral VLPFC, left 
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IFG, right middle frontal gyrus and right IPL, but no difference was found in the ACC. 
Also, no differences were found between probe and irrelevant items in the control group. 
The right VLPFC, the most robust difference between with and without concealed 
information, was attributed to the need to inhibit recognition that may reveal knowledge 
of the probe. Another CIT study used dates as stimuli (Ganis et al., 2011) where 
participants were instructed to lie about their date of birth (probe). A control condition 
(no-knowledge) was included, within-subject where only irrelevant and target dates 
were presented. Numerous areas showed stronger activation for probe than irrelevant 
items in the concealed knowledge condition, including bilateral VLPFC, bilateral 
medPFC, ACC, middle cingulate gyrus and bilateral IPL. The medPFC and VLPFC 
showed the most robust differences, which was interpreted as memory retrieval and 
novelty detection processes.  
 The fundamental mechanism underlying the CIT to detect concealed knowledge is 
based on the orienting response (OR). However, fMRI studies have shown that another 
mechanism might contribute to the CIT effect, which is response inhibition, as several 
studies have found more neural activity in the rIFG (e.g., Gamer et al., 2007; Gamer et 
al., 2009; Ganis et al., 2011; Nose et al., 2009; Phan et al., 2005). The rIFG is 
considered an area crucially involved in inhibitory processes as it has been consistently 
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found in traditional response inhibition tasks (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004, 2014; 
Derrfuss, Brass, Neumann, & Von Cramon, 2005; Kelly et al., 2004). To directly 
examine the effect of response inhibition in the CIT, Suchotzki, Verschuere, Peth, 
Crombez, and Gamer (2015) instructed participants to admit knowledge of half of the 
mock crime-related probe items and deny the other half and compared the neural 
activities between deny and admit condition. They found that activation in the rIFG was 
significantly larger when deception was involved in (i.e., deny condition). Thus, it 
indicated that response inhibition is a crucial mechanism that drives the blood oxygen 
level dependent activity (BOLD) responding to concealed information. In addition, 
Suchotzki et al. (2015) also manipulated the proportion of probe versus irrelevant items 
(1:1 vs. 1:4) and found that the BOLD CIT effect was more robust in the 1:4 condition 
compared with 1:1 condition. To attain the largest effect, the 1:4 proportion of probe 
versus irrelevant items was used in this thesis (Study 3 & 4).   
 The accuracy of fMRI-based methods is an important issue as companies have 
begun marketing fMRI-based “lie detection” services. Davatzikos et al. (2005) used 
high-dimensional non-linear pattern classification methods (support vector machines 
[SVMs]) to discriminate between patterns of entire brain associated with lie and truth. 
99% of the true and false responses were discriminated correctly and predictive 
	 29 
accuracy assessed by cross-validation (leave 1% out from training a classifier) showed 
88% accuracy. Monteleone et al. (2009) conducted one-out single-participant analyses 
and found that the medPFC had the best classification between deceptive and honest 
cases, which could identify 71% of participants as lying with no false alarms. Nose et al. 
(2009) performed a one-out cross-validation analysis based on the activation of the right 
VLPFC and they could classify individuals with and without concealed information 
with 84% accuracy. Ganis et al. (2011) used a one-out approach and linear SVMs based 
on the three regions (i.e., the left and right VLPFC and medPFC) and showed 100% 
accuracy to discriminate concealed knowledge and non-concealed knowledge cases. 
Langleben et al. (2016) directly compared the accuracy between fMRI and polygraph 
experts in a within-subjects study. Using a logistic regression, they found that fMRI 
experts were 24% more likely to detect the concealed information than the polygraph 
experts.  
Countermeasures in the CIT paradigms 
Despite the relative accuracy of neuroscience-based methods in detecting 
concealed knowledge, poor specificity is a big issue when applying these methods to the 
real world. For the ERP-based method, the P300 (the key index used to detect concealed 
knowledge) is elicited by any type salient and infrequent stimuli. In other words, P300 
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enhancement is not only produced by concealed information in the CITs, and so usually 
it can be susceptible to simple countermeasures. For example, Rosenfeld et al. (2004) 
used covert physical acts (e.g., imperceptibly pressing the left forefinger on the leg to an 
irrelevant item) as countermeasures and hit rates dropped from 82% to 18%. Additional 
ERP research on countermeasure will be discussed further in Study 3. 
For the fMRI-based method, a meta-analysis encompassing all CIT studies to 
date (Ganis et al., in preparation) found stronger activation for concealed knowledge 
(i.e., the difference between probe and irrelevant items) in a network of regions similar 
to that found in the deception meta-analyses discussed earlier, including the bilateral 
IFG/insular cortex, the ACC, and bilateral IPL. These activated regions are not specific 
for concealing information, as they overlapped with those found in meta-analyses of 
executive processes: similar brain activation patterns can be generated by cognitive 
processes that have nothing to do with concealing information. This poor specificity 
makes the fMRI methods potentially vulnerable to countermeasures as well. Indeed, a 
previous fMRI study with the CIT using the participant’s date of birth as the probe 
found reliable effects of countermeasures (Ganis et al., 2011). The countermeasure used 
in this study was training participants in associating specific covert actions with specific 
irrelevant items (e.g., imperceptibly wiggling the left index finger upon seeing the first 
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irrelevant item). The accuracy for detecting deception was 100% without 
countermeasures, but the accuracy for classification dropped to 33% (4 out of 12) when 
using the countermeasures. The effect of countermeasure on fMRI methods to detect 
concealed knowledge will be discussed further in Study 4. 
Given that these countermeasures can be implemented easily, additional 
research is needed to examine the vulnerability of neuroimaging methods to various 
countermeasures before these methods can start to be used to detect deception in the 
real world. This thesis addressed this question by conducting two studies to examine 
how a novel mental countermeasure affects the validity of neuroimaging methods to 
detect concealed information. The effect of mental countermeasures on P300 amplitude 
was examined in Study 3, and on fMRI activation in Study 4.  
 
Deception and Creativity 
As mentioned earlier, although most lies are not serious, deception sometimes 
can cause serious consequences and bring high costs for individuals and society. Thus, 
the topic of deception has attracted a lot of attention and investment among law 
enforcement, polygraphers and forensic psychologists. Although there is a rich literature 
on how people tell lies and detect them in others, the role of individual differences in 
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deceptive abilities have not been sufficiently investigated. Following up on recent 
research suggesting a bidirectional link between dishonesty and creativity (Gino & 
Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014), this thesis aimed at exploring the role of 
creative cognition in deceptive communication.  
People are expected to tell the truth all the time; thus, being dishonest involves 
breaking this social rule. On the other hand, to be creative, one must break standard 
rules to take advantage of existing opportunities, or to create new ones (Brenkert, 2009). 
Given that both dishonesty and creativity encompass rule breaking, these two abilities 
may facilitate each other. Indeed, there are many examples of “malevolent creativity” 
from the history of warfare by implementing innovative tactics and technologies in 
order to achieve victory. A number of examples in organizational settings also showed 
“negative creativity” by finding novel ways of stealing from a company. These creative 
activities are beneficial to one group but not another. This concept can also be applied 
to terrorism where terrorists create surprising products that are effective in achieving 
their goals (Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2008). A novel act of terror can be regarded 
as creative, despite the fact that the results do not benefit our common good.  
Recently, some empirical studies have provided evidence for this link between 
dishonesty and creativity. Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) conducted five experiments 
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where participants had the opportunity to behave dishonestly by overreporting their 
performance on various tasks and then they completed several tasks designed to 
measure creativity. One of their experiments included two supposedly unrelated tasks: a 
computer-based math-and-logic game and the Remote Associate Test (RAT). In the first 
task, participants were randomly assigned to either the control or the likely-cheating 
condition. In the control condition, participants completed the task without further 
instructions. In the like-cheating condition, participants were told that the computer had 
a programming glitch where the correct answer would appear on the screen unless they 
stopped it from being displayed by pressing the space bar right after the problem 
appeared. The experimenter also informed participants that they should try to be honest 
and solve the problems on their own although no one would be able to tell whether they 
had pressed the space bar or not. In reality, the “glitch” was a feature of the program 
and the number of space-bar presses was recorded and used as a measure of cheating. 
After the math-and-logic game, participants completed 12 RAT problems, which 
measured creativity by assessing people’s ability to identify associations between words. 
For example, each problem consists of a set of three words (e.g., sore, shoulder, sweat), 
and participants have to find a word that is logically linked to them (cold). The results 
showed that most participants (51 out of 53) cheated in the likely-cheating condition 
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and their RAT performance (M = 6.20, SD = 2.72) was higher than those in the control 
condition (M = 4.65, SD = 2.98), t(97) = 2.71, p = .008. These results demonstrated that 
cheating increased creativity in a subsequent task.  
In another study, Gino and Ariely (2012) used multiple measures of creativity as 
well as various tasks to provide participants with the opportunity to cheat. They found 
that a positive correlation between creative personality and the level of dishonesty. 
Participants’ intelligence was also measured but no link was found between creativity 
and intelligence or between dishonesty and intelligence. Another experiment of Gino 
and Ariely (2012) examined whether activating a creative mindset temporarily can 
promote dishonest behavior by randomly assigning participants to either a 
creative-mindset or a control condition. All participants completed a scrambled sentence 
test where they had to construct grammatically correct four-word sentences (e.g., “The 
sky is blue”) from a set of five randomly positioned words (e.g., sky, is, the, why, blue). 
In the creative-mindset condition, 60% of words related to creativity (e.g., creative, 
original, novel, new, etc.), but no words related to creativity in the control condition. 
Subsequently, participants completed one problem-solving task allowing them to 
overstate their performance. The results showed that people who were primed to think 
creatively were more likely to behave dishonestly than those in the control condition.   
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A study on malevolent creativity conducted by Beaussart, Andrews, and 
Kaufman (2013) showed a negative link between behavioral integrity and creativity. 
The result showed that more creative individuals would tend to receive the reward 
immediately without completing the task, rather than go back and complete the task 
even though they could have received the reward without doing so. In addition, one 
recent study has shown a robust positive relationship between broad foreign experiences 
and immoral behavior across a variety of cultural populations using multiple methods, 
including longitudinal, correlational, and experimental (Lu et al., 2017). They suggested 
that foreign experiences enhance cognitive flexibility and creativity that lead to immoral 
behavior by increasing moral relativism, i.e., the belief that morality is relative rather 
than absolute.  
Thus, previous work has shown that breaking rules may be the root of both 
dishonest behavior and creative performance. However, the potential link between 
deceptive communication (i.e., the ability to generate lies and to detect lies) and 
creativity remains unknown. As creative thinking allows individuals to be flexible 
(Runco, 2004) and to adapt ideas according to the context in order to achieve an original 
and suitable solution (Brophy, 1998, 2001), creative cognition may facilitate generating 
lies by enabling them to flexibly build connections between previously unassociated 
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elements. Thus, people with higher creativity may generate more plausible and 
convincing lies. On the other hand, creativity has been found to be related to “leaky 
attention”, meaning that some information from non-attended sources leaks in and is 
processed (Zabelina, Saporta, & Beeman, 2015). Thus, creative cognition may facilitate 
detecting lies using behavioural cues as well by filtering out fewer deceptive cues, 
enabling people to detect lies in others more accurately. These hypotheses will be 
examined mainly in Study 1.  
 
Summary 
 This introduction reviewed general cognitive processes underlying deception, 
including cognitive control and social cognitive processes, especially from the 
perspective of neuroscience. Moreover, the bidirectional link between dishonesty and 
creativity was discussed providing the rationale for an individual differences approach 
to investigate the potential overlap between processes involved in deceptive 
communication and creative cognition. This was done in Study 1 by using a socially 
interactive setting involving cued and uncued lies.  
Paradigms used to examine deception were also reviewed and subdivided 
according to two categories. One category of paradigms is used to investigate and 
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understand the cognitive and neural basis of deception employing instructed/cued and 
spontaneous/uncued lies. Study 2 examined the neural activities underlying uncued 
deception in an interactive setting.  
The other category of paradigms is used is to detect the presence of guilty 
knowledge in a person’s memory and focuses on the applied end. Studies 3 and 4 aimed 
at examining the vulnerability of concealed information paradigm, which requires cued 
lying, when applying mental countermeasures using ERP and fMRI methodologies 
respectively, and determining the role of creativity in countermeasure use (see these 
chapters for specific hypotheses).   
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1 – What Role Does Creative Cognition Play in  
Deceptive Communication? 
 
Introduction 
This behavioural study aimed at measuring the individual differences in the ability 
to generate lies and to detect lies in a socially interactive setting involving cued and 
uncued lies and at determining how creative cognition contributes to these abilities.  
Creative thinking allows individuals to solve problems in novel ways (Mumford & 
Gustafson, 1988) and to be flexible in order to cope with changes in their daily lives 
(Runco, 2004). Researchers have explored many cognitive processes important for 
creative cognition. Divergent thinking has been identified as one main component 
underlying creative performance and it refers to the ability of individuals to develop 
original ideas and to find multiple solutions to a given problem (Sternberg, 1999). 
Convergent thinking has also been reported as one cognitive process in creativity 
(Brophy, 2001; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992; Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997) and it 
involves judging and adapting ideas in order to achieve an original and appropriate 
solution (Brophy, 1998, 2001). Creative thinking entails thinking outside the box 
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(Runco, 2010) and it requires people to break standard rules within a domain to build 
associations between previously unassociated cognitive elements (Guilford, 1950). 
Breaking the rules and unusual mental associations can lead to novel ideas (Sternberg, 
1988), but in the social domain it can also lead to dishonesty: being dishonest requires 
breaking the social norm that one should be honest all the time.  
Recent research has provided evidence for a bidirectional link between creative 
behaviour and dishonesty because they both share this rule-breaking feature. In a study 
by Gino and Ariely (2012), more creative individuals tended to cheat more in laboratory 
tasks than less creative individuals. In addition, dishonest behaviour could be increased 
by priming participants to think creatively. Conversely, Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) 
found that individuals who cheated in a task were subsequently more creative than 
non-cheaters, even after taking into account individual differences in their creative 
ability. They also confirmed this link by randomly assigning participants to either the 
likely-cheating or the control condition. In the likely-cheating condition, a fake 
programming glitch allowed participants to see the correct answer during a 
math-and-logic game unless they stopped it from being displayed by pressing the space 
bar. The results support the idea that acting dishonestly leads to greater creativity in 
subsequent tasks. However, the potential role of creative cognition on the ability to 
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generate lies and to detect them in others remains unknown. The main aim of this study 
was to investigate for the first time the relationship between creative cognition and 
deceptive communication, that is, the generation and detection of lies.  
Developing a plausible lie requires cognitive resources to flexibly retrieve and 
manipulate episodic and semantic memories within the ongoing social context (Sip et al., 
2008). Creative cognition may facilitate generating lies by enabling liars to flexibly 
restructure knowledge in different ways depending on the changing situational demands. 
Thus, creative individuals may be able to construct more creative and plausible 
deceptive scenarios. Creative cognition may also facilitate detecting lies by means of 
behavioural cues. People’s ability to detect lies by using behavioural cues is just slightly 
better than chance on average, with only 54% of truths and lies being correctly classified 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). One reason for this is that cues to deception are typically 
weak and unreliable (DePaulo et al., 2003), so people overlook them easily or rely on 
stereotypical beliefs about deceptive cues that typically lead to poor lie detection 
performance. Creative cognition could facilitate detecting lies by enabling people to 
filter out fewer cues, and to rely less on stereotypical beliefs (Zabelina, Saporta, & 
Beeman, 2016).  
Wright, Berry, and Bird (2012) proposed the existence of a “deception-general 
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ability” by showing a significant positive correlation between the ability to generate and 
detect lies across people: in their study, better liars were also better at detecting lies. 
Thus, the second aim of the current study was to determine whether creative cognition 
might contribute to both generating and detecting lies, possibly accounting for the 
reported link between the ability to generate and to detect lies. Finding common effects 
of creative cognition on deception generation and detection would provide further 
evidence that they are two facets of a single deception-general ability. On the other hand, 
finding that creative cognition affects only deception generation or deception detection 
would provide evidence against the existence of such a deception-general ability.  
In order to measure individual differences in both generating and detecting lies 
under an interactive and real-life environment, we implemented a group-based 
competitive deception game based on Wright et al. (2012): the Deceptive Interaction 
Task (DeceIT) where controversial topics were used as stimuli (e.g., “Smoking should 
be banned in all public places”) and participants were required to make both truthful 
and deceptive statements about each topic. In this paradigm, groups of 5 participants 
competed with each other in both generating lies (“Sender”) and detecting lies 
(“Receiver”) so that both deceptive abilities could be simultaneously evaluated within 
participants. High-value prizes for the best performers in generating and detecting lies 
	 42 
were given out in order to enhance participants’ motivation.  
In order to measure a person’s ability to generate and to detect lies 
comprehensively, instead of using a single category of stimuli (i.e., controversial topics), 
our interactive deception game required participants to use their deceptive skills in three 
different domains: personal opinions using questions about controversial topics, 
personal experiences using episodic memory questions, and emotions using emotional 
photos. Participants’ overall deceptive abilities were measured using combined results 
across these domains. Moreover, to enable participants to take the initiative in engaging 
in the deception task rather than being passive in receiving the cues (i.e., either tell a lie 
or a truth according to a cue), on some trials participants were allowed to choose 
whether they lied or told the truth (we will refer to these spontaneous lies as uncued 
lies). This design also allowed us to assess the relationship between frequency of 
uncued lies and the ability to generate believable lies and to answer the question of 
whether people are inclined to tell more lies if they are good at lying.  
We used two creativity measures, the Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) 
and the Remote Associate Test (RAT). The CAQ is based on the sum of creative 
products generated by an individual throughout their lifetime. Creative achievement 
seems to be facilitated by a confluence of factors, including the capacity for divergent 
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thinking, imagination, intelligence, confidence, nonconformity and the ability to 
provide practical support (Amabile, 1996; Eysenck, 1995; Ludwig, 1995). The other 
measure, the RAT, was developed as a mean to measure creativity without requiring 
knowledge specific to any fields (Mednick, 1962). In this test, sets of three words are 
provided and participants have to find the solution associated with the three words (e.g., 
the three problem words “Dew/Comb/bee” are associated with the solution “Honey”). 
The RAT assesses associative abilities related to creativity and problem-solving. For the 
two creativity measures in the current study, the CAQ is an index of divergent thinking 
as the CAQ score has been found to be positively correlated with all facets (i.e., 
diversity, fluency, originality and flexibility) of divergent thinking (Carson, Peterson, & 
Higgins, 2005). On the other hand, the RAT is an index of convergent thinking as 
several reference suggested recently (Arden, Chavez, Grazioplene, & Jung, 2010; 
Benedek, Könen, & Neubauer, 2012; Kaufman, Kaufman, & Lichtenberger, 2011; 
Nielsen, Pickett, & Simonton, 2008). Indeed, success on the RAT is determined by 
whether the problem solver can identify the single and correct solution that meets the 
definition of convergent thinking (i.e., discerning which ideas are most appropriate or of 
highest quality and come up with a single and correct solution (Brophy, 2001; Guilford, 
1967).   
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We expected to see a positive relationship between different aspects of creative 
cognition and the abilities to generate and detect lies. In addition, better liars were 
expected to choose to tell more lies than worse liars when given the choice to lie or not, 
as people would feel more confident to use the skill if they were good at it. Finally, we 
expected to replicate the main finding by Wright et al. (2012), that is, a positive 
correlation between the ability to generate and detect lies, and that both abilities would 
be equally affected by creative cognition.  
 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
98 healthy native English speakers (66 females, 32 males, Mean age = 20.6 years, 
range: 18-35) without any difficulties in reading (i.e., no dyslexia) were recruited from 
the student population at Plymouth University, UK, and were either paid 8 pounds/hour 
for participating or received course credit. Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. The full subject information and consent form is presented in Appendix 2A. 
The study was approved by the Faculty of Health and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee.  
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Materials 
Once participants were recruited, they completed an “Opinion Survey (OS)” online 
questionnaire, which included ten controversial topics, such as “Should we stop doing 
medical experiment on animals?” Participants responded “agree” or “disagree” on a 
6-point scale and wrote down the reasons for their choice. These controversial topics 
were used as stimuli in the Opinion Survey (OS) task. All OS topics are presented in 
Appendix 2B. Just prior to the interactive deception game, participants answered ten 
questions about recent episodes from the daily life, such as “What did you do last 
weekend?” on paper. The ten questions were used as stimuli in the Episodic Memory 
Survey (EMS) task. All EMS topics are presented in Appendix 2B. In the Emotional 
Photos Description (EPD) task, twelve photos were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). Half of them were chosen 
to induce pleasant emotions (valence: 7.40 (±0.48); arousal: 6.54 (±0.86)) and the other 
half to induce unpleasant emotions (valence: 1.96 (±0.35); arousal: 6.83 (±0.36)).  
In a second session, after the interaction deception game, participants completed 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999), creativity tests, i.e., 
Remote Associate Test (RAT) (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003), the Creativity 
Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson et al., 2005), and two psychometric tests, 
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the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1992), and the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983). The details of each 
test/questionnaire are described next.  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI): The WASI (Wechsler, 1999) 
consists of four subtests: Vocabulary, Block Design, Similarities and Matrix Reasoning. 
This test was administered in about 30 minutes and testing time varied between subjects 
according to their performance.  
Remote Associate Test (RAT): Mednick (1962) developed the Remote Associate 
Test (RAT) as a mean to measure creativity without requiring knowledge specific to any 
field. In this test, participants have to find a unique solution that is related to all three 
words provided. The relationship type can vary, including synonym, formation of a 
word, or semantic association. Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) created 144 items with 
a uniform way to approach the solution – formation of a compound word/phrase. For 
example, the three problem words “Manners/Round/Tennis” are associated with the 
solution “Table”. We selected 105 out of 144 items in Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) 
excluding 39 items with solving rate of 1% or less in 2 seconds according to the 
Appendix in Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003). There were four solution time limits (2, 
7, 15 and 30 seconds) in Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) study. They found a 0.93 
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correlation between the percentage of participants producing solutions at 2 and 7 
seconds. In order to minimizing testing time, we used 2 seconds as the solution time 
limit in the current study.  
    Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ): The CAQ is based on the sum of 
creative products generated by an individual throughout her/his lifetime. This CAQ 
self-report checklist consists 10 different areas of talents with total 96 items. Each ten 
standard domains or art (visual arts, music, dance, creative writing, architectural design, 
humor, and theatre and film) and science (culinary arts, inventions and scientific inquiry) 
contains eight ranked questions weighted with a score from 0 to 7. Participants are 
asked to place a checkmark on the description fitting their achievement best. 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS): This TAS-20 self-report scale with 20 items 
measures the ability to identify and describe emotions in the self. Alexithymia refers to 
a condition in which people have trouble identifying and describing emotions and tend 
to minimize emotional experience and focus on attention externally. Items are rated 
using a 5-point Likert scale and the sum of responses to all 20 items is the total 
alexithymia score. The TAS-20 uses cutoff scoring: a score equal to or less than 51 is 
classified as non-alexithymia, a score equal to or greater than 61 is classified as 
alexithymia, and scores between 52 and 60 are classified as possible alexithymia.  
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    Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI): This 28-item scale measures empathy, 
defined as the reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of another (Davis, 
1983). This scale is answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Does not describe 
me well” to “Describe me very well”. There are four subscales with 7 different items for 
each (taken directly from Davis, 1983): Perspective taking – the tendency to 
spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others; Fantasy – taps 
respondents’ tendencies to transpose themselves imaginatively into the feelings and 
actions of fictitious characters in books, movies, and plays; Empathic concern – 
assesses “other-oriented” feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate others; 
Personal distress – measures “self-oriented” feelings of personal anxiety and unease in 
tense interpersonal settings.  
 As the TAS and the IRI scales provide self- and other-focused measures of 
emotional intelligence (Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2001), we were able to examine 
whether emotional intelligence would contribute the ability to generate lies by 
manipulating emotions to construct more convincing lies and to detect lies by 
understanding emotions in others to make a correct judgement.  
 
Procedure 
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In the first session, participants were recruited in groups of five for a 
“Communication Skills Study” (except for two groups of four participants due to 
logistical reasons), with the constraint that people within the same group should not be 
acquainted with each other before the experiment. The reason for this requirement was 
to ensure participants did not know each other’s background. This check was carried out 
through emails or text messages. At the beginning of the recruitment, in order to prevent 
preparation of lies before coming to the experiment, participants were told they would 
take part in a “Communication Skills” study instead of a “Deception Study”. Each 
participant was assigned a number from one to five, which would become his or her 
identifier during the game. Participants took turns in making true or false statements as 
Senders while the other four people acted as Receivers, and were instructed to judge 
whether the Sender was making true or false statements. Each group completed three 
tasks. All participants in a group served as Senders in one task before moving on to the 
next task. The order of tasks for each group was counterbalanced.  
The three tasks (OS, EMS and EPD) were presented using E-Prime 2.0. On each 
trial, the Sender sat in front of the rest of the group (the four Receivers) and watched a 
computer screen. A cue (i.e., the word ‘Truth’, ‘Lie’ and ‘Choice’) was presented for 
one second before each question or photo. For the OS and EMS tasks, a question 
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appeared on the screen word by word, with each word presented for 300 milliseconds 
(ms) to equalize reading time across participants. For the EPD task, a photo appeared in 
the middle of the screen for 1500 ms. The sender had to make a true or false statement 
according to the given cue (Truth or Lie). When presented with the ‘Choice’ cue, 
Senders could freely choose whether to tell the truth or a lie. After seeing a question or 
an emotional photo, Senders were instructed to speak for up to 20 seconds (in the OS 
and EMS task) or 10 seconds (in the EPD task) as soon as they were ready. Next, 
Receivers judged whether the Sender told the truth or lied. In total, across the three 
tasks (10 Truth, 10 Lie, and 12 Choice cues), each participant completed 32 trials (10 
for OS, 10 for EMS and 12 for EPD) as Sender. Every question and photo was shown 
only once for each participant to avoid any potential effects of repetition.  
Participants were instructed to appear as credible as possible as Senders, regardless 
of whether they told the truth or lied. In order to further engage participants, monetary 
incentives were offered to the best performers in the Sender and Receiver roles (£30 for 
the first place; £20 for the second place; £10 for the third place).  
Before each task started, all Senders had 2 practice trials for the OS and EMS tasks, 
and 4 trials for the EPD task. In the first practice trial of the OS and EMS tasks, Senders 
were shown a verbatim example of a response to illustrate the type of statement 
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required (OS: “I support immigration. Immigrants usually come from poor regions. 
They can find a better life in a more developed country. People in well-developed 
countries should have more empathy for the poor and give them a chance to have a 
better life”; EMS: “The best trip I have ever had was when I took a boat to a small 
island with my family. This small island was beautiful. We saw many landscapes and 
enjoyed a lot of fresh food cooked by the local residents. The weather was very sunny 
during those days”), and they generated their own statement in the second practice trial. 
In the EPD task, Senders were presented with 2 practice trials of pleasant photos and 2 
of unpleasant photos. In the first pleasant and the first unpleasant photo, the Sender was 
presented with a verbatim example of a response and they generated their own 
statement in the second photo.  
Participants came back to attend the second session individually for the WASI, the 
four questionnaires (TAS, IRI, and CAQ), and the computer-based RAT task. 
 
Data collection and analysis  
Performance during the Sender and Receiver roles were analyzed using Signal 
Detection Theory, SDT (Green & Swets, 1966). SDT allows lie-truth discriminability 
(ď) to be measured independently of judgment bias (C). SDT measures for Sender and 
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Receiver roles were calculated separately. These measures can be used when there are 
unequal proportions of lie and truth statements to be classified. For the Sender, a ”hit” 
(H) can be defined as a “truth” statement correctly judged as the truth, and a “false 
alarm” (FA) can be defined as a “lie” statement incorrectly judged as the truth. For the 
Receiver, a “hit” can be defined as a correct “lie” classification to a lie statement, and a 
“false alarm” can be defined as a incorrect “lie” classification to a truth statement. The 
discriminability of the Sender’s truths and lies is indexed by ďSender and the 
corresponding measure of bias, CSender, indicates the perceived credibility of a Sender 
regardless of the veracity. For the Receiver, ďReceiver indicates the capacity of 
discriminating lies from truths whereas the corresponding measure of bias, CReceiver 
indexes the tendency for a Receiver to endorse a given statement as truthful (credulity). 
The calculation of each parameter is described in the Figure 2-1 (From Figure 1, Wright 
et al., 2012). The SDT supposes that both lie and truth are normally (Gaussian) 
distributed with the same variance (i.e., the equal variance assumption). The 
discriminability (ď) is defined as the separation between the two means expressed in 
units of their common standard deviation. 
With these indices, more successful deception as a Sender role is indicated by 
more negative values of ďSender and better lie detection as a Receiver role is indicated by 
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more positive values of ďReceiver. For the judgment bias (C), appearing more credible 
regardless of the veracity as a Sender role is indicated by more negative values of CSender, 
whereas showing more truth bias as a Receiver is indicated by more positive values of 
CReceiver.  
Deceptive abilities are quantified by ďSender and ďReceiver, where ďSender represents 
the ability to generate credible lies whereas ďReceiver represents the ability to detect lies 
in others. 
 
Figure 2-1. Parameters for Sender and Receiver based on Signal Detection theory (SDT) 
(original resource: Figure 1, Wright et al. (2012))  
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Results 
We collected data from 98 participants during the first session. Data from 97 of 
these participants was collected in the second session. During the analyses, it became 
clear that two participants did not understand the rules of the game (for example, they 
did not follow the cues to tell the truth or to lie in the interactive deception game), and 
so they were excluded. One participant was excluded because of a stammering problem. 
One outlier identified by more than three times the standard deviations in CAQ scores 
was also excluded. Therefore, the final analyses are based on 93 participants.  
 
Deceptive abilities  
Individual differences in deceptive abilities were examined by SDT analysis with 
four performance measures: M ďSender = 0.463, SD = 0.322; M CSender = -0.329, SD = 
0.164; M ďReceiver = 0.441, SD = 0.254; M CReceiver = 0.336, SD = 0.191 (see Table 2-1). 
In the choice condition, participants told the truth much more frequently than they lied 
(M = 9.0, SD = 2.6 vs M = 3.0, SD = 2.6, respectively), a significant difference, t(92) = 
11.037, p < .001, d = 1.14. Fourteen participants (15%) never lied in this condition.    
Receiver performance was analyzed using conventional percentage accuracy rates, 
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and overall accuracy was 60.2% (SD = 5.0%). This accuracy rate is significantly greater 
than chance (t(92) = 19.791, p < .001, d = 2.05), but also significantly greater than the 
54% reported in previous work (t(92) = 12.046, p < .001, d = 1.25) (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006). Fractional rates addressing accuracy for different types of statement showed a 
significantly higher mean accuracy for truths (M = 70.7%, SD = 7.3%) than for lies (M 
= 45.5%, SD = 9.3%, t(92) = 17.485, p < .001, d = 1.81). The percentage of statements 
of all types classified by Receivers as truthful was 64.2% (SD = 6.6%), significantly 
greater than chance (t(92) = 20.586, p < .001, d = 2.13).  
Due to a technical problem, we were unable to record the response latency from 
participants of the last 10 groups. Response latency from the first 47 participants was 
1252 ms (SD = 399) when they told the truth and 1306 (SD= 489) when they told the 
lies, but this difference was not significant (t(45) = -1.014, p = .316).  
 
Creativity measures and cognitive tests 
Participants completed the Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) based on 
the sum of creative achievements throughout one’s lifetime and the scores were found 
as follows (see Table 2-1): expressive domain (visual arts, writing and humor) of CAQ 
(M = 4.86, SD = 4.70); performance domain (dance, drama and music) of CAQ (M = 
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3.86, SD = 6.37); science domain (invention, science and culinary) of CAQ (M = 2.27, 
SD = 3.09). In the other creativity test, RAT, based on the ability of associating remote 
words quickly (2 seconds), participants answered 9.14 out of 105 items on average 
(range 0-29) (see Table 2-1).   
The average score of Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) was 
109.82 (SD = 9.86). The average score of Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS), a measure 
of the degree to which emotions can be identified and described by the individual, was 
49.54 (SD = 10.61) with 16 (17.2%) participants classified as alexithymic and 22 
(23.7%) participants classified as indeterminate. For the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI), a measure of empathy, the average score was 69.89 (SD = 12.41).  
 
Associations between deceptive abilities and creative cognition 
A stepwise multiple linear regression was conducted to predict participants’ ability 
to generate lies (ďSender) using 11 potential predictors (variables 2-12 in Table 2-1). The 
final model contained two of the eleven predictors and was statistically significant, F(2, 
90) = 6.530, p < .005, with an R2 = .127 and an adjusted R2 = .107 (see Table 2-2): 
Choice-Lie and CAQ-performance. The regression equation is shown in the legend of 
Figure 2-2. Both variables were negatively correlated with the ability to generate lies 
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(d’sender), indicating that individuals with higher scores on these variables tended to have 
better ability to generate lies (the more negative the d’sender and the better the Sender is 
at deceiving). The number of lies told when given a choice (Choice-Lie) had the largest 
weight, followed by CAQ-performance. 
 
Table 2-1. Descriptive statistics  
Variable Measure Mean ± SD 
Deceptive 
abilities 
1. d’sender 0.463 ± 0.321 
2. Csender -0.329 ± 0.164 
3. d’receiver 0.441 ± 0.254 
4. Creceiver 0.336 ± 0.191 
5. Choice-Liea 3.04 ± 2.56 
Creativity tests 6. CAQ-expressiveb 4.86 ± 4.70 
7. CAQ-performancec 3.86 ± 6.37 
8. CAQ-scientificd 2.27 ± 3.09 
9. RATe 9.14 ± 6.20 
Intelligence  10.WASIfFull-IQ 109.82 ± 9.86 
Psychometric 
tests 
11.TASg 49.54 ± 10.61 
 12.IRIh 69.89 ±12.41 
aThe number of lies told when given the choice; bthe Creativity Achievement Questionnaire, expressive 
domain score; cThe Creativity Achievement Questionnaire, performance domain score; dThe Creativity 
Achievement Questionnaire, scientific domain score; eRemote Associate test score; fWASI = Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; gToronto Alexithymia Scale; hInterpersonal Reactivity Index; 
iMarlowCrowne Social Desirability scale 
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Table 2-2. Summary correlations and results from the stepwise regression analysis results 
Variables Correlation with 
d’Sender 
Multiple regression 
weights 
  b β 
d’Sender    
Choice-Liea -.279** -0.036** -.287 
CAQ-performancec -.211* -0.011* -.221 
Note. The dependent variable was d’Sender, R2 = .127 and Adjusted R2 = .107;  
* p< .05; ** p< .01 
 
Figure 2-2. Sender’s performance was predicted by the number of lies told when given a 
choice (Choice-Lie) and by CAQ-performance using this equation: Predicted d’sender = 
(-0.036 x Choice-Lie) + (-0.011 x CAQ-performance) + 0.616 (R2 = .127)  
 
 
A second stepwise regression analysis was conducted to predict participants’ 
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replaced d’receiver as a predictor). However, none of the variables survived the stepwise 
regression analysis. To confirm the specificity of the regression model found for 
generating lies, we used it also to try to predict lie detection ability. Results showed that 
the regression model for predicting lie generation ability did not predict lie detection 
ability (R2 = .003, Figure 2-3).  
In sum, higher lying ability is associated with telling more lies when given the 
choice to do so and with a higher performance score on the creativity achievement 
questionnaire, whereas the ability to detect lies is not associated with any of the 
potential predictors.  
 
Figure 2-3. Receiver’s performance was not predicted by the regression model that 
successfully predicted Sender’s performance using this equation: Predicted d’receiver = 
(-0.036 x Choice-Lie) + (-0.011 x CAQ-performance) + 0.616 (R2 = .003)  
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Next, we examined the relationship between the ability to generate lies (d’sender) 
and the ability to detect lies (d’receiver) in our dataset, as done in previous studies (Wright 
et al., 2012; Wright, Berry, Catmur, & Bird, 2015). There were no hints of a correlation 
between these two abilities (r = -.099, p = .345, see Figure 2-4). Moreover, in order to 
directly compare our findings with previous results, an additional correlation analysis 
between these two deception abilities was carried out using data from the Opinion 
Survey task only, excluding Choice cue trials. Again, there was no correlation between 
generating and detecting lies (r = .003, p = .973, see Figure 2-5).  
 
Figure 2-4. Correlation between Sender and Receiver’s performance using SDT 
measures (r = -.099, p = .345). 
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Figure 2-5. Correlation between Sender and Receiver’s performance using SDT 
measures in Opinion Survey (OS) task without Choice cue (r = .003, p = .973). 
 
 
Discussion 
Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of being creative for 
individuals, organizations and society. For example, investments in creativity and 
innovation can enhance organizational performance (Lev, 2004). Creative thinking 
helps us manage our daily life and generate novel ideas to solve problems. This study 
investigated another, possibly less positive side of creativity, by examining the 
contribution of different aspects of creative cognition to deceptive communication.  
The finding of a positive association between the ability to generate lies and 
real-world creative achievement suggests that creative cognition shares some processes 
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with deceptive communication. Creative cognition (especially divergent thinking), 
thinking outside the box and building links between previously unassociated elements, 
may facilitate generating credible lies. Furthermore, the ability to generate lies is 
significantly correlated with creative achievement in the performance domain (i.e. 
dance, drama and music) and not in the expressive or science domains. This indicates 
that creative individuals in the different domains may show different aspects of creative 
dispositions, and this has been supported by previous studies. For example, Feist (1998) 
conducted a meta-analysis and found that creative people in art and science exhibit 
different personality traits. Consistent with this, Silvia, Kaufman, and Pretz (2009) 
found three latent groups (i.e., a visual arts class, a performing arts class and a no 
creativity class) in the CAQ (n = 749) using latent class analysis. They suggested that 
the classes were meaningful by showing a significantly higher openness personality trait 
in the visual art and performing arts class, but a higher extraversion trait only in the 
performing arts class. Our findings also support this idea that creative individuals in the 
arts (especially in performance) and the sciences display different traits and different 
cognitive abilities. Here, we demonstrated that more creative individuals in the 
performance domain may be better at restructuring knowledge in multiple different 
ways to generate convincing lies with their higher imaginative ability. Also, being good 
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at performance, such as dance, acting and music, may make it easier for a person to 
control their body language and hide deceptive cues.  
The most significant variable to predict participants’ ability to generate convincing 
lies in the regression model is the number of lies told when given the choice to do so 
(Choice-Lie). In other words, individuals who are good at generating plausible lies, 
choose to tell more lies when they are allowed to do so. One interpretation of this 
finding is that senders with a high d’ may already know they are good at telling lies, and 
they may feel confident enough to choose to deceive others more often. Future studies 
can investigate whether these individuals also tell more lies in real life. If individuals 
with higher d’ also show higher frequency of lying in their real life, it is possible that 
daily engagement in lying leads them to performing better also when lying in a 
laboratory study, and the rewards gained by successful lies encourage them to tell more 
lies when they have the chance to do so.   
We hypothesized that creative cognition may also facilitate detecting lies by 
filtering out fewer potential deceptive cues that one could use to make the correct 
judgment. However, we failed to find any correlation between the ability of detecting 
lies and creative cognition. There are some possible reasons, described as follows. First, 
in the current interactive deception game, detecting lies required full attention 
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throughout the whole experiment where participants had to make 32 judgments for each 
of the other four participants in the group. Thus, it is possible that the ability to detect 
lies might not be measured consistently due to difficulties in maintaining concentration 
throughout the whole game. Second, one meta-analysis has shown that people are 
barely able to detect lies using behavioral cues and the accuracy of a deception 
judgment depends more on the liar than on the judge (Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2008). 
Finally, personal learning and previous experience may play a more important role in 
detecting deception than creative cognition abilities as Ekman and O'sullivan (1991) 
found that one occupational group (i.e., Secret Service) was significantly more accurate 
than all of the other groups (e.g., federal polygraphers, judges, psychiatrists, college 
students, etc.).  
The other creativity test, RAT, showed correlation with neither lying nor 
lie-detecting ability. The RAT (Mednick, 1962; Mednick & Mednick, 1967) has been 
used to examine the link between creativity and problem-solving, and it has been found 
to be related to analytical and deductive processing (e.g., intelligence, working memory 
and academic achievement) but only weakly correlated with divergent thinking scores 
(Lee, Huggins, & Therriault, 2014). In addition, there is a growing consensus that the 
RAT mainly measures convergent thinking processes (Brophy, 2001; Hommel, Todd, 
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Hills, & Robbins, 2012). The current RAT performance results are consistent with the 
evidence reported in previous studies. First, the RAT was found to be significantly 
correlated with IQ scores (r = .355, p < .001), showing that it is more likely engaged in 
analytical processes related to intelligence. Second, the RAT performance showed no 
correlation with total CAQ score, the other creativity measure. This is consistent with 
the idea that RAT performance relates to convergent thinking processes that are 
different from the cognitive processes (e.g. divergent thinking and imagination) 
essential for creative achievement (Amabile, 1996; Eysenck, 1995; Ludwig, 1995); 
indeed, it has been proposed that divergent and convergent thinking are distinct 
cognitive abilities that represent unique facets of creative cognition (Lee & Therriault, 
2013). On the other hand, creative achievement has been found to be correlated with 
divergent thinking test scores in one meta-analysis (Kim, 2008), and Plucker (1999) 
showed that divergent thinking strongly predicted creative achievements in a 
longitudinal study using structural equation modelling. The CAQ score is also 
substantially correlated with all facets (i.e., diversity, fluency, originality and flexibility) 
of divergent thinking (Carson et al., 2005). Thus, the ability to generate lies may be 
linked to divergent thinking processes captured in part by the CAQ but not by the RAT.  
 Unexpectedly, the two psychometric tests (i.e., TAS and IRI) showed contribution 
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to neither lying nor lie-detecting ability. The TAS is used to examine whether people 
have trouble identifying and describing emotions while the IRI is used to examine 
perspective taking and empathy. No correlation between the TAS and deceptive abilities 
might indicate that the capacity for manipulating emotions was not involved in the 
deceptive abilities. On the other hand, although generating credible deceptive responses 
requires theory of mind (ToM) and perspective taking, the lack of a correlation with the 
IRI might suggest that in our paradigm even relatively low levels of ToM and 
perspective taking were sufficient for people to generate credible lies. A paradigm 
requiring more complex social interactions (e.g., involving several iterations), may be 
able to capture more subtle effects of ToM and perspective taking in generating lies.  
The interactive deception game used in the current study was adapted from the 
Deceptive Interaction Task (DeceIT) by Wright et al. (2012). That study found a 
significant positive relationship between the ability to generate and detect lies, a finding 
that was replicated by Wright et al. (2015) in a later study. Based on this evidence, 
Wright et al. (2012) proposed the existence of a “deception-general ability” that would 
underlay both the ability to generate and detect lies. The authors of the study suggest 
that skills in both the generation and detection of deception would offer evolutionary 
advantages, and improvements in the ability to deceive in one species would produce 
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selective pressure for corresponding improvements in deceptive detection among 
competitors and vice versa (Bond Jr & Robinson, 1988). Under this evolutionary 
selection idea, Wright et al. (2012) proposed that improvement in either lie generation 
or detection will result in concomitant improvements in the other ability. However, this 
argument may explain parallel changes in the ability to lie and to detect lies in a 
population over time but it is not clear how it could explain the correlation between 
these two abilities across participants within a population.  
Indeed, we failed to find a significant positive correlation (or correlation at all) 
between these two deception abilities (r = -.099, p = .345, N=93) in the current study. 
Although the design and procedure was very close to that used in Wright et al. (2012) 
and had similar limitations, there were some differences that is important to discuss.  
First, in our study there were three tasks, i.e., Opinions Survey, Episodic Memory 
Survey and Emotional Photo Description, compared with only one task (Opinion 
Survey) in Wright et al. (2012, 2015). Deception abilities may vary in different domains 
and the “deceptive-general ability” may only exist mainly on opinion topics. However, 
when we analysed the deceptive abilities in the Opinion Survey task separately, there 
was still no correlation (r = .051, p = .628).  
Second, we had non-instructed lies, i.e. Choice cue in the paradigm whereas 
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Wright et al (2012, 2015) only had instructed lies. In the current study, on some trials 
participants had the choice to lie or to tell the truth, which may have affected the results. 
However, no correlation was found also when we excluded the Choice trials and 
analysed the deceptive abilities in the Opinion Survey task alone (r = .003, p = .973). 
With regard to this task design, we should note that the total numbers of truth and lies 
participants told was not even, which means that their d’s are based on different 
numbers of truths and lies judged. On the other hand, truth-bias has been widely found 
in deception studies (Anderson, Ansfield, & DePaulo, 1999; Levine, Park, & 
McCornack, 1999; McCornack, Parks, & McLaughlin, 1986), where judges tend to 
judge more messages as truths than lies. We also found a truth-bias in the current study 
(64.2%). According to Levine et al. (1999), accuracy of judgment is a positive linear 
function of the ratio of truthful messages to total messages. In other words, the more 
truthful messages the Sender told, and the more accurate the judgement by the Receiver 
due to truth-bias. Thus, in the current study, people’s higher ability of generating lies 
might be due to telling more lies when given a choice, because the more lies they told 
and the lower the chance they would be detected. Nevertheless, the SDT we used in the 
current study allows lie-truth discriminability (ďReceiver) to be measured independently of 
judgment bias. Thus, truth-bias should not affect the capacity to discriminate lies from 
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truths. Furthermore, we calculated the ability to generate lies (ďSender) again without the 
12 Choice trials and found a high positive correlation (r = .832, p < .001) between 
ďSender with Choice trials and ďSender without Choice trials. This shows that those who 
are better liars still show higher ability to generate lies, even when the Choice trials are 
excluded. 
Third, in Wright et al (2012, 2015)’s paradigm, each participant had to make both 
truthful and deceptive statements on each of the opinion topics in different trials. In 
contrast, in our paradigm people only saw each item once and either lied or told the 
truth. It is unclear what impact item repetition might have had on the results. Repeating 
items introduces potential problems for two reasons: (i) from the sender’s perspective, 
lying about an item one just told the truth about (and vice versa) may be different than 
lying about a new item, and (ii) from the receiver’s perspective, having judged that a 
sender told the truth (or lied) about an item earlier in the game, would constrain the 
judgment on the same statement later on.   
Fourth, the questions used in the Opinion Survey were probably not the same as 
those used in Wright et al (2012, 2015). These questions may vary in a number of 
different ways, for example in how controversial they are in the studied population. Lies 
told by a Sender may be more difficult to detect if they are about controversial topics 
	 70 
than if they are about less controversial topics. For example, if a Sender lies by claiming 
to be in favour of a topic that is known to be unpopular in the studied population, then a 
Receiver can use this background information to predict that the Sender probably is 
lying. In the current study, participants had to rate how much they agreed with each 
opinion topic on a 1 (absolutely agree) to 6 (absolutely disagree) scale before the task. 
The ‘Agreement Index (AI)’ was calculated for each topic by giving each individual +1 
if they rated 1, 2 or 3; -1 if they rated 4, 5 or 6, and by summing up the scores of all 93 
participants. After converting the scores to their absolute value, higher AI means that 
most participants had a similar opinion about the topic and low AI (close to zero) means 
participants showed diverse opinions toward the topic. There was a strong positive 
correlation between AI and accuracy of judgment by receivers (r = .908, p < .001), 
indicating that if most people have a similar opinion about the topic, then it will be 
easier for receivers to detect deception. In contrast, if people do not have a consistent 
opinion about the topic, the accuracy of lie detection will drop. This finding shows that 
it is not only individual differences in lie-detection ability that matter, the topic people 
lie about also plays a critical role for receivers to judge. In other words, in addition to 
how credible the sender is, receivers also consider the topical context in making their 
judgment. However, since all participants lied or told the truth about the same set of 
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topics and lie detection rates were only 60%, it is unlikely that the AI played an 
important role in affecting the correlation results between lie generation and detection 
abilities.  
Our data suggest that the correlation between lie generation and detection abilities 
reported by Wright et al. (2012) is not a robust finding. At best, it is highly dependent 
on the details of task design and stimulus set; at worst, it is a false positive.   
Based on the current findings, the ability of people to generate lies correlates with 
their creative achievement, especially in the performance domain. However, their ability 
to detect lies shows no relationship with creative cognition. Together with the lack of a 
correlation between generating and detecting lies, these results provide evidence against 
the idea of a general deception ability. This is also in line with a number of other 
findings. Kraut (1978) showed that accuracy in judging the veracity of one person is 
independent of accuracy in judging the veracity of another. One meta-analysis has 
shown that all individuals are barely able to detect lies and the real differences in 
detection ability are miniscule (Bond Jr & DePaulo, 2008). They suggested that in an 
individual differences sense, the accuracy of a deception judgment depends more on the 
liar than the judge. The individual differences for liars (i.e., the positive correlation with 
creative cognition) found in the current study also support this suggestion that the 
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ability to generate lies of a liar plays a major role in the accuracy of a deception 
judgement. In contrast, the ability of detecting lies showing no correlation with both 
creative cognition and the ability of generating lies may indicate that there is no specific 
ability associated with lie detection.  
Although these results are correlational, future research could also directly 
examine whether creative cognition influences the ability to generate lies by 
manipulating an independent variable (i.e., creative cognition) or vice versa. For 
instance, participants could be randomly assigned to two conditions, where one group of 
participants is primed to think creatively before the interactive deception game and the 
other one is a control group. That way one could examine whether participants who 
have been primed to think creatively show better ability of generating lies compared 
with the control group.  
 
Summary and Conclusion  
The main goal of this study was to address one of the aims of this thesis — to 
determine whether creative cognition contributes to deceptive communication using an 
individual differences logic. The results show that the ability to generate lies was 
predicted by the number of uncued lies told when given the choice and by a higher 
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creative achievement score in the performance domain. In contrast, the ability to detect 
lies was not predicted by any of the creativity measures. Importantly, no hints of a 
correlation between the ability to generate and to detect lies were found challenging the 
idea of a deception-general ability. This research provides the first evidence for a link 
between creative cognition and deceptive abilities. Although these findings are 
correlational, they suggest that creative cognition is one of the factors contributing to 
the ability to generate believable lies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 – An ERP Study of Uncued lies in a Bluffing Game 
 
Introduction 
  In the behavioural study reported in Study 1, participants delivered deceptive 
messages in an interactive paradigm where they were not only instructed to lie but they 
were also allowed to lie at will. This paradigm, involving a key component of deception 
– decision-making, successfully enabled participants to decide when to lie in an 
experimental setting. To further investigate this type of realistic and interactive 
deception setting in the laboratory, this event-related potential (ERP) study aimed to 
create an ecologically valid paradigm suitable for electroencephalogram (EEG) 
recording to examine the neural processes underlying spontaneous deception. 
There has been increasing interest in the cognitive and neural mechanisms 
underlying deception. Conceptually, lying is usually more cognitively demanding than 
truth telling (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2006). First, liars need to invent a credible 
story and to suppress the truth that is also actively kept in working memory. Second, 
one needs to monitor one’s fabrication so that the fake story is plausible within the 
context of the interaction, otherwise the target might become suspicious. Third, in order 
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to maintain consistency, extra cognitive effort is required to remember what was said 
(Christ et al., 2009; Spence et al., 2001; Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; Walczyk, 
Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003). Fourth, liars may attempt to control behaviours 
by avoiding exhibiting behaviours that may appear suspicious and also by showing 
behaviours to appear credible (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Hocking & Leathers, 1980). 
Increased cognitive load for lying is in line with recent fMRI results showing more 
activation in brain areas associated with cognitive control (e.g., prefrontal cortex and 
anterior cingulate cortex) for lying than telling the truth (Bhatt et al., 2009; Christ et al., 
2009; Langleben et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001).  
Event-related potentials (ERPs), which provide millisecond temporal resolution, 
have been an attractive means to study the neural dynamics of cognitive processes 
underlying deception. ERP results during the last decade have shown that lying has a 
different electrophysiological signature than truth telling. For example, the P300 
component, known to be reduced by cognitive load, is significantly smaller during lying 
compared to truth telling (Hu et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2003, 2005; Pfister, Foerster, 
& Kunde, 2014; Suchotzki et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2009). The reduced P300 for lying 
reflects the fact that lying requires the truth to be monitored, inhibited and kept active at 
the same time (Christ et al., 2009; Vrij et al., 2011). Note that the P300 component is 
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actually enhanced in concealed information paradigms (more on this in Study 3) 
because in these paradigms the “oddball” recognition aspect of the task is much more 
prominent than the deception aspect. Another component, the frontal N200, has also 
been found to be relevant for lying. The enhanced N200 for lying compared with truth 
telling was interpreted as an indication that lying comes with increased response 
conflict (Hu et al., 2011; Suchotzki et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2009). Also, several ERP 
studies assessed the roles of strategic monitoring processes in deceptive responding by 
investigating response-locked ERPs (Johnson et al., 2004, 2005, 2008). The medial 
frontal negativity (MFN) has been found to be larger for deceptive responses than 
truthful responses (Johnson et al., 2008), consistent with evidence that the MFN is 
generated in or near anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; 
Johnson et al., 2004; Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2001) and is linked to response 
monitoring and response conflict (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Johnson et al., 2004; 
Mathalon et al., 2003; Vidal et al., 2000). Another ERP component, the pre-response 
positivity (PRP), appearing around 250 -300 ms prior to the response, has been found to 
be smaller for self-generated lies compared with directed lies, because self-generated 
lies require more strategic monitoring prior to response execution (Johnson et al., 2008). 
The late positive component (LPC) at parietal regions provides a sensitive index of how 
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processing resources are allocated between two simultaneously performed tasks 
(Johnson, 1988, 1993). In deception studies, the LPC is smaller in amplitude for 
deceptive than for truthful responses (Johnson et al., 2003, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008), 
because some resources are allocated to secondary task (i.e., responding deceptively) 
while holding the information of the primary task (i.e., the truth). Recently, Panasiti et 
al. (2014) found that lying was associated with decreased motor readiness prior to the 
response, as indexed by the Bereitschaftspotential (BP). The BP is an index of motor 
readiness to volitional movements (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006), and is modulated among 
other factors by the moral value of the selected option, with instrumental dilemmas (i.e., 
intended means to save others but kill one individual) showing lower motor readiness 
(Sarlo et al., 2012). Panasiti et al. (2014) proposed that the BP could be a good marker 
of the moral conflict related to spontaneous deception with reduced motor readiness for 
lying compared to truth telling.  
 There has been much discussion about the ecological validity of the current 
neuroscience of deception due to the unrealistic paradigms used in most studies. Vrij 
and Ganis (2014) provided a characterization of deception as follows: ‘deception, a 
deliberate attempt to convince someone of something the liar believes is untrue, is a fact 
of everyday life.' From this definition, it follows that deception involves deliberation 
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and an intention to convey misleading information. However, instructing participants to 
lie is a feature of nearly all studies in the literature, eliminating a key component of 
deception. In addition, deception is socially rooted and is associated with the 
expectation of social consequences either positive or negative (Sip et al., 2008). Here, 
we aim to develop an ERP task that takes into account some of the cognitive processes 
underlying deception in an interactive context with information of possible reward and 
risk of punishment.  
Recent studies have begun to develop tasks to characterize the 
electrophysiological signature of spontaneous deception. For example, Hu, 
Pornpattananangkul, and Nusslock (2015) used an incentive-based coin-guessing task 
(adapted from an fMRI study by Greene and Paxton (2009)) in which participants 
predicted the outcome of an upcoming coin flip and they had the opportunity to lie for 
monetary incentive because in the critical condition their prediction was not recorded in 
advance but it was only reported after the coin flip outcome. With this design, however, 
it was not possible to access the participants’ private predictions and compare truthful 
and deceptive trials directly. Pfister et al. (2014) devised a paradigm in which 
participants were asked to locate a knife (i.e., upper or middle compartment) for a 
virtual police officer. They had to announce that they would lie or tell the truth (i.e., 
	 79 
intention response) at the beginning of the trial, and then made a truthful or deceptive 
response based on the intention response when the stimulus appeared. Although the 
experimenters found differences between truthful and deceptive trials, announcing 
whether to lie or tell the truth before seeing the target stimulus was far from real-life 
deception. As Sip et al. (2008) suggested, in order to deceive, a person must be able to 
weigh the advantage to be gained by deceiving against the risks, which in this study was 
not possible because the decision to lie was made before seeing the item to lie about. 
Also, there was no motivation for participants to lie. Another paradigm used in Panasiti 
et al. (2014) was based on a two-card (i.e., winning card and losing card) game, in 
which an opponent (OP) had to pick one of the two covered cards and the participants 
had to communicate the outcome of the choice to the OP because the OP could not see 
it. For each trial, participants were completely free to decide whether to lie or not to the 
OP and the winner took money from the other player. Participants were told that the OP 
would meet them at the end of the experiment. This paradigm contained social 
interaction and motivation elements to lie in order to gain more money, but there was no 
risk or punishment if participants lied unsuccessfully. In other words, participants 
would never be caught when they made deceptive responses and so the choice about 
whether to lie or tell the truth was only affected by moral factors. However in real life, 
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deception is typically influenced by probable gains and losses (Sip et al., 2012) and it 
involves both greater potential risks and rewards. In an ERP study, Sun, Mai, Liu, Liu, 
and Luo (2011) took this characteristic of deception into consideration by using a 
simulated "bill-identification" task where participants were required to pick out the 
genuine bill picture from a set of mixed fake ones. Telling the truth would gain them a 
small but guaranteed monetary reward, whereas lying might lead to a larger potential 
gain but might also carry the risk of a double penalty if they were caught. Participants 
were encouraged to use spontaneous deception without being explicitly instructed to lie. 
However, they were advised to make approximately equal deceptive and truthful 
responses in this task, and so the "free-will deception" was constrained by these 
instructions. Another disadvantage of this task was that participants might respond 
arbitrarily to the bill and perform inattentively, which was addressed by adding some 
probe trials on which participants had to respond truthfully.  
The first aim of the current study was to develop a novel task involving some 
social interaction with possible gains and losses that would elicit a broad set of 
cognitive processes during spontaneous/uncued deception. Overall, we expected to see 
that the neural correlates measured under this ecologically valid paradigm would show a 
different pattern from that typically found in studies using instructed lies. A novel task 
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was implemented based on the main idea of a bluffing game. In this task, one out of 
three different cards (i.e., High-, Mid-, and Low-value) was presented to participants in 
random order, and they were asked to report either truthfully or deceptively the value of 
the card they had just seen. They were told that they were playing a real-time bluffing 
game with a judge sitting outside of the EEG room and their goal was to deceive the 
judge in order to win more money. Reporting the card truthfully would win them the 
value of the card, whereas lying might win double the value of the card they reported 
plus an extra reward if the judge believed it, but it would also carry the risk of losing the 
same amount of money they could win if they got caught.  
This design requires the ability to make rapid decisions involving several 
cognitive processes, including: (i) recognizing the target and deciding that deception is a 
possible course of action, (ii) evaluating the advantage to be gained by deceiving 
against the risks of being detected, (iii) figuring out how to manipulate the receiver (i.e., 
the person who receives deceptive/truthful message), which might also involve moral 
conflict, (iv) making a decision (deceptive response or not), (v) executing the decision 
while monitoring actions to ensure that selected response conform to one’s plans and 
goals. These cognitive processes are the key components of social decision-making 
underlying deception, and it is crucial to consider these different components of 
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deception if we want to determine the neural markers of deception (Sip et al., 2008). 
Critically, instead of being instructed to deceive the receiver, participants were free to 
choose when to deceive, after evaluating whether deception was feasible or 
advantageous based on the current situation. In addition, as argued by Sip et al. (2012) 
we choose to deceive because we believe that if our deception is successful we shall be 
better off than if we had told the truth; meanwhile managing one’s reputation enhances 
the moral conflict that is linked to deception (Panasiti, Pavone, Merla, & Aglioti, 2011). 
These arguments might suggest that one’s personality traits and cognitive abilities 
related to generating lies would affect the number of spontaneous lies made during the 
task. Thus, we also planned to examine whether generating more lies would be 
correlated with certain personality traits and cognitive abilities.   
The second aim was to see whether there were neural patterns associated with 
successful detection of deception. Although deception can lead to possible gains, 
detecting deception is also important in social interactions, and it depends on one’s 
ability to predict and infer the mental state of the other. To avoid a possible loss, it is 
important to judge accurately whether the other person is lying or not. To this aim, after 
the bluffing game, we showed participants a series of short videos of a person playing 
the same bluffing game and asked them to judge whether or not the person was being 
	 83 
deceptive in order to gain more rewards. It has been consistently reported that detection 
of deception based on behavioural cues is not an easy job (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; 
DePaulo, Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980; Ekman & O'sullivan, 1991; Vrij, 2000) and 
people have the strong tendency to judge the behaviour of others as being truthful 
(Levine et al., 1999; Vrij, 2000). There has been very little work on the neural correlates 
associated with detecting deception. In fact, to our knowledge, only two studies have 
investigated this topic with neural measures both using fMRI. Grèzes, Frith, and 
Passingham (2004) found that there was increased activation in the amygdala and 
rostral anterior cingulate cortex when participants judged the actions (i.e., lifting a box) 
concerning the real weight of the box as reflecting deceptive intention. In contrast, Sip 
et al. (2010) found no differences between judging the opponent’s claim truthfully or 
deceitfully when participants were playing a two-person game. In the current lie 
detection task, participants judged whether the person was being truthful or deceitful 
based on their facial expression and oral report. We expected to find some ERP 
differences between correct and incorrect judgment of deception. We also expected to 
see that better lie detectors would show different neural patterns compared to those with 
lower rate of correct judgment.  
Finally, the third aim was to examine whether detection of deception would 
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show different patterns of neural activity compared with a simple perceptual judgment 
(e.g., detection of motion) of the same stimuli. Therefore, we implemented another task 
using exactly the same stimuli for participants to judge whether the person in the video 
was moving his/her head or not. Both detection of motion and deception require visual 
attention to process the stimuli, and so early ERP components such as the P1 and N1, 
which are frequently of interest in perception and attention studies (Woodman, 2010), 
were examined and compared between these two tasks. Since the detection of motion 
task is a low-level visual task, it was expected to elicit a larger P1 and N1 over occipital 
regions than the detection of deception task early in processing. In contrast, the 
detection of deception involving higher-level categorization processes was expected to 
show differences later in processing over frontal regions compared with the detection of 
motion task. 
In sum, we aimed at creating a deception paradigm with a social context 
requiring a series of key cognitive processes for successful deception. Since this 
experimental paradigm was developed and used for EEG study for the first time, we 
conducted mass univariate analyses to examine the effect of ERP components that have 
been reported in previous deception studies as described earlier, and to identify any 
unexpected effects. We aimed to compare whether spontaneous deception induced by 
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an interactive circumstance would exhibit different electrocortical activity that reported 
in the instructed deception literature. Based on previous ERP studies of deception and 
on the deception-related cognitive processes that were proposed for the ERP 
components found in previous studies, we expected the following: for stimulus-locked 
components, (1) an attenuated parietal P300 for lying compared to truth-telling because 
lying is associated with higher cognitive load, (2) a larger N200 for deceptive responses 
due to conflict detection; for response-locked components, (3) a larger MFN for lying 
due to increased response conflict, (4) a smaller PRP for lying because it requires 
strategic monitoring to be successful, (5) a smaller LPC for deceptive response 
reflecting how resources are allocated to process lying, and (6) reduced motor readiness 
(i.e., BP) for lying, possibly due to moral conflict.   
We also carried out additional analyses to compare the results with those of the 
first behavioural study (i.e., Study 1). As participants completed both generation and 
detection of deception in the current ERP study, we conducted the same signal detection 
theory (SDT) analysis to examine the individual differences in the ability to generate 
and to detect lies and the correlation between these two abilities. In addition, scores for 
the creativity achievement questionnaire (CAQ) and the Abbreviate Torrance Test for 
Adults (ATTA) were also collected to examine the correlations with deceptive abilities. 
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Consistent with what was found in Study 1, we expected to find a positive correlation 
between creativity scores and the ability to generate lies but not with the ability to detect 
lies.  
 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
A total of 45 healthy participants (34 females and 11 males, mean age = 20.0 
years, SD = 2.0), recruited from University of Plymouth, completed the head movement, 
bluffing game and lie detection tasks. All participants had normal or corrected vision, 
and no history of neurological or psychiatric disease. Data from 9 participants were 
excluded from the analyses (1 due to excessive muscle tension artifacts, 2 due to 
misunderstanding of the rules, 1 due to inattentive performance, 5 due to too few lies (< 
10) to be analysed after artifact rejection), leaving 36 participants (26 females and 10 
males, mean age = 20.1 years, SD = 2.2). All procedures were approved by the 
Plymouth University Faculty of Science and Technology Human Ethics Committee.  
All participants gave signed informed consent and were either given course credits or 
remunerated for their time in the study. The full subject information and consent form is 
presented in Appendix 3A. 
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Stimuli 
In the bluffing game, the stimuli were 3 gray cards depicting the shape of a 
pentagon, a square or a triangle in blue against a black background (Figure 3-1). Each 
card had a different monetary value. Every stimulus was presented after an average 
inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1000 ms, ranging from 750 ms to 1250 ms. There were 180 
stimuli composed of 60 High-value, 60 Mid-value and 60 Low-value cards. To 
counterbalance the assignment of values to shape, there were two versions of the stimuli: 
(i) one with more complex shapes representing higher values (pentagon: High-value; 
square: Mid-value; triangle: Low-value), and (ii) one with less complex shapes 
representing higher values (triangle: High-value; square: Mid-value; pentagon: 
Low-value). Each stimulus was presented until a response was made. 
 
Figure 3-1. Card stimuli used in the bluffing game 
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In the head movement and lie detection tasks, the stimuli were clips produced 
during a pilot study of the bluffing game. 135 trials were selected as stimuli. Each trial 
was cut into two parts: between card onset and before the onset of the oral response, and 
after such onset. By doing this, we were able to know when participants heard the voice 
cue in each trial so that we could examine whether the voice cue played a role in 
detecting lies or not. There were 70 truths (High: 25; Mid: 25, Low: 20), 53 small-lies 
(Mid: 27; Low: 26) and 12 big-lies (small-lies and big-lies will be explained in the 
Procedure session). The stimulus was presented after a blank of 1000 ms and a fixation 
of 1000 ms. The duration of each stimulus varied, depending on the length of the clip.  
 
Procedure 
The study was divided into two sessions. The first session was the EEG 
experiment, where participants completed the head movement task, the bluffing game 
and the lie detection task. After the EEG experiment, participants were scheduled for a 
second session to complete cognitive tests and questionnaires.   
In the first session, after setting up the EEG cap and electrodes, participants 
were seated on a comfortable chair, 115 cm from a computer screen in a dark room. 
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Stimuli for the three tasks were presented using Presentation○R  software (Version 18.0, 
Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com).  
In the bluffing game, participants were asked to report either truthfully or 
deceitfully the value of the card on each trial using a 3-button response box with their 
dominant hand. If participants chose to report the value of the card deceitfully, they 
were only allowed to report a card type with a higher value (that is, they were not 
allowed to lie counter productively by reporting a lower value); otherwise the trial was 
considered as rule-breaking and a penalty occurred. Under this rule, when seeing a 
High-value card participants could only respond truthfully, a trial type we will refer to 
as “Cued truth”. When seeing a Mid-value card, participants could either report 
truthfully by pressing the Mid-value button (Uncued truth) or report deceitfully by 
pressing the High-value (Small lie) button. There were three options when participants 
saw a Low-value card, report truthfully by pressing the Low-value button (Uncued truth) 
or report deceitfully by pressing either the High-value (Big lie) or the Mid-value (Small 
lie) button. After pressing the button, an image of a microphone appeared and 
participants were asked to say aloud the value they had just reported on the response 
box. The response participants gave via the button had to match their verbal response. 
After the verbal report, participants pressed a button with their thumb on their 
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non-dominant hand to continue.  
Participants were filmed for the duration of the task and the video was streamed 
in real time to a laptop outside the room. Participants were told that a judge sitting 
outside the room would assess whether their response was truthful or not by watching 
the live stream. We also told participants to make sure the verbal report was clear 
enough for the judge to understand. However, the feedback (i.e., accept or reject) from 
the judge was fixed by the program to make sure everyone received the same amount of 
accepts and rejects. Participants won or lost money depending on the response they 
made and the judge’s assessment of their response. If the deceptive response was 
accepted, participants gained the value of the card and a bonus, with bigger the lies 
corresponding to bigger bonuses. For example, reporting a High-value card when 
participants actually had a Low-value card gained a bigger bonus than reporting it as a 
Mid-value card. However, if the deceptive response was rejected, participants were 
penalised by losing the value of the card and an additional penalty that is, bigger lies 
corresponded to bigger penalties. On trials when a truthful response was rejected, 
participants gained the value of the card plus a small amount of compensation.  
The gains and losses accrued throughout the task and the updated score was 
shown at the end of every trial. The objective was for the participants to deceive the 
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judge in order to win as much money as possible. We told participants to appear as 
credible as possible, regardless of whether they told a lie or the truth. Participants were 
reminded that the money they won from the game would be paid in cash. The list of 
payoff possibilities is shown in Figure 3-2.  
 
Figure 3-2. List of payoff possibilities in the bluffing game 
 
The mapping of buttons to card values was counterbalanced. There were two 
versions: (i) button 1 referred to High-value, button 2 referred to Mid-value and button 
3 referred to Low-value, (ii) button 3 referred to High-value, button 2 referred to 
Mid-value, and button 1 referred to Low-value. Together with the two versions of the 
assignment of value to shape (mentioned in the Stimuli section), there were 4 (2 x 2) 
instruction-counterbalancing versions in total.  
!
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The 180 trials were divided into 3 blocks with equal numbers of High-value, 
Mid-value and Low-value cards (20 of each) pseudo-randomly presented in each block 
with the constraint that the same card was never repeated more than 3 times in a row. 
The accept/reject feedback ratio was fixed at 60/40 so 36 of the trials in each block were 
accepted and 24 were rejected. This distribution of feedback was used in previous ERP 
studies (Kireev, Pakhomov, & Medvedev, 2007; Kireev, Starchenko, Pakhomov, & 
Medvedev, 2007) and it was shown to elicit cheating in participants. Again, the same 
feedback was never repeated more than 3 times in a row. Each block had a fixed 
(stimuli) presentation order. The order of these 3 blocks was counterbalanced (123, 231, 
312), and each order also had a reverse version, (i.e., where the last stimulus was 
presented as the first one). The feedback also followed this fixed structure. Thus, there 
were 6 different fixed orders in total for both the cards and the feedback. Each 
participant was assigned to a version of instructions and order randomly.  
 Participants received a practice session before the experimental trials. There were 
15 trials with the same number of each card type. The accept/reject feedback ratio was 
also fixed at 60/40 during this practice session. The door of the testing room was open 
so participants could see that the judge was making judgments by pressing a keypad 
connected to the laptop. By doing so, participants were induced to believe that the 
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feedback was provided by the judge.  
 In the lie detection task, participants watched a series of short clips where the 
person in the video played the same bluffing game they had just played. Each clip was 
followed by a question mark and participants were asked to judge whether the person in 
the clip was lying or telling the truth by pressing one of two buttons on a response box. 
The mapping between response keys and conditions was counterbalanced across 
subjects. The 135 trials were divided into 2 blocks with 68 trials in the first block. There 
were two fixed orders of clip presentation.  
In the head movement task, participants watched the same stimuli as the lie 
detection task, but the goal was to judge whether the person in the clip was moving 
his/her head or not by pressing a button on a response box. The mapping between 
response keys and conditions was counterbalanced across subjects. The 135 trials were 
divided into 2 blocks with 68 trials in the first block. There were two fixed orders of 
clip presentation. Participants received the same 4 practice trials before the real task for 
head movement and lie detection tasks. 
 Participants completed the 3 tasks in the same order: head movement, bluffing 
game and lie detection. This order was constrained by the following considerations. If 
participants had done the bluffing game first, before the head movement task, they 
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would notice that the person in the clip was actually playing the bluffing game when 
watching the clips in the head movement task. This could produce some automatic 
deception detection activities in the head movement task. Moreover, if participants had 
done the lie detection task before the bluffing game itself, they would have trouble 
understanding the rules and the meaning of the verbal reports. By arranging the lie 
detection task after the bluffing game, participants understood how to judge the clips 
right away because they just carried out that task.  
  After completing the three tasks, participants were asked if they had any trouble 
understanding the rules of the bluffing game by filling out a follow-up questionnaire. 
The full follow-up questions are presented in Appendix 3B. All participants reported 
that they had no difficulty in understanding the rules and found the bluffing game 
interesting. However, occasionally participants did not believe that they would be 
awarded their winnings in cash until the reward was given.  
 At the end of study, participants were informed that during the bluffing game, the 
accept/reject feedback was driven by computer.  
 
Cognitive tests and Questionnaires  
 Participants came back for the second session individually to complete two 
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creativity tests, the Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson et al., 2005) 
and the Abbreviate Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA) (Goff, 2002), and the 
psychometric tests, the Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD) (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960) and the Lie Acceptability Scale (Oliveira & Levine, 2008). 
 Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ): The CAQ is based on the sum of 
creative products generated by an individual throughout her/his lifetime. This CAQ 
self-report checklist consists 10 different areas of talents with total 96 items. Each ten 
standard domains or art (visual arts, music, dance, creative writing, architectural design, 
humor, and theatre and film) and science (culinary arts, inventions and scientific inquiry) 
contains eight ranked questions weighted with a score from 0 to 7. Participants are 
asked to place a checkmark on the description fitting their achievement best. 
 Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA): The ATTA is a shortened version 
of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) with three activities given 3 minutes 
to respond each. The ATTA provides substantial insight into the creativity of adults by 
quantifying verbal and figural creative strengths. The creativity index is measured by 
four norm-referenced abilities (i.e., fluency, originality, elaboration and flexibility) and 
fifteen criterion-referenced creativity indicators.  
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD): This 33-item scale 
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measures the tendency to produce social desirable responses. This scale was used to 
detect potential biases toward responding in socially desirable ways on other 
questionnaires administered in this study. Participants were asked to answer Truth (T) 
or False (F) to each item 
 Lie acceptability scale: This 11-item scale measures an individual’s attitude about 
deceptive communication. People likely hold different opinions about deceptive 
communication. For example, people who see lying as acceptable will view deception 
as one viable tactic for accomplishing personal goals. Participants were asked to 
indicate the extent of agreement to each item from a 1 to 7 scale.  
 
Electrophysiological data acquisition  
 The electroencephalogram (EEG) was sampled at 8192 Hz using a Biosemi 
ActiveTwo system. EEG data were collected from 32 electrodes Ag/AgCl electrodes 
arranged according to the 10-20 system, and loose lead electrodes below the left eye to 
monitor eye blinks and vertical eye movements, and on the left and right mastoids. 
Horizontal eye movements were monitored using 2 loose electrodes places on the outer 
canthi of the right and left eyes. The data were downsampled off-line to 512 Hz before 
further processing. For analyses, data were re-referenced off-line to the average of the 
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two mastoids for consistency with most of the existing literature on the topic.  
 
Behaviour analysis  
 Performance in the bluffing game (i.e., how good participants were in telling lies) 
and the lie detection task (i.e., how good they were at judging whether a person was 
lying or not) were analysed using Signal Detection Theory, SDT (Green & Swets, 1966). 
For the bluffing game, the recorded videos of each participant were analysed off-line. 
The discriminability of a participant’s truths and lies was indexed by d’Sender and the 
perceived credibility of a participant regardless of the veracity was indexed by C’Sender. 
For the lie detection task, d’Receiver indicated the capacity of discriminating lies from 
truth and C’Receiver. indicated the tendency for a participant to endorse a given statement 
as truthful (credulity). With these indices, more successful lying was indicated by more 
negative values of d’Sender and better lie detection was indicated by more positive values 
of d’Receiver, as explained in Study 1.  
 
ERP analyses 
For the bluffing game, stimulus-locked ERPs were calculated for a 1200-ms 
epoch (including a 200-ms baseline), beginning 200 ms prior to stimulus onset. 
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Response-locked ERPs were calculated for a 1450-ms epoch (including a 200-ms 
baseline), extending from 1100 ms before the response until 350 ms after the response. 
For both the lie detection and head movement tasks, stimulus-locked ERPs were 
calculated for a 1200-ms epoch (including a 200-ms baseline), beginning 200 ms prior 
to stimulus onset. Independent component analysis (ICA) was conducted for 65% of 
participants using the runica algorithm to identify ocular and muscle artifacts (Mognon, 
Jovicich, Bruzzone, & Buiatti, 2011; Winkler, Haufe, & Tangermann, 2011). The 
results of the artefact detection were visually inspected before the components were 
manually removed. Subsequently, trials still contaminated by blinks, eye movements, 
muscle activity or amplifier blocking were rejected off-line. The data were low-pass 
filtered at 30 Hz. 
 
Bluffing game 
For the bluffing game, ERPs of interest were N200, P300, MFN, PRP, LPC and 
BP. To examine the effects of these ERP components, mass univariate analyses with 
powerful corrections for multiple comparisons were conducted on the difference 
amplitudes of the comparison between Cued truths and Small lies, the comparison 
between Uncued truths and Small lies, and the comparison between Cued truths and 
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Uncued truths. The individual erp files were collected to construct a GND variable 
using the Mass Univariate Toolbox function erplab2GND.m with default baseline 
settings. The differences of waveforms between conditions were calculated using the 
function bin_dif.m. In order to reduce the number of comparisons, the data were 
decimated and resampled to 64 Hz. 
Given that the current paradigm was used for the first time, we tested all 
electrodes and time steps between 100 and 900 ms for stimulus-locked ERPs and -800 
and 200 ms for response-locked ERPs. To correct for multiple comparisons, we used 
the Benjamini and Hochberg (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) procedure for controlling 
for false discovery rate (FDR) as this method is suggested to be best suited for 
exploratory studies (Groppe, Urbach, & Kutas, 2011a, 2011b).  
To identify ERPs of interest existed from the mass univariate results, each ERP 
component was defined by electrodes and time windows below based on the results of 
previous research (Hu et al., 2015; Hu et al., 2011; Suchotzki et al., 2015) as well as on 
aggregated grand average from trials collapsed across conditions (Brooks, Zoumpoulaki, 
& Bowman, 2017). For the N200 and P300, ERP components were stimulus-locked to 
the onset of the card during the time window between 250 and 350 ms for the N200 and 
between 450 and 650 ms for P300. For the MFN, PRP, LPC and BP, ERP components 
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were response-locked to the onset of the response at mid-frontal electrodes (Fz, F3, F4, 
FC1, FC2 and Cz) during the time window between 0 and 100 ms for the MFN, and 
-200 and 0 ms for the PRP. For the LPC, the response-locked ERPs were defined during 
the time window between -250 and 0 ms at mid-posterior electrodes (Pz, P3, P4, CP1 
and CP2). The BP was defined between 800 ms and 400 ms prior to the response at 
medial frontal electrodes (Fz and Cz). 
All mass univariate analyses were carried out using the Mass Univariate ERP 
Toolbox (http://www.openwetware.org/wiki/Mass_Univariate_ERP_Toolbox).  
Repeated-measures of ANOVAs were also conducted on the mean amplitude in 
a priori windows to examine each ERP component. The full details of methods and 
results are presented as supplementary result in Appendix 3C. 
Since 20 participants (out of 36) had less than 10 valid trials in the Big lie 
condition, the current ERP results only included Small lie condition in analyses.   
 
Lie detection task 
Participants were split into “Good-judge” and “Bad-judge” groups based on the 
median according to their behavioural performance on lie detection judgement in order 
to examine whether those who were better at detecting lies would show distinct 
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electrophysiological signatures reflecting their better lie detection ability.  
For the lie detection task, ERPs of interest were the P1 and the N1 (i.e., visual 
components). Based on aggregated grand average from trials of collapsed conditions 
(Brooks et al., 2017) and previous ERP literature (Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Vogel 
& Luck, 2000), visual components were defined at Oz, O1, O2, Pz, PO3, PO4, P7 and 
P8 in the time window between 80 and 150 ms for the P1 and between 150 and 250 ms 
for the N1.  
Mass univariate analyses were conducted on the difference amplitude of the 
comparison between stimulus types (i.e., truthful and untruthful event) and judgement 
types (i.e., judged as truth and untruthful event) across groups. The same mass 
univariate analyses were also conducted between Good-judge and Bad-judge groups. As 
we did not have prior hypotheses (apart from visual components) about which 
electrodes and time windows would demonstrate the effect, we tested all electrodes and 
time window between 100 and 900 ms. 
In addition to the onset of the clip, we also locked to the onset of the speaking 
cue (i.e., audio onset). We performed the same mass univariate analyses on the audio 
onset to demonstrate the overall pattern of ERP waveforms between Good-judge and 
Bad-judge groups, and across groups. 
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Figure 3-3. Diagrams showing the sites analysed for the MFN, PRP and LPC 
   
 
Head movement task 
 The only reason to have this task in the current study was to compare it with the 
Lie detection task. Therefore, the ERP data of the Head movement task are not analysed 
separately.  
 
Lie detection and Head movement  
To assess potential ERP differences between judging if a person was lying or 
telling the truth and judging a physical feature (i.e., head motion), the same mass 
univariate analyses were carried out as in the lie detection task but using the factor Task 
(detection, head movement), instead of Group.  
 
MFN & PRP
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3. Results 
3.1 Bluffing game 
3.1.1   Behaviour 
 Note that participants were only allowed to lie when the card type was Mid-value 
and Low-value. Thus, participants had 120 chances (60 Mid-value cards and 60 
Low-value cards) to lie spontaneously in this task. Participants generated an average of 
52.9 lies (SD = 17.2, range from 15 to 97) with 41.5 Small lies (SD = 13.6, range from 
15 to 71) and 11.3 Big lies (SD = 9.6, range from 0 to 37). Thus, there was an average 
44.1% chance for participants to generate a lie in this experimental setting. Participants 
only made an average of 0.8 mistakes (SD = 1.0, range from 0 to 4), due to breaking the 
rules.   
 We used paired t-tests to compare the Response time (RT) between the Total truth 
and Total lie conditions. The Total truth trials were subdivided into “Cued truth” and 
“Uncued truth” categories, and the Total lie trials were subdivided into “Small lie” and 
“Big lie” categories. For the Big lie category, 5 participants in total were excluded (4 
because they did not generate any big lies and one because of a Z-score greater than 3). 
The descriptive statistics of these six variables are shown in Table 3-1. For the pairwise 
comparisons, only 4 subgroups of truth and lie (i.e., Cued truth, Uncued truth, Small lie 
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and Total lie) were compared using paired t-tests in order to compare them with ERP 
results (Table 3-2). The reasons for picking these 4 subgroups for the paired t-tests are 
as follows. First, we assumed that Cued and Uncued truths rely on different cognitive 
processes, so these two subgroups were used in the comparisons instead of Total truth. 
Second, due to insufficient ERP data for the Big lie condition, these comparisons only 
involve Small lie in order to match the ERP results. Finally, Total lie were also involved 
in these comparisons in order to match the supplementary results. RTs for Cued truths 
(M = 794.6 ms, SD = 221.3 ms) were faster than for Uncued truths (M = 870.2 ms, SD 
= 202.6 ms), t(35) = -3.95, p < .001, d = 0.66. RTs for Small lies (M = 902.2 ms, SD = 
195.9 ms) were slower than for both Cued truths, t(35) = 4.87, p < .001, d = 0.81 and 
Uncued truths, t(35) = 2.58, p < .05, d = 0.43. However, after Bonferroni correction, the 
difference between Small lies and Uncued truths was not significant. RTs for Total lies 
(M = 887.6 ms, SD = 195.4 ms) were slower than for Cued truths, t(35) = 4.07, p < .001, 
d = 0.68, but not Uncued truths, t(35) = 1.27, p = .213.  
At the end of the game, participants received a payment of £12.3 (SD = 1.7) on 
average.  
In order to compare the results with those of Study 1, performance was also 
analysed using Signal Detection Theory, SDT (Green & Swets, 1966). The recorded 
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videos of each participant were analysed off-line by an experimenter. The 
discriminability of the person’s truths and lies and the perceived credibility of a person 
were indicated by these two measures respectively: M ďSender = 0.323, SD = 0.293; M 
CSender = -0.165, SD = 0.126 (these results were based one 26 participants as 10 
participants’ data were lost due to technical reasons). More successful deception is 
indicated by more negative values of ďSender and higher credibility regardless of the 
veracity is indicated by more negative values of CSender.   
 
Table 3-1. Mean (SD) response time  
 Mean SD 
Total Truth 835.2 206.3 
     Cued Truth 794.6 221.3 
     Uncued Truth 870.2 202.6 
Total Lie 887.6 195.4 
     Small Lie 902.2 195.9 
     Big Lie 799.6 219.6 
Note: “Total Truth” is the combination of “Cued Truth” and “Uncued Truth”; “Total 
Lie” is the combination of “Small Lie” and “Big Lie”.  
 
 
 
 
	 106 
 
Table 3-2. Paired t-tests of response time (RT) 
 Cued Truth Uncued Truth Small Lie Total Lie 
Cued Truth  
 
   
Uncued Truth t(35) = -3.95 
(p < .001) 
   
Small Lie t(35) = -4.87 
(p < .001) 
at(35) = -2.58 
(p < .05) 
  
Total Lie t(35) = -4.07 
(p < .001) 
t(35) = -1.27 
(p = .213) 
t(35) = 3.61 
(p < .001) 
 
Six comparisons were conducted using Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008 (.05/6) 
per test. a Using Bonferroni adjusted alpha level, the comparison between Uncued truth 
and Small lie conditions is not significant 
 
3.1.2   Stimulus-locked ERPs 
3.1.2a    Cued truth vs. Small lie  
 A mass univariate analysis with FDR control was conducted on the difference 
between Cued truths and Small lies. A raster diagram illustrates significant differences 
between ERPs at every electrode and time point from 100 to 900 ms (Figure 3-4a). The 
most pronounced ERP difference was a P300 effect from 470 to 660 ms at central and 
posterior electrodes. Consistent with this, the grand-average waveforms revealed a P300 
peaking around 550 ms (Figure 3-4c). The grand-average waveforms revealed a N200 
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peaking around 300 ms at fronto-central electrodes (Figure 3-4b), but no N200 
difference was found between Cued truth and Small lie conditions (Figure 3-4a). Two 
unexpected effects were apparent in the raster diagram (Figure 3-4a): a left frontal effect 
around 130 ms, and an effect at P7 around 200 ms. 
 
3.1.2b  Uncued truth vs. Small lie 
 A mass univariate analysis with FDR control was conducted on the difference 
between Uncued truth and Small lie conditions, but no significant difference between 
ERPs at any electrode and time point were found. 
 
3.1.2c Cued truth vs. Uncued truth 
 A mass univariate analysis with FDR control was conducted on the difference 
between Cued truth and Uncued truth. A raster diagram illustrates significant 
differences between ERPs at every electrode and time point from 100 to 900 ms (Figure 
3-4a). The most pronounced ERP difference was a P300 effect between 440 and 660 ms 
at central and posterior electrodes. No N200 effect was found. 
 
In summary, the P300 effect was most pronounced in the comparisons between 
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Cued truth and Small lie/Uncued truth conditions. Neither a P300 nor a N200 effect was 
found between Uncued truth and Small lie conditions. 
 
Figure 3-4.  (a) Raster diagrams (Stimulus-locked) illustrating significant differences 
between ERPs to Cued truth and Small lie and between ERPs to Cued truth and Uncued 
truth. Note that there was no significant difference between ERPs to Unuced truth and 
Small lie so it is not shown here. Grand-average ERPs for the Cued truth, Uncued truth 
and Small lie condition at Fz with the N200 time window shown in grey (b) and at Pz 
with the P300 time window shown in grey (c)  
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3.1.2   Response-locked ERPs 
3.1.2a    Cued truth vs. Small lie  
 A mass univariate analysis with FDR control was conducted on the difference 
amplitude of the comparison between Cued truths and Small lies. A raster diagram 
illustrates significant differences between ERPs at every electrode and time point from 
-800 to 200 ms (Figure 3-5a). There was a pronounced LPC effect from -190 to 90 ms 
at all mid-posterior electrodes we focused on (i.e., Pz, P3, P4, CP1 and CP2) with a 
reduced LPC for lying compared to cued truths. The grand-average waveforms also 
revealed a LPC peaking around -100 ms (Figure 3-5d). There was a PRP effect starting 
from -170 ms before the response at fronto-central electrodes (i.e., Cz, FC1 and FC2) 
with a smaller PRP for lying compared to cued truths. An MFN effect was also found at 
Cz and FC2 after response. The grand-average waveforms also revealed the PRP before 
the response and MFN after the response (Figure 3-5c). Finally, smaller BP amplitude 
for lying was found compared to cued truths from -600 to -300 ms at Cz and -490 to 
-330 ms at Fz. The grand-average waveforms are presented in Figure 3-5b.  
 Unexpected effects were apparent in the raster diagram (Figure 3-5a): a slow wave 
effect from -730 ms to -300 ms mostly at mid-posterior and some frontal electrodes, and 
a frontal effect in the early time window (-800 to -700 ms). 
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3.1.3b Uncued truth vs. Small lie 
A mass univariate analysis with FDR control was conducted on the difference 
amplitude of the comparison between Uncued truths and Small lies, but no significant 
differences between ERPs were found at any electrode or time point between -800 to 
200 ms. 
 
3.1.3c Cued truth vs. Uncued truth 
A mass univariate analysis with FDR control was conducted on the difference 
amplitude of the comparison between Cued truths and Uncued truths. A raster diagram 
illustrates significant differences between ERPs at every electrode and time point from 
-800 to 200 ms (Figure 3-5a). There was a pronounced LPC effect from -160 to 40 ms 
at all mid-posterior electrodes we focused on (i.e., Pz, P3, P4, CP1 and CP2) with a 
reduced LPC for uncued truths compared to cued truths. There was a PRP effect starting 
from -130 ms before the response at fronto-central electrodes (i.e., Cz, FC1 and FC2) 
with a smaller PRP for uncued truths compared to cued truths. No MFN effect was 
found. Finally, smaller but sporadic BP amplitude for uncued truths was found 
compared to cued truths at around -600 and -500 ms at Cz only.  
 An unexpected effect was apparent in the raster diagram (Figure 3-5a): a slow 
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wave effect from -740 ms to -330 ms at most mid-posterior electrodes. Compared with 
the slow wave effect between Cued truth and Small lies, the slow wave effect between 
Cued truths and Uncued truths was less pronounced. 
 
In summary, the LPC effect was most pronounced in the comparisons between 
Cued truth and Small lie/Uncued truth conditions. A moderate effect of PRP was also 
found in the comparisons between Cued truth and Small lie/Uncued truth conditions. 
Again, none of the effect was found between Uncued truth and Small lie conditions.  
 
Figure 3-5.  (a) Raster diagrams (Response-locked) illustrating significant differences 
between ERPs to Cued truth and Small lie and between ERPs to Cued truth and Uncued 
truth. Note that there was no significant difference between ERPs to Unuced truth and 
Small lie so it is not shown here. Grand-average ERPs for the Cued truth, Uncued truth 
and Small lie condition at Cz (c) and at Pz (d). Another Grand-average ERPs at Fz and 
Cz with BP time window shown in grey (b) 
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3.2 Lie Detection task 
3.2.1   Behaviour 
Overall accuracy was 53.6% (SD = 5.7%), which is significantly greater than 
chance (t(35) = 3.779, p < .001, d = 0.63). Fractional rates addressing accuracy for 
different types of response showed a significantly higher mean accuracy for truths (M = 
61.3%, SD = 9.4%) than for lies (M = 45.4%, SD = 12.6%, t(35) = 4.95, p < .001, d = 
0.83). The percentage of statements of all types classified as truthful (truth bias) was 
58.0% (SD = 9.4%), significantly greater than chance (t(35) = 5.060, p < .001, d = 
0.84). 
 Performance was also analysed using Signal Detection Theory, SDT (Green & 
Swets, 1966) in order to compare the results with those of Study 1. The ability of 
discriminating lies from truths and the tendency to judge statements as truthful was 
quantified by M ďReceiver = 0.184, SD = 0.297 and M CReceiver = 0.208, SD = 0.251, 
respectively.  
 A paired t-test showed no significant differences between RTs on trials that were 
judged as truthful (M = 652.1 ms, SD = 301.8 ms) and deceptive (624.0 ms, SD = 259.9 
ms), t(35) = 3.779, p = 0.168. 
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3.2.2   ERP data 
Clip onset 
Mass univariate analyses were conducted on the difference amplitude of the 
comparison between Good-judge and Bad-judge in 2 types of stimuli (i.e., truthful and 
untruthful events) and 4 types of judgements (i.e., truthful event judged as truth, truthful 
event judged as untruth, untruthful event judged as truth, and untruthful event judged as 
untruth). No significant effects were found.  
 
Audio onset 
   The same mass univariate analyses were conducted on the difference amplitude 
of the comparison between Good-judge and Bad-judge in 2 types of stimuli and 4 types 
of judgements. Again, there were no significant effects. 
 
3.3 Head movement task 
3.3.1   Behaviour 
 The accuracy rate was 84.3% (SD = 4.7%), which is significantly greater than 
chance (t(35) = 43.356, p < .001, d = 7.23). Paired t-test comparing RTs between 
correct (M = 522.6 ms, SD = 144.8 ms) and incorrect (M = 546.3 ms, SD = 232.7 ms) 
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trials showed no significant differences, t(35) = -0.935, p = 0.356. 
 
3.4 Comparison between the lie detection and head movement tasks 
3.4.1   Behaviour 
 A paired t-test was used to compare the RT between the lie-detection and head 
movement tasks. We averaged RTs regardless of the types of judgement in each task 
and compared the means. RTs were slower for the lie-detection (M = 638.0, SD = 275.2 
ms) than the head movement (M= 534.5 ms, SD = 178.2 ms) task, t(35) = 3.110, p 
< .005, d = 0.52. The stimuli were the same between these two tasks so this direct 
comparison is not affected by stimulus differences, but only by the different cognitive 
processes engaged by the two tasks. The longer RTs for lie-detection indicated that this 
task required more effort for participants to judge if a person was lying than to judge the 
physical feature of head movement.  
 
3.4.2   ERP data 
Clip onset 
 A mass univariate analysis was conducted on the difference amplitude of the 
comparison between lie detection and head movement tasks. A raster diagram illustrates 
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significant differences between ERPs at every electrode and time point from 100 to 900 
ms (Figure 3-6a). There was a N1 effect from 180 to 280 ms at occipital electrodes and 
grand-average waveforms are presented in Figure 3-6b. The overall amplitude for lie 
detection task was consistently larger than head movement task and the difference of 
amplitudes between these two tasks shifted from posterior to anterior regions along the 
epoch time. 
  
Figure 3-6  (a) Raster diagram (Stimulus-locked) illustrating significant differences 
between ERPs to Lie detection and Head movement tasks. (b) Grand-average ERPs for 
the Lie detection and Head movement tasks at visual component (i.e., mean amplitude 
of Oz, O1, O2, Pz, PO3, PO4, P7 and P8). Topographic maps showing the difference 
between the Lie detection and Head movement tasks between (c) 100 and 300 ms and (d) 
between 400 and 700 ms (clip onset, collapsing stimuli) 
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found. 
 
3.5 Correlations  
3.5.1   Correlations between ďSender, ďReceiver, creativity scores and task behaviours 
 Consistent with the result found in the Study 1, no correlation between ďSender and 
ďReceiver was found (r = -.12, p = .559, see Figure 3-7). Furthermore, neither ďSender nor 
ďReceiver were correlated with creativity scores (i.e., CAQ and ATTA). In addition, 
neither ďSender or ďReceiver were correlated with the number of lies generated during the 
task. All the statistics are shown in Table 3-3.  
 
Table 3-3 
Correlations between ďSender, ďReceiver, creativity scores (i.e., CAQ and ATTA) and the 
number of Total Lie 
 ďSender ďReceiver CAQ- 
Expression 
CAQ- 
Performance 
CAQ- 
Science 
ATTA Total Lie 
ďSender  
 
r = -0.12 
(p = 0.559) 
r = 0.203 
(p = 0.320) 
r = -0.256 
(p = 0.208) 
r = 0.181 
(p = 0.376) 
r = -0.075 
(p = 0.715) 
r = -0.248 
(p = 0.221) 
ďReceiver   r = -0.276 
(p = 0.104) 
r = -0.073 
(p = 0.673) 
r = 0.136 
(p = 0.428) 
r = 0.162 
(p = 0.345) 
r = -0.069 
(p = 0.688) 
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3.5.2   Correlations between task behaviours and cognitive questionnaires 
 We performed correlational analyses between the number of lies participants 
generated in the bluffing game and cognitive questionnaires (i.e., MCSD and Lie 
Acceptability Scale). The number of small lies generated during the task was positively 
correlated with Lie acceptability (r = .355, p = .034) (Figure 3-8), indicating that those 
with higher lie-acceptability chose to generate more spontaneous lies during the task.  
 
Figure 3-7. Scatter plot between ďSender and ďReceiver 
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Figure 3-8. Scatter plot between the amount of Small lies and lie acceptability score 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated the behavioural and neurophysiological 
signatures underlying deception by using a novel bluffing card game in which 
participants chose to generate spontaneous lies in order to maximize gains. The main 
results can be summarized as follows. First, lies showed longer RTs than cued truths but 
not uncued truths. Second, unexpectedly, no effect was found between lies and uncued 
truth. In contrast, compared with cued truths, lies elicited a smaller P300, a larger MFN 
and a smaller PRP, LPC and BP. A similar pattern was found comparing cued and 
uncued truths. Third, good and bad lie-detectors showed no ERP differences in any kind 
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of stimulus and judgement types. Finally, comparing the head movement and lie 
detection tasks showed early occipito-parietal and late fronto-central effects.  
 
Bluffing game  
 An advantage of the temporal resolution offered by ERPs is that it allowed us to 
observe multiple cognitive processes associated with spontaneous decision-making over 
time. The ERP results suggest that spontaneous deception is not different from 
spontaneous/uncued truth. Previous studies using cued conditions have reported a 
smaller P300 for lying compared to truth-telling in stimulus-locked analyses and 
interpreted it as an indication that lying is associated with higher cognitive load in order 
to keep the truth active, monitored and inhibited at the same time (Hu et al., 2011; 
Johnson et al., 2003, 2005; Pfister et al., 2014; Suchotzki et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2009). 
However, no such effect was found in the current study. Panasiti et al. (2014) proposed 
that instructed and spontaneous lying rely on different cognitive processes. Instructed 
lying resembles a typical executive function task where participants have to inhibit an 
automatic response and reverse it, whereas spontaneous lying is akin to a 
decision-making task where participants have to decide between two options. The lack 
of a P300 difference in stimulus-locked ERPs in the current study supports this notion 
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that spontaneous deception engages decision-making processes, rather than the 
processes involved in reversing an automatic response.   
 The LPC is a positive-going ERP component generally found over parietal sites, 
and its amplitude has been considered a sensitive measure of processing resource 
allocation between two simultaneously performed tasks (Johnson, 1988, 1993). 
Previous studies using cued conditions have also reported a smaller LPC for lying 
compared to truth-telling in response-locked analyses (Johnson et al., 2003, 2005; 
Johnson et al., 2008) and interpreted it as an indication that lying allocates some 
resources to respond deceptively while holding the information of the truth. However, 
no LPC effect was found between spontaneous lying and truth-telling in the current 
study. It is likely that spontaneous truth-telling also requires allocating some resources 
to remember which response was made in preparation for the next trial. This strategic 
monitoring process to keep track of the pattern of responses during the task has been 
discussed in Johnson et al. (2003)’s study. In one condition of their study called 
“random deceptive”, participants were instructed to lie randomly for half of the stimuli. 
There were no differences in LPC amplitude between random deceptive and random 
truthful responses because both were engaged in the strategic monitoring. Although 
participants were not instructed to lie randomly for half of the stimuli in the current 
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study, they still needed to keep track of the pattern of responses to distribute lies and 
truths during the task in order to maximize gains. The lack of a LPC difference in 
response-locked ERPs in the current study suggests that spontaneous decision-making 
requires strategically monitoring one’s responses regardless of whether the outcome is a 
lie or the truth.   
In addition, Johnson et al. (2003) also directly compared random deceptive 
responses (i.e., participants instructed to lie randomly for half of the stimuli) and 
consistent deceptive responses (i.e., participants instructed to respond the opposite of 
the truth for all stimuli), and found much smaller P300s and LPCs in the random 
deceptive condition than in the consistent deceptive condition. This random deceptive 
condition simulating more realistic deception scenarios compared to the consistent 
deceptive condition provided support for the idea that real-world deception requires 
more cognitive resources than instructed deception measured in the laboratory. 
In contrast to previous findings of a larger frontal N200 during instructed 
deception compared with truth-telling (Hu et al., 2011; Suchotzki et al., 2015; Wu et al., 
2009), no such effect was found in the current study. The frontal N200 has been 
hypothesized to be involved in cognitive control for strategic monitoring, especially in 
conflict detection (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). In the 
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previous deception studies, the enhanced N200 for lying compared to truth-telling has 
been interpreted as indicating that lying comes with increased response conflict (Hu et 
al., 2011; Suchotzki et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2009). A possible explanation for the 
absence of a frontal N200 effect is proposed here. In the current paradigm, participants 
had to first recognize the stimulus/target so they would know whether deception was a 
possible course of action or not. We propose that the N200 component might reflect a 
target-recognition stage in which participants saw the card and distinguished the type of 
card based on the rules they just learned. This recognition phase had to be carried out in 
the beginning of the trial regardless of card type. Therefore, there was no N200 effect in 
any comparisons.  
Regarding the MFN, we expected a larger MFN after deceptive responses than 
after truthful responses. However, there was no such effect when comparing lying with 
the uncued truth. The MFN is believed to reflect executive processes involved in 
conflict detection and response monitoring (Johnson et al., 2004; Ullsperger & Von 
Cramon, 2001). Some deception studies have found that lying elicited a larger MFN 
(also referred to as Correct Response Negativity, CRN) compared to truth-telling, 
reflecting stronger conflict for non-default answers, i.e., deceptive responses (Johnson 
et al., 2004, 2005; Johnson et al., 2008; Kireev et al., 2008). However, task 
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characteristics may determine whether a truthful response is still the default (i.e., 
"correct" response). Verschuere and Shalvi (2014) proposed that lying may be an 
automatic reaction when it yields important self-profit. In other words, by rewarding 
and promoting successful deception, the deceptive response may be treated as the 
"correct" response; while the truthful response may turn into the "incorrect" response as 
telling the truth leads to no extra reward. Actually, Suchotzki, et al. (2015) even found a 
reversed effect with lying showing a smaller MFN compared with truth telling if 
participants were promised an extra reward if they succeeded in hiding the guilty 
information. In the current study, participants were motivated to lie, so it was likely that 
deceptive response was perceived as the "correct" response. However, the result showed 
no reversed effect either. A possible explanation could be that lying also carried the risk 
of getting caught in our paradigm but not the one in Suchotzki et al. (2015). In this case, 
lying was not a perfectly correct response; thus it might be the reason that neither a 
typical nor a reversed effect was found. These hypotheses could be empirically 
examined in the future studies by manipulating participants' motivation to deceive and 
feedback (i.e., risk of being caught). 
The BP is a marker of volitional movement modulated by lower- and 
higher-order cognitive factors (Shibasaki & Hallett, 2006). In the current study, it is 
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unlikely to be caused by the difference in lower-level motor activity as the same 
movement (i.e., press one button) was produced, and the corresponding buttons were 
counterbalanced. We inferred that the reduction in BP is related to high-order cognitive 
factors, such as decision-making based on the mental computation of the trade-off 
between morality and reward suggested by Panasiti et al. (2014). They found a 
reduction in BP for self-determined lies compared to self-determined truths and 
attributed this reduced motor readiness to moral conflict as lying took the reward from 
the opponent in their paradigm. Thus, we expected a reduced BP for lying compared to 
both cued truth and uncued truth in the current study. However, only the comparison 
between lying and cued truth showed this effect and a small BP effect was found 
between uncued truth and cued truth. One possible reason for this is that the reduced 
motor readiness might due to other cognitive factors, such as risk-taking or reward 
expectation. In the paradigm used by Panasiti et al. (2014), participants received the 
same monetary reward for both self-gain lies and self-gain truths, and they did not risk 
being punished. Thus, they claimed that the reduced BP was contributed by moral 
conflicts instead of rewards and punishments. In the current study, it was likely that the 
reduced BP might not only reflect deception-related moral conflict, but also involve 
reward expectation as uncued truths could result in a higher reward for compensation if 
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it was a false alarm. Therefore, both lying and uncued truths showed a reduced BP 
compared with cued truth and no such effect was found between lying and uncued truth. 
An apparent but unexpected slow wave effect was found starting from -740 to 
-340 ms before response at mid-posterior electrodes. This effect was shown in both 
comparisons between lying and cued truth, and between uncued truth and cued truth. To 
our knowledge, the more positive slow wave effect before response for lying compared 
with truth telling has not been discussed in the deception literature. This positive slow 
wave before the LPC observed here may be related to the amount of information 
required from working memory to reach a decision. In the current paradigm, both lying 
and uncued truth trials provided participants two choices (i.e., lying or telling the truth) 
where they had to retrieve information from working memory about the possible reward 
and punishment corresponding to the response they were going to make. In contrast, 
cued truth trials only allowed a choice, i.e., truth telling, so the retrieval of information 
was not required. Therefore, lying and uncued truths showed a more positive slow wave 
effect than cued truths. On the other hand, the previous literature has discussed the 
positive slow wave after the P300 peak in the stimulus-locked ERPs. This positive slow 
wave has been recognized as a response-related component. For example, it has been 
related to response difficulty (Kok & De Jong, 1980; Roth, Ford, & Kopell, 1978), 
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response selection (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Hoormann, 1994; Naylor, Halliday, 
Callaway, Yano, & Walton, 1987), and the amount of processing required for a decision 
(Garcı́a-Larrea & Cézanne-Bert, 1998; Ruchkin, Munson, & Sutton, 1982). 
Nevertheless, the current results did not match directly those found in the existing 
literature and future work will be needed to shed further light on this slow wave.  
   
Comparison with fMRI studies  
 Recently, several neuroimaging experiments using fMRI have investigated 
deception in more ecologically valid paradigms. In a study conducted by Sip et al. 
(2010), one deception game ‘Meyer,' widely played in Denmark, was developed into a 
laboratory version and suitable for the scanning environment. Participants played with a 
Confederate and they decided when to deceive the Confederate and also had to reject or 
accept the confederate's claim. They found that both false and truthful claims were 
associated with activity in the frontopolar cortex, BA10, which is considered to be at the 
top of a hierarchy of executive functions and associated with internally determined 
behaviours (Koechlin & Hyafil, 2007; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Koechlin & 
Summerfield, 2007), i.e., behaviours that are not determined by external stimuli. These 
cognitive processes were engaged when the participants made choices in their paradigm. 
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This finding was different from what most previous studies had found. Deceptive- 
related activity had usually been located in DLPFC and VLPFC in most studies where 
participants were instructed to respond deceptively. These DLPFC and VLPFC regions 
are lower in the executive hierarchy than BA10 and are associated among other things 
with the selection of appropriate responses (Frith, 2000). This is consistent with 
traditional task designs in which participants select appropriate responses, either truthful 
or deceptive according to the instructed cues. These combined results provided evidence 
that instructed and spontaneous lying rely on disparate cognitive processes.   
 A recent meta-analysis of fMRI deception research directly compared neural 
activation patterns between social-interactive and non-interactive deception studies 
(Lisofsky et al., 2014). They found higher activation in the dorsal ACC, the right 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)/angular gyrus and the bilateral temporal pole (TP) in 
social-interactive than in non-interactive deception. The latter two brain regions have 
been linked to perspective taking, theory of mind and moral reasoning processes (see 
Mar, 2011; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe et al., 2006) demonstrating the importance 
of these socio-cognitive processes in deception. In addition, they also conducted another 
meta-analysis to compare the neural activation between volitional (i.e., 
uncued/spontaneous) and instructed (i.e., cued) deception paradigms and showed 
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increased activation in the bilateral IPL in volitional deception. These two 
meta-analyses indicated that the two important components of deception, i.e., social 
interaction and volitional/uncued decision, are distinct underlying processes. This 
review study also pointed out the importance of taking these factors into account when 
developing new experimental paradigms.  
  
Cued truth vs. Uncued truth 
Because of the bluffing game rule, participants had no choice but to respond 
truthfully to the High-value card, which was different from truthful responses when 
they could choose at will. The direct comparison between these two kinds of truths can 
give us a hint about the neural activity underlying spontaneous decision-making process 
and also indirectly provide evidence that instructed and spontaneous deception rely on 
different cognitive processes. Although both cued and uncued truths are instances of 
truth-telling, ERPs to uncued truths showed smaller P300, PRP and LPC components 
than to cued truths. Modulation of these components is often reported in the comparison 
between instructed lies and truths. These results have a number of implications 
described below. First, decision-making processes themselves regardless of the type of 
response (i.e., deceptive or truthful) increase demands on executive control as indexed 
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by a smaller P300 (Chen et al., 2008; Garcı́a-Larrea & Cézanne-Bert, 1998; A. Kok, 
2001) compared to executing specific actions (e.g., cued truth). Consistent with this idea, 
Hu et al. (2015) also found a smaller P300 for the opportunity condition (i.e., when the 
individual is free to make a truthful or untruthful response) than for the non-opportunity 
condition regardless of the response; the reduced P300 was proposed to reflect the 
engagement of executive control processes to resolve the conflict between two 
competing response tendencies. Second, making a choice between lying and 
truth-telling seems more demanding than just lying itself. From the previous literature, 
it is commonly believed that lying engages executive functions more (Spence et al., 
2001) than telling the truth and earlier studies on instructed lying have reported longer 
RTs for lying (Abe et al., 2007; Abe et al., 2006; Dong et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2003, 
2005; Mameli et al., 2010; Spence et al., 2001; Wu et al., 2009). However, recent 
studies on spontaneous lie using ecological paradigms have shown no difference in RTs 
between lying and truth-telling (Karim et al., 2010; Panasiti et al., 2014; Sip et al., 2010; 
Sun et al., 2011) similarly to what we found in the current study, i.e., there was no RT 
difference between uncued truth and lie, but uncued truth showed longer RTs than cued 
truth. Finally, these results support the idea that there is no "specific deceptive 
response" based on the ERPs that can be used to investigate deception; the effects found 
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in deception conditions are typically due to general purpose cognitive processes 
underlying deception instead (e.g., Ben-Shakhar & Furedy, 2012). In other words, there 
is no distinct neural activity pattern exclusively for deception and so detecting deception 
based on neuroimaging measures could provide incorrect information. The thesis will 
examine the vulnerability of these neuroimaging measures in Studies 4 and 5. 
 
Novel Design 
Our paradigm is based on the idea that deception is the outcome of social 
decision-making where people face the dilemma of deciding whether to deceive others 
to gain a reward or to avoid the risk of being punished by telling the truth. One novel 
feature of the current paradigm is that there are not just two choices (lie or tell the truth), 
because participants could decide the level of deception they wanted to engage in. One 
of the key elements of successful deception is to keep track of the false beliefs being 
engendered in the receiver (Sip et al., 2008). A good liar should consider that if there 
are too many big lies (i.e., always reporting High-value card), it might arouse suspicion 
in the receiver (i.e., judge) and it would increase the risk of getting caught. Keeping 
track of all this requires maintaining the information in working memory in order to 
deceive the other successfully. This feature of our paradigm makes this experimental 
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setting closer to real life situations than other paradigms in the literature. Furthermore, 
this paradigm simulates a game where there is also a rule to follow to avoid incurring 
into a penalty for breaking it. Consequently, participants have to pay attention to the 
game all the time without the need to intersperse target trials during which participants 
have to respond truthfully in order to make sure they pay attention to the task. For 
example, the bill-identifying task mentioned earlier and used in Sun et al. (2011) 
allowed participants to lie at will. However, the lack of a rule allowed participants to 
just give random responses. To make sure participants paid attention, they had to insert 
target trials for participants to always respond truthfully. Also, because the current 
paradigm simulated a game, most of the participants found the game very interesting 
and were able to concentrate on it all the time through the experiment, at least judging 
from the follow-up questionnaire.  
However, the closer the paradigm gets to real life in the laboratory and the more 
experimental control we have to sacrifice. Specifically, we could not control the 
proportion of deceptive trials as the number of lies varied from participant to participant. 
For some participants there were not enough deceptive trials for ERP analyses, and we 
had to remove them from the dataset. In addition, more complex social interactions may 
lead to the engagement of additional cognitive processes that vary from person to 
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person due to using different strategies to make their lies more convincing. For example, 
in the follow-up question of what strategies they used to tell convincing lies, some 
participants reported they focused on facial expression, some focused on the tone of 
voice, and yet others focused on answering speed.  
  It is noteworthy to mention that several participants tried to gain some trust from 
the judge by telling the truth at the beginning of the game, as reported in the follow-up 
questions. This strategy has been considered to be one of the key components of 
deception proposed as "impression management" (Sip et al., 2008). To deceive the other 
successfully, some foundation in truth is required so that people tend to incorporate 
deception with truthful responses instead of making a series of exclusively deceptive 
responses (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; Ekman, 2009). Establishing a 
reputation for being trustworthy by building the initial cooperation is necessary for 
deception in order to secure the trust of receivers (Sip et al., 2012). Based on the 
strategy used by participants, the current design successfully engaged a series of 
cognitive operations required for participants to conduct deceptive communication in a 
social context. 
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Detection of deception  
In addition to the stimulus and judgment type, the individual differences in 
detecting lies based on their behavioral performance (i.e., Good judge vs. Bad judge) 
were also studied. The results showed that there was no electrocortical signature for 
stimulus and judgment types across the groups. In other words, participants' ERPs 
revealed no difference between whether the person in the video was trying to deceive or 
to tell the truth, or between whether participants judged the person as truthful or 
deceptive. Similarly, there was no difference between good and bad judges in any 
comparisons of stimulus and judgment types.  
It has been reported repeatedly that detection of deception using behavioral cues 
is difficult (DePaulo et al., 1980; Ekman & O'sullivan, 1991; Vrij, 2000) with people’s 
ability to detect lies being just slightly better than chance (i.e., 54% on average) (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2006). Surprisingly, only a few previous studies have examined the neural 
correlates of detecting deception. One study was conducted by Sip et al. (2010) as 
mentioned earlier, in which participants had to judge whether the opponent was being 
truthful or not in the Meyer game. They found no differences in neural activity between 
judging opponent as truthful versus deceptive regardless of whether the judgment was 
correct or not. Similarly, our study found no difference between judgment types across 
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groups (i.e., good vs. bad judges).   
In an fMRI study conducted by Grèzes et al. (2004), participants attempted to 
detect whether an actor in the clip was pretending that a box they lifted was heavier or 
lighter than it actually was. They observed increased activity in the amygdala when 
participants inferred deceptive intention from the actions of the actor regardless of 
whether the judgment was correct or not, possibly reflecting an emotional response to 
the belief of being deceived. They also observed increased activity in right superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), an area involved in the perception of biological motion (Allison, 
Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). However, our study found no ERP differences between 
judgment types. One possible reason for this is that the current study participants could 
only judge the person in the video based on their vocal answer with perhaps some minor 
facial expressions rather than their full-body behavior. As in Grèzes et al. (2004) study, 
the activity in STS might reflect inferential judgment about a person’s intention based 
on observed body movements. Another possible reason is that neural activity elicited by 
being deceived triggered emotional responses like Grèzes and colleagues have found 
(i.e., an enhanced activity in the amygdala), but that this subcortical activity was too 
subtle for the ERP technique to detect. It is also possible that the detection of deception 
task in the current study did not prompt many emotional responses; instead, some 
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participants might focus on the evaluation of probabilities of the card the person 
reported. For example, if the individual reported the high-value card much more 
frequently than the other cards, participants would become aware of it and take it into 
consideration for their judgment. In other words, for some participants, the strategies for 
detecting lies may be based more on perceived probabilities of the card value rather 
than simulating the intention of the person.  
 
Comparison with the head movement task 
The comparison between the detection and head movement tasks illustrated the 
ERP differences between higher-level and lower-level cognitive processes. The results 
showed that the head movement task elicited a larger N1 than detection task. The visual 
N1 component is typically modulated by visual attention processes (Luck & Yard, 1995; 
Vogel & Luck, 2000). Paying attention to nonspatial features such as colour, motion or 
shape modulates occipital-parietal ERPs between 100 and 150 ms (Hillyard & 
Anllo-Vento, 1998). Wang, Kuroiwa, Li, Wang, and Kamitani (2001) also suggested 
that the N1 might be involved in both early and late visuo-spatial processing, whereas 
the preceding P1 might reflect early perceptual processing. Thus, the larger N1 in the 
head movement than the detection task may reflect visual attention to head motion.  
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 The lie detection task required participants to observe the behavioural cues from 
the person in the clip, and the behavioural cues participants relied on in making their 
judgment varied. Ekman and O'sullivan (1991) gave participants open-ended 
descriptions of behavioural clues they used in judging whether the person in the video 
was lying or not. Many answers were given, including answering too slowly, strained 
voice, avoiding eye contact, phony smile and body language. Thus, unlike the head 
movement task with a clear and uniform target to attend, in the lie detection task 
participants could use different strategies to make the judgement according to their 
previous experience, thus affecting different ERP components when they were detecting 
deception. In our data, for the clip onset, the difference in mean amplitude between the 
two tasks appeared early at posterior sites and later shifted toward anterior sites. The 
initially difference at posterior sites was contributed by visual ERP components, 
whereas the subsequently difference at anterior sites might reflect higher-level cognitive 
activity involved in detecting deceit compared with the simple detection of physical 
movement  
 
Comparison with the results in Study 1 
 The same SDT analyses used in Study 1 were applied in the current study to 
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examine the individual differences in the ability to generate lies and to detect lies. No 
correlation was found between the ability to generate lies and the ability to detect lies (r 
= -.12, p = .559) as found in Study 1 (r = -.099, p = .345). Both results go against the 
idea of a deception-general ability proposed by Wright et al. (2012). Although the 
paradigm used in the current ERP study was completely different from the one in 
Wright et al. (2012), the existence of a deception-general ability should be tested in 
another context to show whether this phenomenon is independent of the paradigm used. 
To some extent, the current result provides such a test, further suggesting that these two 
abilities are not correlated, and providing no support for the idea of a deception-general 
ability.  
Study 1 demonstrated that the ability to generate lies was higher in people with 
higher creativity achievement scores and who generated more uncued lies in the task. In 
order to examine whether this also was true in the current study, we correlated ďSender 
/ďReceiver with creativity scores and number of lies generated during the task, but neither 
ďSender nor ďReceiver correlated with creativity scores nor number of lies. There are a 
number of potential reasons for this difference. First, the hypothesis of the link between 
the ability to generate lies and creativity relies on the idea that both are involved in 
breaking standard rules to build associations between previously unassociated cognitive 
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elements. We expected that people with higher creativity would create novel 
associations quickly (i.e., false information) and make their lies more convincing. The 
paradigm in Study 1 provided ideal circumstances for participants to lie because they 
were given 20 seconds to justify their opinions or describe their previous events and 
feelings. In contrast, the current paradigm only allowed the participants to speak one 
word in a physically constrained situation (i.e., EEG cap and electrodes) where there 
was no room for them to create unusual mental associations for the purpose of lying. 
Second, in order to make more convincing lies, instead of creating novel associations, 
the current paradigm was more likely to require the mental computation of reward 
maximization (i.e., monetary reward) by allocating deceptive and truthful responses 
based on the card type. In other words, the deception elicited in the current paradigm 
relied more on the decision-makings based on reward computation, which is another 
important lying ability to evaluate whether deception is advantageous based on the 
current situation. 
 
Limitations and future studies  
This study successfully created a realistic experimental environment to 
investigate deception closer to real life than in previous paradigms. However, the 
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ecologically valid paradigm comes at a price. The first limitation is that we could not 
control how many deceptive and truthful responses were generated by the participants. 
Thus, some participants who generated only few lies had to be excluded from the 
analysis. Also, individual differences in how frequently people told lies resulted in a 
broad range of total lies from 15 to 97, which increased the variability in our data. 
Another limitation is that we did not know the intention of participants when they made 
truthful responses. Based on the bluffing game rule, if a truthful response was rejected, 
participants would get compensation on top of the card value. It was possible that 
participants made truthful responses with deceptive intent and expression in order to 
mislead the judge and get compensation. In future studies, one could manipulate this 
effect by providing compensation or not in false alarm trials. Then one could examine if 
the intention of inducing misjudgement exists and how this intention influences the 
ERPs accordingly.   
 One possibility to improve the paradigm is for participants to play the game with a 
peer, not with an experimenter. According to the experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 
2010), the vertical relationship between the experimenter and participant can elicit 
different behaviours from a horizontal peer-to-peer interaction. Especially in social 
interactions, participants would more likely behave in a certain way to fulfil the 
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expected objectives of the experiment or receive more pressure during the interaction. 
To minimize this effect, in future studies participants can be informed that they will 
play with a peer and experimenters have no access to their interaction until the end of 
the task. Although the interaction between participants and the experimenter (i.e., judge) 
was not face-to-face, avoiding this possible effect would increase the external validity 
of the experiment. 
Additional limitations for the current lie detection task for investigating the neural 
processes underlying detection of deception are worth mentioning. First, each trial 
lasted around 1.5 seconds limiting nonverbal cues, and the verbal cue was only a single 
word from the person in the clips. Thus, instead of making judgements based on 
deceptive behavioural cues generated by the person, participants might focus on the 
context, such as the evaluation of probabilities mentioned earlier. Future research needs 
to create a set of stimuli with considerable verbal and nonverbal cues in order to explore 
the neural correlates underlying detection of deception. Second, some participants 
reported that they lost their attention at some point because they had no idea whether 
their judgment was correct or not. Some participants also reported that it was more 
difficult to concentrate on the lie detection task compared with the bluffing game since 
there was no monetary motivation for a correct judgment. In future studies, one could 
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provide feedback on each trial. In this design, it is likely that participants would modify 
their strategies constantly according to the feedback so that intra-subject variability 
would increase. However, it would be interesting to examine whether participants' 
ability to detect lies would improve as a result of feedback.    
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The current study provided participants the choice to deceive by creating a 
context where deception was possible in some conditions but also came with the risk of 
being punished if it was detected. Our paradigm captured the idea that real-life 
deception is a decision with costs and benefits in which the deceptive agents have to 
decide between the possible reward from deception and the cost of being caught. The 
paradigm allowed us to investigate deception as the outcome of social decision-making. 
Our results suggested that deceptive behaviour commences with a target-recognition 
process followed by a decision-making process. That is, the deceptive agent has to 
recognize the target to see whether deception is a possible course of action and then 
make a choice between lying and truth- telling. These processes in the early stage 
require similar cognitive resources regardless of whether the outcome is a lie or the 
truth as indexed by identical N200 and P300 for lying and uncued truths. Similar RTs 
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for lies and uncued truths also support this suggestion. Once the spontaneous decision 
has been made, it requires strategic monitoring to keep track of the responses in order to 
maximize the gains regardless of whether the outcome is a lie or the truth as indexed by 
identical LPC for lies and uncued truths. These processes are summarised in Figure 3-9 
suggesting that spontaneous deception and spontaneous/uncued truths require 
comparable cognitive effort. The lie detection task was a first attempt to examine the 
electrophysiological signals underlying detection of deceit. Our result showed no ERP 
differences in any comparisons. Future studies are needed to investigate whether there 
are neural signatures of correct and incorrect judgments using stimuli with both verbal 
and nonverbal cues. Finally, in line with the results in Study 1, the ability to generate 
lies was not correlated with the ability to detect lies against the idea of a 
deception-general ability.  
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Figure 3-9. A diagram depicting some of the suggested cognitive processes for lying 
compared with two types of truth telling  
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 3 – The Effect of Mental Countermeasures on ERP-based  
Concealed Information Test 
 
Introduction 
 The last ERP study reported in Study 2 has elucidated key cognitive and neural 
processes underlying the generation of uncued lies by implementing an interactive card 
game where the deceptive agents had to evaluate possible reward and punishment and 
make a decision of whether to lie or not. The results have provided theoretical 
understanding of neural mechanisms underlying real-life deception. In the current ERP 
study, we focused on applied end by examining the validity of the lie detection 
paradigm, i.e., concealed information test, when applying mental countermeasures, and 
determining the role of creativity in countermeasure use.  
Concealed information tests (CITs, also known as Guilty Knowledge Tests, were 
introduced by Lykken (1959, 1960) have been used for many decades to determine the 
presence of crime-related knowledge in a suspect’s memory by measuring behavioural, 
autonomic, electrophysiological and hemodynamic variables (Ganis et al., 2016; Ganis 
et al., 2011; Meijer et al., 2014; Rosenfeld, Ben-Shakhar, & Ganis, 2012; Verschuere et 
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al., 2011). The most common type of CIT paradigm employs 3 types of stimuli 
(Rosenfeld et al., 2012): probes (familiar items from a crime scene, such as a stolen 
ring), irrelevants (control, unfamiliar but comparable items, such as a necklace, a 
bracelet, a watch, etc.) and a target (an item with an unique response requirement for 
holding attention). The main comparison of interest in this 3-stimulus paradigm (3-S 
CIT) is between the probe and the irrelevants (normally, the mean of the irrelevants). 
The logic of this paradigm is that if the probe consistently elicits a stronger response 
than the irrelevants in a person, then one can infer that this person is familiar with the 
probe even though the person denies having knowledge of the probe: Deception may be 
taking place under this circumstance. Conversely, if there is no different response 
between probe and irrelevants, one may conclude that the person has no knowledge of 
the probe. 
 The detection of deception using CITs relies on solid scientific ground (e.g., 
Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, and Meijer 2011), mostly from psychophysiological research 
on the orienting reflex (OR) (e.g., Siddle 1991, Sokolov 1966, Sokolov 1963). The OR 
is a complex of physiological and behavioral reactions evoked by significant stimuli 
(e.g., Gati and Ben-Shakhar 1990, Siddle 1991). Traditionally, the responses examined 
have been autonomic nervous system (ANS) measures, such as skin conductance (SCR), 
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respiration and heart rate (for reviews, see Meijer et al., 2014, Ben-Shakhar and Elaad 
2003). The typical responses elicited by the familiar CIT items in knowledgeable 
individuals are increased SCR (Lykken, 1959), heart rate deceleration (Verschuere, 
Crombez, De Clercq, & Koster, 2004) and respiratory suppression (Timm, 1982). 
Meta-analyses have shown that SCR measures can discriminate between individuals 
with and without knowledge with high accuracy (effect size (Cohen’s d) of 1.55 for 
both Meijer et al., 2014 and Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003).  
In more recent years, event-related potential (ERP) have been used in CIT 
paradigms, the focus of this study (for reviews, see Rosenfeld 2011, Rosenfeld, Ben 
Shakhar, and Ganis 2012). Two main ERP components have been investigated in these 
paradigms, the anterior N2 and the P300.  
With regard to the N2 (Gamer & Berti, 2010, 2012; Ganis & Schendan, 2012; 
Hu, Pornpattananangkul, & Rosenfeld, 2013), the findings so far have been inconsistent. 
Gamer and Berti (2010) reported a larger N2 to the probe, which was attributed to an 
orienting reflex to meaningful information. However, no such difference was found in a 
second study (Gamer & Berti 2012). Another study found the opposite effect, with a 
larger N2 to the irrelevants than the probe (Ganis & Schendan, 2012). Ganis et al., 
(2016) suggested that the overall N2 effect observed in CIT studies with visual stimuli 
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may be the superposition of multiple N2 components with similar latency but 
modulated in opposite ways by different factors, such as stimulus complexity and the 
similarity between stimuli. Therefore, the N2 component is not a straightforward index 
of concealed information. In the current study, the N2 component will be measured in 
order to compare it with previous CIT studies but only the P300 component will be used 
for further classification analyses.  
The P300 component has been mostly investigated as a robust index of 
recognition of concealed information, with the probe eliciting a P300 with a larger 
amplitude than the irrelevants (e.g., Meijer et al., 2014, Rosenfeld et al. 1988, Rosenfeld 
et al. 2004). The P300 is a positive brain potential, which usually occurs between 300 
and 800 ms after stimulus onset. Typically, the P300 is elicited by rare stimuli in a 
series of standard stimuli in an oddball paradigm and its amplitude is inversely related 
to the subjective frequency of the eliciting stimulus (Donchin & Coles, 1988). 
Furthermore, its amplitude increases with the level of significance of the stimulus 
(Berlad & Pratt, 1995; Johnston, Miller, & Burleson, 1986). The P300 has two 
subcomponents: (i) the P3a, thought to reflect stimulus-driven frontal attention 
mechanisms and is characterized by a frontal/central scalp distribution; (ii) the P3b, 
thought to originate from temporal-parietal of attention and subsequent memory 
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processing, and characterized by a parietal scalp distribution (Polich, 2007). The P300 
described here is an instance of the P3b, and the term “P300” will be used throughout 
the chapter.   
In the CIT paradigm, the P300 is enhanced in individuals with concealed 
knowledge by infrequently presenting the probe (e.g., p = .17) within a stream of 
frequent irrelevants (e.g., p = .67). However, to individuals without probe knowledge 
(innocent), the probe is just another irrelevant that elicits a smaller P300, comparable to 
that of other irrelevants. A meta-analysis (Meijer et al., 2014) examined the validity of 
the CIT using P300 amplitude and showed high accuracy in differentiating between 
individuals with and without probe knowledge (effect size (d*)= 1.89). However, the 
P300 is not elicited by the recognition of concealed information, but by many other 
factors, for example, anything that affects the saliency of a stimulus (Polich, 2012). 
Thus, a large P300 to an item does not necessarily mean that one is familiar with that 
item. Such lack of selectivity means that P300 amplitude as an index of concealed 
knowledge is potential vulnerable to countermeasures. The main aim of this study was 
to determine the effect of cognitive countermeasures on P300 amplitude in a CIT 
paradigm.  
To determine whether CIT paradigms can be useful in real-life settings, it is 
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necessary to investigate the effect of countermeasures (CM), deliberate strategies used 
by suspects in order to alter their psychophysiological reactions during the test 
(Ben-Shakhar, 2011). Since the contrast between the probe (i.e., crime-related item) and 
the irrelevants (i.e., neutral items) is the key index to discriminate between individuals 
with concealed knowledge and no knowledge, countermeasures can be employed to 
suppress the responses to the probe or to artificially enhance responses to the irrelevants 
(cf. Ben-Shakhar, 2011). Suppressing autonomic responses to the probe is relatively 
difficult because such a strategy may increase item saliency and end up producing larger 
responses (Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 1991). Thus, most studies on the topic employed the 
later CM strategy of trying to enhance responses to the irrelevants during the CIT. The 
CM techniques reported in the literature can be categorized into physical CMs (e.g., 
Rosenfeld et al., 2004 using covert physical acts, like pressing the left forefinger), and 
mental CM, (e.g., Sasaki, Hira, & Matsuda, 2001 counting backwards by sevens). Note 
that some CMs may be effective with some measures (e.g., skin conductance, as in 
Honts et al., 1996) but not with others (e.g., ERPs, as in Sasak et al, 2001). Mental CMs 
are generally more difficult to detect than physical ones because they do not result in 
behavioral differences one can easily measure. Thus, it is especially important to 
investigate to what extent the validity of the test is affected by the mental CMs since 
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they are hardly detectable. The current study aimed at examing how mental CMs affect 
concealed knowledge detection using P300 amplitude.  
Recent studies have begun to examine how CMs can affect the accuracy of a 3-S 
CIT paradigm using ERP and fMRI measures which, at first sight, may seem more 
resistant to CMs than ANS measures. Sasaki et al. (2001) instructed participants to 
count backward by sevens in a P300-based CIT and found this mental CM was largely 
ineffective based on P300 amplitude. Later on, Rosenfeld et al. (2004) devised a more 
effective CM strategy that involved making irrelevant stimuli meaningful by assigning 
covert responses to each irrelevant, including some physical (e.g., imperceptibly 
wiggling the big toe in the left shoe) and one mental CM (i.e., imaging the experimenter 
slapping the participant in the face). This combination of physical and mental CMs 
significantly decreased the hit rate from 82% (normal guilty group) to 18% (CM guilty 
group). This study showed that concealed knowledge detection using P300 amplitude is 
readily defeated by a mixture of physical and mental CMs. An fMRI study conducted 
by Ganis et al. (2011) employed physical CMs like those used by Rosenfeld and 
collaborators (2004) in a 3-stimulus CIT paradigm and found that hit rates of concealed 
knowledge detection fell to 33% with CM from 100% without CM using activation in 
ventrolateral and medial prefrontal cortices.  
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These studies have shown that physical CMs can significantly impair 
classification accuracy using P300-based or fMRI-based measures in 3S CIT paradigms. 
However, it remains unknown whether purely mental CMs can also decrease the 
accuracy of P300-based CITs. Although Rosenfeld et al. (2004) implemented one 
mental CM, the proportion of mental CMs (20%) was small compared with physical 
CMs (80%) and so the effect was likely driven by the physical CMs. This is an 
important question because mental CMs are unlikely to be detected by the examiner, 
even with sophisticated instrumentation (Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 1991). The aim of this 
ERP study was to determine whether purely mental CMs are effective in 3S CITs. 
Mental CMs employed in the current study aimed at both suppressing responses to the 
crime-related item and enhancing responses to neutral items. By reducing the response 
difference between these two types of stimuli, we expected to reduce the difference in 
P300 amplitude between the probe and irrelevants, thus decreasing classification 
accuracy. 
Another question we wanted to address was whether CM efficacy is linked to 
certain cognitive abilities. It has been found that individuals with higher standard 
creativity measures have shown to have more flexible cognitive control (Zabelina & 
Robinson, 2010). In the current study, participants were instructed to apply different 
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mental coutnermeasures to the probe and the irrelevants respectively (for details, see 
Materials and methods). We hypothsized that more creative individuals may be better at 
implementing this type of mental countermeasures as they may be better at switching 
from trial to trial between the two attentional modes requried by the countermeasures.  
Finally, note that variants of the 3-S CIT aimed at defeating saliency-based CMs 
have been under development (Bowman, Filetti, Alsufyani, Janssen, & Su, 2014; 
Winograd & Rosenfeld, 2011). However, given that these methods are quite new and 
have not yet been systematically replicated by multiple laboratories, they will not be 
discussed in this thesis. 
 
Materials and methods 
Participants 
 A total of 45 healthy participants (32 females and 13 males, mean age = 20.6 years, 
SD = 2.3), recruited from University of Plymouth, completed no knowledge (NK), 
concealed knowledge (CK) and countermeasure (CM) tasks. All participants had normal 
or corrected vision, and no history of neurological or psychiatric disease. Data from 2 
participants were excluded from the analyses (one due to excessive muscle tension 
artifacts and the other due to misunderstanding of the rules), leaving 43 participants (30 
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females and 13 males, mean age = 20.7 years, SD = 2.3). All procedures were approved 
by the Plymouth University Faculty of Science and Technology Human Ethics 
Committee. All participants gave signed informed consent and were remunerated for 
their time in the study.  
 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were the single digits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, green against a black background. 
Probes and targets varied across participants and these pairs were drawn randomly from 
the 20 possible pairings with a numerical distance between the probe and the target of at 
least 2. The same probe-target pair was used for the NK, CK and CM conditions. Each 
digit subtended approximately 2 x 2 degrees of visual angle (Figure 4-1).  
 
Figure 4-1. Digit stimuli 
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Procedure  
 The study was divided into two sessions. The first session was the EEG experiment 
where participants completed the NK, CK and CM tasks. After the EEG experiment, 
participants were scheduled to come back for a second session to complete cognitive 
tests and questionnaires.  
After setting up the EEG cap and electrodes, participants were seated on a 
comfortable chair, 115 cm from a computer screen in a dark room. The paradigm was 
presented by Presentation○R  software (Version 18.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., 
Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com). A total of 210 stimuli were presented in each 
condition with each digit presented 35 times. Each stimulus was presented for 800 ms, 
with an average inter trial interval (ITI) of 3500 ms, randomly varying between 3200 
and 4000 ms to minimize expectation potentials.  
At the beginning of the study, participants were given a target digit verbally and 
instructed to press a ‘Yes’ button to it with their dominant hand during the entire 
experiment. In the NK condition, participants pressed a ‘Yes’ button when they saw the 
target digit and a ‘No’ button for all other digits. Before starting the second task (CK 
condition), participants were instructed to choose a “secret” digit (probe) by selecting an 
envelope from a set of 5 (all containing the same digit assigned by design to that 
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participant). The instructions asked participants to open the selected envelope, take the 
card with the secret digit inside it, keep it face down on their lap, and to lie by denying 
having knowledge of this digit by pressing the ‘No’ button throughout the test. 
Participants were informed that the experimenter did not know their secret digit (probe) 
as they kept the envelope until the end of the experiment. Their job was to lie to the 
experimenter by trying to control their behavior and brain signals, as these would be 
monitored during the test for the experimenter to find signs of deception. In the final 
task (CM condition), participants were instructed to perform a mental countermeasure 
composed of two strategies to beat the test while performing the CK task just described. 
The first strategy was to pay attention to superficial aspects of the probe by focusing on 
some physical features (e.g., font, color or size) of the digit. In other words, participants 
were asked to try to ignore the meaning of the probe and to focus on how it looked like 
on the screen. The second strategy was to think of something meaningful from one’s 
memory that was associated with each of the irrelevant digits and once the association 
between one’s own memory and each irrelevant digit was created, to just think of the 
same memory each time one encountered the corresponding irrelevant. This strategy 
was designed to try to make the irrelevant digits more meaningful to the participants 
thus reducing the difference between the secret digit and the other irrelevant digits.  
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To ensure that the secret number had no meaning in the NK condition and no 
strategies were applied in the CK condition, all participants completed the three tasks in 
the same order, i.e., NK, CK and CM. Prior to each task, participants carried out a 
practice session to make sure that they understood the instructions and performed the 
tasks correctly. The same stimulus sequence was used in the three tasks for the practice 
session and it consisted of 12 trials.   
In order to avoid confounds due to local statistical properties of the sequences, the 
stimulus sequences used in these three tasks were the same. Thus, the pattern of button 
presses was identical in each task and the only differences between tasks were the 
concealed information about the probe and the execution of the CMs.  
 
Creativity tests 
 Participants came back for the second session individually to complete the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999) and two creativity tests, 
i.e., the Abbreviate Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA) (Goff, 2002) and the Creativity 
Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) (Carson et al., 2005).   
 
Electrophysiological data acquisition  
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The electroencephalogram (EEG) was sampled at 8192 Hz using a Biosemi 
ActiveTwo system. EEG data were collected from 32 electrodes Ag/AgCl electrodes 
arranged according to the 10-20 system, and loose lead electrodes below the left eye to 
monitor eye blinks and vertical eye movements, and on the left and right mastoids. 
Horizontal eye movements were monitored using 2 loose electrodes places on the outer 
canthi of the right and left eyes. The data were downsampled off-line to 512 Hz before 
further processing. For analyses, data were re-referenced off-line to the average of the 
two mastoids for consistency with most of the existing literature on the topic.  
 
ERP analyses 
ERPs were averaged off-line for an epoch of 1200 ms (including a 200 ms 
baseline), beginning 200 ms prior to stimulus onset. Independent component analysis 
(ICA) was conducted for 65% of participants using the runica algorithm. Independent 
component analysis-based artefact identification methods were employed to identify 
ocular and muscle artifacts (Mognon et al., 2011; Winkler et al., 2011). The results of 
the artefact detection were visually inspected before the components were manually 
removed. Subsequently, residual trials contaminated by blinks, eye movement, muscle 
activity or amplifier blocking were rejected off-line. The data were low-pass filtered at 
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30 Hz.  
Analyses focused on the comparison between the probe and the irrelevants. Here 
we use the term “probe effect” to indicate the difference in the measure of interest 
between the probe and irrelevants. The P300 probe effect, regarded as a robust index of 
recognition, was used here to determine whether and to what extent the mental 
countermeasures worked. For completeness, we also measured the amplitude of the N2. 
The time window used to quantify P300 amplitude was between 500 and 700 ms. The 
amplitude of the N2 component was measured between 200 and 250 ms. The selection 
of time windows was based on the results of previous research (e.g., Farwell & Donchin, 
1991; Ganis et al., 2016; Rosenfeld, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 2004) as well as on 
aggregated grand average from trials.  
To assess the overall pattern of results, repeated-measures ANOVAs on lateral and 
midline sites were conducted on the mean amplitudes of the average ERPs from each 
participant. The “lateral” ANOVAs were carried out on the 14 pairs of lateral sites using 
three factors: Item Type (probe vs. irrelevants), Hemisphere (L vs. R) and Site (14 site 
pairs). The “midline” ANOVAs were carried out on the 4 midline sites (Fz, Cz, Pz, and 
Oz) using 2 factors: Item type (probe vs. irrelevants) and Site (4 midline sites). The 
“irrelevants” level in the item type factor was the average of all 4 irrelevants.  
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After the omnibus analyses, we focused on the Pz site for further analyses of the 
P300, as Pz has been repeatedly reported in the previous studies (Ganis et al., 2016; 
Rosenfeld, 2011; Rosenfeld et al., 2004) and also showed the largest effect of concealed 
information in the current study compared with other sites. To assess if countermeasures 
reduced the P300 probe effect, we directly compared the activity of (Probe – Irrelevants) 
between CK and CM condition by conducting paired t-tests. To examine if the reduced 
P300 probe effect was due to a decreased P300 to the probe or to an increased P300 to 
irrelevants, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted using two factors: Condition 
(CK vs. CM) and Item Type (probe vs. irrelevants). Follow-up t-tests were carried out 
to compare pairs of items of interest.  
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) and linear discriminant analyses were 
conducted between each group (NK vs. CK, NK vs. CM and CK vs. CM) to determine 
the accuracy with which the P300 component could be used to classify between 
different conditions. We also compared the area under the ROC curve (AUC) between 
for the classification of NK vs. CK and NK vs. CM using a nonparametric approach 
(Hanley & Hajian-Tilaki, 1997). These ROC analyses were performed using MedCalc, 
version 12.0 (MedCalc Software, Ostend, Belgium).  
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Correlations between ERP component and creativity measures 
 Since we hypothesized that more creative individuals might implement 
countermeasures more efficiently because of higher flexible cognitive control, we 
conducted correlation analyses between the mean amplitude of the P300 probe effect 
and creativity measures. We expected to see individuals with higher creativity score 
showing smaller P300 probe effect in the CM task.  
 
Results 
Behavioral results 
 For the response time (RT), a two-way ANOVA was conducted using 2 factors: 
Item type (probe, irrelevants) and Condition (CK, CM, NK). The results showed a main 
effect of item type, F(1, 42) = 39.62, p < 0.001, η2= 0.485, with participants responding 
slower to the probe than the irrelevants, and a main effect of condition, F(2, 84) = 12.53, 
p < 0.001, η2= 0.230, with participants responding slower in the CM compared with CK 
and NK condition but no difference between CK and NK. There was also a significant 
interaction between item type and condition, F(2, 84) = 16.11, p < 0.001, η2= 0.277, 
indicating that the effect of item type (i.e., probe and irrelevants) differed across 
conditions. Although the pattern of YES/NO responses was constant across conditions, 
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the RTs revealed that participants followed the instructions of each condition and 
performed differently in the different conditions.  
Next, to understand how the effect of item type differed across conditions, we 
conducted paired t-tests to compare RTs between probe and irrelevants in each 
condition (see Table 4-1 for descriptive statistics). The RTs showed no significant 
difference between the probe and irrelevants in the NK condition, t(42) = -1.052, p = 
0.299. In contrast, the RTs were slower for the probe than the irrelevants in the CK 
condition, t(42) = 5.431, p < 0.001, d = 0.83. Thus, hiding information of probes in the 
CK condition required deceptive response that took more time than processing 
irrelevants (i.e., honest response). Similarly, the RTs showed slower responses for the 
probe than the irrelevants in the CM condition, t(42) = 5.051, p < 0.001, d = 0.77.  
We also conducted paired t-tests to compare the RTs between CK and CM 
condition for the probes and irrelevants, respectively in order to examine the effect of 
countermeasures on the RTs. The RTs for the probe were slower in the CM than CK 
condition, t(42) = -3.268, p < 0.005, d = 0.50. Similarly, the RTs for irrelevants were 
slower in the CM than CK condition, t(42) = -3.747, p < 0.001, d = 0.57. The longer 
RTs in the CM condition suggest that participants were performing the countermeasures 
to make irrelevants more salient for them and the probe less significant by focusing on 
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physical features.  
 
Table 4-1 
Mean (SD) response time (ms) in the NK, CK and CM conditions 
 NK CK CM 
Probe 455.7 (±65.9) 489.0 (±90.9) 564.9 (±178.6) 
Irrelevants 459.8 (±68.9) 445.9 (±72.3) 506.2 (±129.0) 
 
P300 (500-700 ms): No knowledge (NK) condition 
Without probe knowledge, there was no P300 probe effect. Both lateral and 
midline ANOVAs revealed neither a main effect of item type nor any interactions 
involving item type (Table 4-2, and Figure 4-2a). 
 
P300 (500-700 ms): Concealed knowledge (CK) condition 
The standard CIT effect on the P300 (i.e., P300 probe effect) was replicated when 
participants were informed about a probe. Lateral and midline ANOVAs revealed both a 
main effect of item type and an interaction between item type and site (Table 4-2) where 
the probe was more positive than the irrelevants and the effect was maximal at the 
central-parietal sites. For the midline ANOVA, there was a main effect of item type, and 
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an interaction between item type and site. The direct comparison between probe and 
irrelevants at each site (i.e., Fz, Cz, Pz and Oz) showed significant differences, t(42) > 4, 
p < 0.001 for all contrasts (Figure 4-2b shows the data at Pz as a representative site).    
 
P300 (500-700 ms): Countermeasure (CM) condition 
Although participants were instructed to implement countermeasures in this 
condition, the CIT effect on the P300 was still present. Lateral and midline ANOVAs 
revealed both a main effect of item type and an interaction between item type and site 
(Table 4-2) where the probe was more positive than the irrelevants, and the effect was 
maximal at the central-parietal sites. For the midline ANOVA, there was a main effect 
of item, and an interaction between item type and site. The direct comparison between 
probe and irrelevants at each site (i.e., Fz, Cz, Pz and Oz) showed significant 
differences, t(42) > 2, p < 0.05 for all contrasts (Figure 4-2c shows Pz site as a 
representative).  
 
Figure 4-2. Grand-average ERPs for the probe and the irrelevants at Pz as well as the 
scalp distribution maps (500, 700 ms) for the P300 probe effect in the (a) NK, (b) CK 
and (c) CM conditions. 
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Direct comparison between Concealed knowledge (CK) and Countermeasure (CM) 
condition 
 We conducted an ANOVA using two factors (condition and item type) to examine 
whether the effect of item type differed between the CK and CM condition. There was a 
main effect of item type, F(1,42) = 73.67, ηp2 = 0.637, p < 0.001, but no main effect of 
condition, F(1,42) = 0.06, ηp2 = 0.001, p = 0.806. There was an interaction between 
condition and item type, F(1,42) = 8.03, ηp2 = 0.160, p < 0.01, where the probe effect 
was larger in the CK than CM condition (Figure 4-3). Although the direct comparison 
between the CK and CM conditions for each item type separately showed no significant 
difference (probe: t(42) = 1.22, p = 0.229; irrelevants: t(42) = -1.85, p = 0.072) (Figure 
4-4), the difference for the irrelevants approached significance.  
In sum, the implementation of the countermeasure successfully reduced the P300 
probe effect in the CM condition, and it was due to both a numerical reduction in P300 
amplitude for the probe and an increase for the irrelevants.  
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Figure 4-3. Grand-average ERPs for the difference between the probe and irrelevants at 
Pz as well as the P300 scalp distribution maps (500, 700 ms) 
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Classification between conditions 
 ROC analyses were carried out on the P300 probe effect at Pz between conditions. 
The area under the Curve (AUC) was 0.91 ([0.83, 0.96]) for the classification of NK 
and CK cases, 0.86 ([0.77, 0.93]) for the classification of NK and CM cases, and 0.63 
([0.51, 0.75]) for the classification of CK and CM cases. The AUC reduction due to CM 
use, relative to CK, was not statistically significant, but there was a trend towards 
significance (p = 0.108).  
 
N2 (200-250 ms) 
 In the CK condition, both lateral and midline ANOVAs revealed a main effect of 
item type (Table 4-2) where the probe showed a smaller N2 than irrelevants (Figure 
4-5b). This finding was in the same direction as in the study by Ganis and Schendan 
(2012) showing that concealed information is not necessarily associated with a larger 
frontal N2. In the NK condition, both lateral and midline ANOVAs revealed an 
interaction between item type and site (Table 4-2), indicating that the effect of item type 
varied from site to site (Figure 4-5a). In the CM condition, no main effect or interaction 
including the item factor were found (Figure 4-5c). 
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Figure 4-5. Grand-average ERPs for the probe and the irrelevants at Fz as well as the 
N2 scalp distribution maps (250, 300 ms) in the (a) NK, (b) CK, and (c) CM conditions.  
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Correlations between ERP component and creativity measures 
 To examine if more creative individuals implemented countermeasures more 
effectively, we conducted correlation analyses between the P300 probe effect at Pz site 
in the CM condition and creativity scores (i.e., CAQ arts, CAQ science and ATTA). No 
significant correlations were found. Only a trend towards significance in the expected 
direction was found with CAQ science (r = -0.266, p = 0.084).  
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Table 4-2  
               Lateral (Lat) and Midline (Mid) ANOVAs on N2 (200, 250 ms) and P300 (500, 700 
ms) amplitude in no knowledge (NK), concealed knowledge (CK), countermeasure 
(CM) tasks, comparison between the CK and CM tasks and comparison between the CK 
and NK tasks. The item factor includes two levels: the probe and the average of the 4 
irrelevants. 
ERP  N2 
 
P300 
  Lat 
 
Mid 
 
Lat   Mid 
Source F p 𝜂!! 
 
F p 𝜂!! 
 
F p 𝜂!!   F p 𝜂!! 
No Knowledge (NK) Task 
Item 2.54 .12 .06 
 
2.62 .11 .06 
 
2.75 .11 .06 
 
3.66 .06 .08 
I x Site 3.15 <.05 .07 
 
5.71 <.01 .12 
 
0.84 .51 .02 
 
0.36 .71 .01 
I x Hemi 0.42 .52 .01 
     
0.37 .55 .01 
    
Concealed Knowledge (CK) Task 
I 8.08 <.01 .16 
 
8.78 <.01 .17 
 
55.70 <.001 .57 
 
68.74 <.001 .62 
I x S 1.00 .38 .02 
 
0.76 .46 .02 
 
27.29 <.001 .39 
 
17.84 <.001 .30 
I x H 2.71 .11 .06 
     
0.81 .37 .02 
    
Countermeasure (CM) Task 
I 0.57 .45 .01 
 
0.27 .60 .01 
 
18.29 <.001 .30 
 
26.42 <.001 .39 
I x S 1.67 .18 .04 
 
2.42 .10 .06 
 
27.69 <.001 .40 
 
14.55 <.001 .26 
I x H 6.00 <.05 .13 
     
0.00 .95 .00 
    
Concealed Knowledge Task vs Countermeasure Task 
I 5.23 <.05 .11 
 
4.52 <.05 .10 
 
49.65 <.001 .54 
 
64.24 <.001 .61 
I x S 1.85 .16 .04 
 
1.66 .20 .04 
 
39.79 <.001 .49 
 
23.48 <.001 .36 
I x Task 1.23 .30 .03 
 
2.35 .13 .05 
 
5.68 <.05 .12 
 
6.65 <.05 .14 
I x H 6.50 <.05 .13    0.31 .58 .01    
I x S x H 1.01 .43 .02      2.08 <.05 .05     
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Concealed Knowledge Task vs No Knowledge Task 
I 1.05 .31 .02 
 
1.08 .31 .03 
 
15.00 <.001 .26 
 
22.40 <.001 .35 
Task 32.60 <.001 .44 28.74 <.001 .41 17.53 <.001 .29 24.79 <.001 .37 
I x S 0.86 .44 .02 
 
1.80 .18 .04 
 
17.18 <.001 .29 
 
15.92 <.001 .28 
I x T 12.22 <.001 .23 
 
12.48 =.001 .23 
 
59.96 <.001 .59 
 
84.67 <.001 .67 
I x S x T 3.67 <.05 .08 
 
4.69 <.01 .10 
 
23.49 <.001 .36 
 
11.08 <.001 .21 
Note. Degrees of freedom: i) No Knowledge, Concealed Knowledge, and 
Countermeasure Tasks. Item: 1, 42; Item x Hemi: 1, 42; Item x Site (Lat) & Item x Site 
x Hemi: 13, 546; Item x Site (Mid): 3, 126. ii) Concealed Knowledge Task vs 
Countermeasure Task & Concealed Knowledge Task vs No Knowledge Task. Item, 
Item x Hemisphere, Item x Task: 1, 42; Item x Site (Lat), Item x Site x Task (Lat), Item 
x Site x Hemisphere, Item x Site x Hemisphere x Task: 13, 546; Item x Site (Mid), Item 
x Site x Task (Mid): 3, 126. F values are with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
 
Discussion 
 This study showed that the P300 probe effect could differentiate concealed 
knowledge and no-knowledge cases but that it became significantly smaller when 
participants applied mental countermeasures.   
 This result is novel and important because it is the first ERP study to apply purely 
mental CMs during a standard CIT. Previous ERP studies did not use CMs on the probe 
under the assumption that doing so would result in increased attention to the probe 
(Waid, Orne, Cook, & Orne, 1978; Waid, Orne, & Orne, 1981). Indeed, Elaad and 
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Ben-Shakhar (1991) found that item-specific countermeasures tended to increase 
psychophysiological detection with autonomic measures when participants were 
requested to count silently from one to ten every time the probe was presented. They 
proposed that this item-specific countermeasure requires participants to identify the 
probe prior to implementing the mental countermeasure and resulting in an increased 
autonomic response. In the current study, one strategy of the CM was applied to the 
probe, and it resulted in a numerical reduction of P300 amplitude compared to the CK 
condition, not an increase (Figure 4-4). This suggests that ERPs to the probe can be 
modulated via top-down inhibiting processes and that the probe is also vulnerable to 
mental countermeasures. The second CM strategy was applied to the irrelevants and it 
enhanced their saliency.  
 Compared with physical CMs, mental CMs are much less likely to be detected by 
examiners. Thus, it is important to examine whether ERP-based measure can still detect 
concealed information when the mental CMs are implemented. In this study, purely 
mental CMs appear to be less effective than the physical CMs (or a mixture of physical 
and mental CMs) used in previous studies because the AUC reduction only showed a 
trend towards significance. Previous CM studies using neuroimaging techniques have 
shown that combining physical and mental CMs, or using physical CMs only, 
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significantly reduced concealed knowledge detection accuracy rate (Ganis et al., 2011; 
Rosenfeld et al., 2004). Although paired t-test showed the mental CMs successfully 
reduced the P300 probe effect in the current study, the classification did not show 
significance. Recently, Peth, Suchotzki, and Gamer (2016) systematically compared the 
application of physical and mental CM on autonomic measures during the CIT, and they 
found that physical CMs (e.g., moving their toes) were more effective than mental CM 
(e.g., imaging an emotional picture following specific irrelevant items). On reason for 
this difference may be that the effectiveness of mental CMs requires participants’ 
imagination and the level of vividness may vary from trial to trial. This may enhance 
the inter- and intra- variability so that mental CMs only have a moderate effect on 
average. In contrast, physical CMs require participants to carry out specific movements 
of body parts when the corresponding items are shown. This type of CM is more likely 
to have a consistent effect on the dependent measures than mental CMs, as the 
movement is objective.  
In a real crime testing, suspects will not know the irrelevant items until they start 
the test, as they did in the current study. Under this circumstance, it is unlikely that 
participants had practiced countermeasures beforehand. In one fMRI study conducted 
by Ganis et al. (2011), they instructed participants to imperceptibly wiggle the left index 
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finger upon seeing the first irrelevant item, wiggle left the middle finger upon seeing the 
second irrelevant item, and wiggle the left big toe upon seeing the third irrelevant item. 
These consistent associations between covert actions and irrelevant items required some 
practice before participants executed them correctly. However, the suspects in a real 
crime case do not have the chance to practice which covert action is performed in 
response to each irrelevant item. What suspects could do is make spontaneous responses 
to the stimuli, just as participants did in the current study, where they had to generate 
mental associations upon seeing the irrelevant items. This strategy is more difficult to 
implement and is closer to a real-life situation, but it still affects the deception index 
(i.e., P300 amplitude) significantly, according to the current results.  
For the anterior N2 results, we found that the probe elicited a smaller N2 than 
the irrelevants in the concealed knowledge condition, which is similar to what Ganis 
and Schendan (2012) found. This can be explained with the idea that the amplitude of 
the anterior N2 is proportional to the degree of mismatch to memory (Folstein & Van 
Petten, 2008; Folstein, Van Petten, & Rose, 2008). In the CK condition, compared with 
the probe, participants had minimal memories about irrelevant items, and so the N2 was 
larger to the irrelevants.  
There was a small but significant interaction between item type and site in the 
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NK condition where participants did not have concealed information. One likely reason 
for this is that despite stimulus randomization across participants, residual perceptual 
differences between the probe and the irrelevants remained at the group level. This 
would be consistent with the idea that small perceptual differences among the stimuli 
can strongly modulate the N2 effect in the CIT paradigm, as shown in Ganis et al. 
(2016). These findings further confirm that the anterior N2 is not a robust index of 
concealed knowledge because it is affected by many cognitive processes, such as 
cognitive control, attention, novelty, etc. (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008).  
 The effect of mental CMs, as indexed by the P300 probe effect, was not associated 
with creative abilities, with the exception of a trend in the expected direction for the 
CAQ Science. In other words, the current result did not support the hypothesis that 
people with higher creativity scores were better at switching countermeasures from trial 
to trial between the two attentional modes, i.e., probe and irrelevants, respectively. It is 
possible that the ERP components involved in attentional switch occurred in the earlier 
time window, not in the P300 we focused on. From the previous ERP studies on visual 
selective attention, the P1 and N1 are frequently of interest and normally occur between 
80 and 200 ms after stimulus onset (e.g., Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998; Vogel & Luck, 
2000). The P300 probe effect we examined occurred between 500 and 700 ms and its 
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amplitude is mainly based on the perceived category probabilities of stimuli (see 
Johnson, 1988 for reviews), not attention orienting. Thus, due to the limitation of the 
dependent variable used in this ERP study, we were unable to find the smaller probe 
effect modulated by creative abilities. In the next study, we expected that the fMRI 
method would provide more information, e.g., a neural index representing the probe 
effect modulated by creativity, because of its better spatial resolution.   
 This is the first study to show how purely mental CMs influence the accuracy of 
P300-based CITs by reducing the difference between the probe and irrelevant. Although 
mental CMs seem to have limited effect compared with physical CMs, this study 
provides evidence that even with short response times (i.e., 800 ms), top-down 
cognitive processes can still affect the reliability of ERP-based CIT. This study also 
provides another general point that the vulnerability of the neuroimaging methods for 
deception detection to numerous countermeasures should be assessed, especially those 
countermeasures which cannot be observed by the examiners. The next study will 
continue examining the vulnerability of another neuroimaging method — functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for concealed knowledge detection using the same 
mental countermeasures. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 4 – The Effect of Mental Countermeasures on fMRI-based  
Concealed Information Test 
 
Introduction 
 This study used the same countermeasures employed in the previous chapter, but 
with an fMRI adaptation of the concealed information paradigm. The role of creativity 
in implementing these countermeasures was also examined.  
 Concealed information tests (CITs, also known as Guilty Knowledge Tests, 
invented by Lykken (1959, 1960) have been used for many decades to determine the 
presence or absence of crime-related knowledge in a suspect’s memory (Ganis et al., 
2011; Meijer et al., 2014; Rosenfeld et al., 2012; Verschuere et al., 2011). The basic 
logic of these paradigms (Lykken, 1959) is that recognition of an item of interest 
(referred to as “probe”) will generate a stronger response (compared to suitable control 
items referred to as “irrelevants”) that can be measured by monitoring behavioural, 
psychophysiological, or neural variables. Thus, the difference in response between the 
probe and the irrelevants (“probe effect”, hereafter) can be used as an index of whether 
somebody has concealed knowledge about a certain item. 
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Currently, the CIT is used for forensic purposes only in Japan, but there has been 
growing interest in it across the world (Matsuda, Nittono, & Allen, 2012). Among the 
important issues for any potential application of the CIT is the extent to which 
countermeasures, physical or mental, can reduce its accuracy (Honts et al., 1996). An 
effective physical countermeasure with polygraphy-based CITs involves pressing one’s 
toes to the floor during the presentation of irrelevants (Honts et al., 1996). Similarly, an 
effective mental countermeasure entails counting backwards by sevens to irrelevants 
(Honts et al., 1996). Countermeasures can be effective even with neuroscience-based 
methods that at first sight may seem more difficult to compromise. One type of 
countermeasure that can disrupt the accuracy of a common kind of fMRI-based CIT 
involves associating covert actions with a subset of the irrelevants (Ganis et al., 2011). 
Its effectiveness is thought to rely on increasing the relative saliency of irrelevants, thus 
reducing the size of the probe effect. 
Although this fMRI study was the first on this topic, it had some limitations. First, 
it examined only a very specific type of countermeasure, leaving open the issue of 
whether a more general class of mental countermeasures may be equally or more 
effective. Second, the countermeasure was applied only to a subset of the irrelevants 
because applying it to all irrelevants might have artificially increased the saliency of the 
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probe. This may have not only diluted the effect of the countermeasure, as one typically 
compares the probe with the mean of all the irrelevants, but it may also provide clues of 
countermeasure use. Thus, countermeasures that can be applied to all items may be 
more effective. Third, this countermeasure was detectable by examining activation in 
primary motor cortex, as it involved making irrelevant-specific imperceptible 
movements with one’s fingers and toes and probably engaged motor planning and 
motor imagery. Finally, no personality dimensions were measured to determine if some 
people were better than others at implementing the countermeasures.  
An interesting class of mental countermeasures that may address the limitations 
just discussed was tested in recent fMRI work in a different context using standard 
old/new face recognition paradigms (Rissman, Greely, & Wagner, 2010; Uncapher, 
Boyd-Meredith, Chow, Rissman, & Wagner, 2015). This work showed that multivariate 
analyses of brain activation could discriminate well above chance hits (correctly 
recognized old faces) from correct rejections (correctly rejected new faces) in single 
individuals. However, the accuracy of the discrimination was reduced to chance by 
using attentional countermeasures (Uncapher et al., 2015). On the one hand, patterns of 
brain activation associated with a new face could be made to resemble that of an old 
(recognized) face by retrieving similar faces already stored in memory and focusing 
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attention to them and by responding as if it was an old face (i.e., pressing the “old” key). 
On the other, brain activation associated with an old face could be made to look like that 
of a new face by diverting attention away from the recognition experience and by 
focusing instead on peripheral perceptual details of the old face and by responding as if 
it was a new face (i.e., pressing the “new” key).  
There are notable differences between standard recognition and CIT paradigms. 
Specifically, standard recognition paradigms usually employ hundreds of stimuli that 
are presented only once during study and test and a new stimulus in this paradigm is 
never encountered before in the study. In contrast, CIT paradigms typically use fewer 
than 10 stimuli, and these stimuli are repeated tens of times during testing; irrelevant 
stimuli in these paradigms are not new, in the sense that they have been encountered 
many times before in the CIT session, like the probes. Thus, at least some of the neural 
processed involved in discriminating old and new items in standard recognition 
paradigms are likely to be different from those involved in discriminating between 
probes and irrelevants in CIT paradigms. Despite these differences, we predicted that 
attentional countermeasures of this kind would also be effective with CIT paradigms. 
Thus, we devised a countermeasure that required attention to be focused to superficial 
probe features and to meaningful memories associated with the irrelevants. 
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Finally, we tested the hypothesis that more creative individuals may be better at 
implementing this type of attentional countermeasures. This is because individuals who 
score high on standard creativity measures have been shown to have more flexible 
cognitive control (Zabelina and Robinson, 2010), and so they may be better at switching 
from trial to trial between the two attentional modes required by the countermeasures. 
In sum, we compared the probe effect in concealed knowledge, no knowledge, and 
countermeasure conditions and used both univariate and multivariate analyses to 
determine the effect of these countermeasures. We expected to find a reliable probe 
effect in the same prefrontal-parietal network reported in previous CIT studies in the 
concealed knowledge condition (Ganis et al., 2011; Peth et al., 2015), compared to the 
no knowledge condition, which in turn was expected to show no probe effect. 
Furthermore, we expected the probe effect to be smaller in this network in the 
countermeasure condition. Finally, we expected to find a modulation of countermeasure 
effectiveness in this network by creativity. 
 
Materials and methods 
Subjects 
Twenty-three right-handed normal participants (9 females; mean age = 24.2 years) 
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from the University of Padova participated in the study. Exclusion criteria included 
history or presence of neurological or psychiatric disorders and failure to meet the 
screening criteria for MRI scanning. Three participants did not follow the instructions 
and their data were not used. All analyses were carried out on the remaining twenty 
participants (9 females, mean age = 24.1 years). The Ethics Committee at the University 
of Padova approved the study and all participants gave signed informed consent. The 
full subject information and consent form is presented in Appendix 5A. 
 
Stimuli 
In each task, the stimuli were six digits (3-8) shown in white against a black 
background and presented for 750 ms. The stimuli were followed by a black screen with 
a fixation dot lasting between 1000 and 9000 ms (2000 ms on average), according to a 
pseudo-random sequence (Dale, 1999). These stimuli were used because they were very 
similar to each other visually and they had already been successfully used in prior work 
by this group (Ganis et al., 2016).  
 
Design and procedure  
The study was divided into two sessions. The first session took place at the 
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Neuroradiology Unit, University Hospital of Padua, where fMRI scanning was 
conducted. After this session, participants were scheduled for a follow up session to 
complete the Creativity Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ) and the Abbreviated 
Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA).  
Stimuli for the event-related fMRI tasks were presented using E-prime 2.0 
software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA, USA) and were projected 
onto the screen of MR-compatible LCD video goggles (VisuaStim XGA, Resonance 
Technology Inc.) worn by participants. The stimuli were presented at a resolution of 
800 x 600 pixels and refreshed at 60 Hz). The three conditions were (i) no knowledge 
(NK), (ii) concealed knowledge (CK), and (iii) countermeasure (CM). Participants 
responded on a MR-compatible response box (Evoke Response Pad, Resonance 
Technology Inc.) using right-handed button presses with their index and middle finger 
(yes/no, respectively). They were instructed to respond as fast as possible without 
sacrificing accuracy. There were four runs for each condition and each run consisted of 
36 trials where each digit showed up six times. Participants completed a total of 12 runs 
in the scanner.  
All conditions included three types of items (single digits) as follows: (i) one 
“target” (16.7% of all stimuli) was given participants, who responded truthfully by 
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pressing the “yes” button. This target number was given to participants before starting 
the fMRI session and it was included to ensure attention was paid in all tasks; (ii) one 
“probe” (16.7% of all stimuli), whose meaning and response instructions varied by 
condition. For the NK condition, the probe was just another irrelevant number without 
any particular meaning for the participants, who simply pressed the “no” key to this 
item, indicating truthfully they did not know it. No information was given about the 
probe beforehand and so this control condition simulated the case of participants 
without concealed knowledge about the probe. In contrast, for the CK condition, 
participants were given the probe and they were instructed to keep this number secret 
from the experimenter by pressing the “no” button to pretend they did not know it. 
Finally, the CM condition was the same as the CK condition, with participants 
instructed to hide knowledge of the probe by pressing the “no” button. However, in this 
condition participants were taught to perform a countermeasure on the probe by 
focusing on superficial aspects of it such as its physical features (e.g., font features, 
color, size, and so on) as if they were seeing a word but they tried to ignore its meaning 
by focusing just on how the word looked like on the screen; (iii) four “irrelevants” 
(66.7% of all stimuli), with no particular meaning for participants, who responded 
truthfully by pressing the “no” button, indicating they did not know these numbers. 
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However, in the CM condition, participants were taught to perform a second 
countermeasure by focusing attention on memories associated with each of the 
irrelevant numbers (no specific examples were given in order to avoid limiting the kind 
of associations participants could spontaneously generate). This way, the irrelevants 
would become more meaningful to participants. The two countermeasures in the CM 
condition were based on those used by Uncapher and collaborators (Uncapher et al., 
2015). Note that in the CM condition too, participants were instructed to respond as fast 
as possible without sacrificing accuracy. This was done in order to minimize potential 
differences in the RTs between the CM and the CK conditions.  
To ensure that the secret number had no meaning in the NK task and that no 
systematic countermeasure strategies were applied during the CK task, all participants 
completed the three tasks in the same order: NK, CK and CM, as in previous work 
(Ganis et al., 2011). Prior to the fMRI scan, participants underwent a practice session 
for the NK condition outside the scanner to familiarize them with the stimuli and 
responses. Instruction and practice for the CK and CM tasks were given before the 
actual runs while participants were in the scanner. The practice session consisted of 12 
trials and was the same for each task but with different instructions.  
To enhance the social component of the task, before the CK task participants were 
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told that the main experimenter did not know the secret number, that she was not in the 
MRI control room, and that she would try to identify the secret number by analyzing 
their brain images on a computer in a different room. Thus, the job for participants 
during the CK and CM tasks was to hide their secret number by pressing the “no” 
button to pretend they did not know it while responding truthfully to all other numbers. 
In reality, the main experimenter knew the secret number and was in the MRI control 
room, and this was revealed during the debriefing session at the end of experiment. The 
debriefing session showed that all participants believed they were hiding their secret 
number from the experimenter, who was trying to discover it.  
 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ, Carson et al., 2005) 
We assessed real-world creative behavior with the Creative Achievement 
Questionnaire, in which participants catalogued any prior creative achievements across 
ten creative domains (visual art, music, dance, architectural design, creative writing, 
humor, inventions, scientific discovery, theater and film, and culinary arts). In the music 
domain, for example, questions range from “I have no training or recognized talent in 
this area” (score of 0) to “my compositions have been critiqued in a national publication” 
(score of 7). In the scientific discovery subset, scores vary from “I have no training or 
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recognized ability in this field” (score of 0) to “my work has been cited by other 
scientists in national publications” (score of 7). Separate domain scores were then 
combined to form a single index of creative achievement (mean score was 9.45, SD = 
8.19, range 2-36). In addition, there is evidence that artists display different personality 
traits (Feist, 1998, 1999) than creative scientists. Carson et al. (2005) examined the 
factor structure of the CAQ and provided a two-factor solution identifying an Arts 
domain (visual art, music, dance, creative writing, humor, and theater and film) and a 
Science domain (inventions, scientific discovery, and culinary arts). The mean creative 
achievement score for the Arts domain was 6.00 (SD = 4.41, range 0-14), and for the 
Science domain was 3.40 (SD = 4.91, range 0-22). These two scores were used to 
examine whether more creative individuals might be better at implementing 
countermeasures.  
 
Abbreviated Torrance Test for Adults (ATTA, Goff, 2002):  
The ATTA is a shortened version of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
(TTCT) with three activities given 3 minutes to respond each. The ATTA provides 
substantial insight into the creativity of adults by quantifying verbal and figural creative 
strengths. The creativity index is measured by four norm-referenced abilities (i.e., 
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fluency, originality, elaboration and flexibility) and fifteen criterion-referenced 
creativity indicators. The mean creativity index was 68.2 (SD = 5.33, range 61-78). 
 
fMRI data acquisition 
Whole brain imaging data were acquired using a 1.5T (Siemens Avanto) MRI 
scanner with an 8-channel head coil. For each participant, functional images were 
acquired using a gradient-echo planar pulse sequence with 31 axial slices parallel to the 
anterior-posterior commissural plane, TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV = 20 cm, FA = 
90º, 64 x 64 matrix and 3.125 x 3.125 x 4 mm resolution. During each run 116 
functional volumes were acquired, for a total of 464 volumes. A high resolution 
T1-weighted structural image was acquired, using a magnetization-prepared rapid 
gradient echo (MPRAGE) sequence with TR = 1900 ms, TE = 2.91 ms, FOV = 25 cm, 
FA = 8º, 176 sagittal slices, 256 x 256 matrix and 1 x 1 x 1 mm resolution for 
normalization to a template space. Finally, a T2-weighted structural image co-planar to 
the functional images was also obtained with 31 axial slices, TR = 7480 ms, TE = 94 ms, 
FA = 150º, 256 x 256 matrix and 0.8 x 0.8 x 4 mm resolution.  
 
Preprocessing of fMRI data 
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Brain imaging data were pre-processed and statistically analyzed using SPM8 
(Statistical Parametric Mapping, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, 
UK). The first four volumes of each run were not used in the analyses to ensure that T1 
equilibrium was reached. For each participant, slice-time and motion correction were 
applied to the functional volumes, which were then coregistered to the co-planar 
T2-weighted images and finally with the T1-weighted structural images. T1 images 
were normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template using SPM8’s 
segmentation tool. The resulting transformation parameters obtained from the 
segmentation were applied to the functional images to spatially normalize them to MNI 
space (2 x 2 x 2 mm voxels for the whole brain univariate analyses, 3 x 3 x 3 mm 
voxels for the ROI and multivariate analyses). Finally, for the univariate analyses the 
normalized functional images were spatially smoothed using an 8 mm full-width at 
half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. 
 
Univariate fMRI analyses 
For the subject-level analyses, we applied voxel-wise univariate general linear 
models (GLM) on each participant’s preprocessed functional data to obtain individual 
whole-brain estimates of brain responses to the stimuli presented during the NK, CK 
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and CM conditions. For each condition and run, the GLM included one regressor for 
each of the 3 types of items (i.e., target, probe, and irrelevant) and six covariate motion 
parameters. Onset delta functions were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic 
response function (HRF). Low-frequency noise was eliminated by high-pass filtering at 
1/128 Hz. 
Contrast images were generated to capture the difference in response between the 
probe and the irrelevants types for each individual participant (combined across runs) 
for the NK, CK and CM conditions, which were subsequently used in group-level 
analyses. The key contrasts were “probe > irrelevants” and “irrelevants > probe”. For 
the whole-brain group analyses, statistical significance was tested using paired- and 
one-sample t-tests at p < 0.001 at the voxel level (uncorrected), with p < 0.05 
(FWE-corrected) at the cluster level. 
To further quantify the neural response in brain areas known to be involved in this 
paradigm, we defined spherical ROIs (12 mm radius) around the centers of mass of the 
seven ROIs reported in Ganis et al. (2011), where the same type of CIT and stimulus 
timing were used. It was critical to employ ROIs defined in an independent dataset in 
order to avoid overfitting (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009). The 
coordinates of the centers of the seven ROIs were: 5, 21, 49 (medial/superior frontal 
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gyrus/anterior cingulate, GFd), 1, -19, 34 (middle cingulate gyrus, GC), 45, 26, -6 (right 
inferior frontal gyrus/insula, RGFi), -38, 22, -8 (left inferior frontal gyrus/insula, LGFi), 
52, -46, 42 (right inferior parietal lobule/supramarginal gyrus, RLPi), -60, -44, 35 (left 
inferior parietal lobule/supramarginal gyrus, LLPi), and 3, -3, 2 (thalamus, caudate 
nucleus, lenticular nucleus, Thal). Note that for simplicity in the rest of the paper we 
will refer to these ROIs by using only the first anatomical structure or its abbreviation. 
ANOVAs were conducted on the contrast between the probe and the irrelevants with 
ROI and condition as factors. 
 
Multivariate fMRI analyses 
Multivariate analyses were conducted to determine whether patterns of brain 
activation (multiple ROIs or multiple voxels) could reliably discriminate concealed and 
no concealed knowledge cases. The multivariate analyses were carried out on spatially 
normalized contrast images (probe minus irrelevants) without smoothing. Each feature 
was also normalized across cases by means of a z-score transformation (Hsu, Chang, & 
Lin, 2003). Classification analyses were carried out with the MATLAB implementation 
of LIBSVM (Chang & Lin, 2011). Since the number of features far exceeded the 
number of cases in the multi-voxel analyses, linear support vector machines (SVMs) 
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instead of nonlinear ones were used (Hsu et al., 2003). All analyses reported here were 
conducted with default cost parameter c = 1. Exploratory analyses with lower and 
higher values of this parameter (range: 10-5 to 105) showed only small effects on the 
results and so they will not be reported here. Additional exploratory analyses indicated 
that quadratic and Radial Basis Function kernels (RBFs) did not lead to better 
generalization than the linear kernel.  
A key issue with multivariate analyses of fMRI data is the high-dimensionality of 
the datasets, usually requiring data reduction procedures before classification (Jin et al., 
2009). To address this issue, in one set of analyses we used as features activation in the 
7 ROIs defined in our previous study (Ganis et al., 2011), thus eliminating biases due to 
selecting features in the same dataset on which the classification is performed. Note that 
multivariate analyses in this context usually refer to “multi-voxel” analyses, where 
features are individual voxel activations (Tong & Pratte, 2012). However, they can also 
encompass “multi-ROI” analyses in which features are ROI average activations. Both 
multi-ROI and multivoxel analyses (voxels from the ROIs) were performed here.  
A recent CIT study (Peth et al., 2015) used signal detection theory methods to 
quantify accuracy, and showed an Area Under the Curve (AUC) ranging between 0.78 
and 0.87 using univariate ROI analyses, and higher classification accuracy (AUC = 0.98) 
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using activation in all grey matter voxels (over 105 features) as input to a linear 
classifier. Although this was unexpected (Jin et al., 2009), we carried out this same 
analysis on our dataset.  
In sum, the multivariate analyses were conducted on three types of data: 
multi-average ROIs (7 features), multi-voxel ROIs (1069 features), multi-voxel whole 
brain (26452 features).  
For the classification, we used a one-pair-out cross-validation approach in which 
one pair of cases out of 40 (one case per condition tested, always from different 
participants) were left out for testing, and training of the classifier was carried out on 
the remaining cases. Since data in the different conditions were acquired in a 
within-subject manner, all cases for the left out participants were excluded from the 
training set as well (e.g., if case CK for participant X was used during testing, then case 
NK for participant X was excluded also from the training set). This was repeated for all 
possible 380 pairs of left-out cases (20x19). These analyses were repeated by taking 
both members of the left-out pair from the same participant, but the differences were 
negligible, and so they will not be reported.  
In applied situations, one might build a classifier on a known set of NK and CK 
cases and then use it to classify new cases, among which there could be some CM cases. 
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Thus, in these generalization analyses we trained a classifier to discriminate NK and CK 
cases, and compared the performance of the classifier on discriminating left-out NK and 
CK cases and NK and CM cases. The only difference with the previous procedure was 
that the left-out CK/NK and CM/NK cases were always from 4 different participants, 
which were not used during training to discriminate CK and NK cases. For these 
analyses, 10000 random permutations of 4 participants (out of 20) were selected for 
testing, with training performed on the remaining participants (16 NK and 16 CK cases). 
The same analyses were repeated by removing the constraint that the left-out cases had 
to come from different participants, but the results were comparable and so they will not 
be reported here.  
To determine how accurately a classifier discriminated between the different 
conditions, we used signal detection theory, as detailed in the following section (Peth et 
al., 2015). 
 
Validity analyses 
The validity of behavioural and neural measures in discriminating pairs of 
conditions was calculated by generating receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves 
(National Research Council, 2003) using signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). 
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This approach provides more complete and precise information than simply calculating 
accuracy using hits and false alarms at a particular decision value threshold (criterion) 
that does not reflect directly the distance between the two distributions being 
discriminated. The key parameter estimated with these analyses is the area under the 
curve (AUC), which quantifies the separation between two distributions (for example, 
NK and CK cases) using information from the entire range of criteria (Green & Swets, 
1966). An AUC equal to 1 indicates perfect classification accuracy whereas an AUC 
equal to 0.5 indicates classification at chance. In the present study, we carried out CK vs 
NK and CM vs NK classifications using the activation probe effect (probe minus 
irrelevants contrast estimate, for univariate fMRI data) and the decision value 
distribution for all possible left-out pairs (for multivariate fMRI data). ROC curves for 
each possible pair of conditions were generated by calculating hits and false positives 
for criteria spanning the entire distribution of decision values. To determine whether a 
given AUC value was significantly different from chance (0.5), for univariate fMRI 
analyses we calculated the 95% confidence interval using parametric methods 
(Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). For multivariate analyses, significance was determined 
using randomization methods (Good, 2005) to empirically estimate the null distribution 
of AUC values. To calculate the area under the curve (AUC) for the classification 
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between conditions, we used the distribution of decision values resulting from this 
process (using ‘svmpredict’ in LIBSVM). The significance of the AUC was determined 
using a randomization approach as in previous work (Peth et al., 2015). Specifically, we 
estimated the null distribution of AUCs under the null hypothesis of no difference 
between conditions, by randomly shuffling the labels of the two conditions and by 
performing the classification procedure just described. This process was repeated 1000 
times. The AUC calculated for the unshuffled data was considered significant at p < 
0.05 if it was larger than 95% of the values in this null distribution. The difference 
between the AUC in pairs of conditions was tested for significance by estimating the 
null distribution of the difference by shuffling the data and by determining whether the 
unshuffled AUC difference was larger than 95% of the null difference distribution. 
 
Analyses on the effect of creativity measures 
To determine if countermeasure use was more effective by more creative 
individuals, participants were divided into low- and high-creativity subgroups via a 
median split and probe-irrelevant activation in the right supramarginal gyrus ROI 
identified in the CM condition was compared between these two groups.  
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Results 
Behaviour 
 Median target detection accuracy was high in all conditions (NK = 95.8%, 
CK=91.7%, CM=87.5%), indicating that participants were paying attention to the 
stimuli. Bootstrap tests comparing the means showed no significant differences in 
accuracy between any pair of conditions (all ps > 0.05). 
We conducted two-way ANOVAs comparing RTs between the probe and the 
irrelevants in the 3 possible pairs of conditions. Follow-up t-tests were carried out to 
unpack interactions between item and condition. 
The ANOVA including the CK and NK conditions (Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1a) 
showed a main effect of item type, and a trend for a main effect of condition. 
Importantly, there was a significant interaction between condition and item type. 
Follow-up t-tests showed that RTs to the probe were slower than to the irrelevants in the 
CK condition, t(19) = 4.77, p < .0001, but not in the NK condition, t(19) = 0.52, p = 
0.61, as found in previous studies using similar CIT paradigms (Ganis et al., 2011). 
The ANOVA comparing the CM and NK conditions (Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1a) 
showed main effects of item type and condition, as well as an interaction between 
condition and item type. Follow-up t-tests revealed that RTs to the probe were slower 
	 201 
than to the irrelevants in the CM condition, t(19) = 3.15, p < .01.  
Finally, the ANOVA comparing the CK and CM conditions (Table 5-1 and Figure 
5-1a) showed only a main effect of item type, as RTs were slower for the probe than the 
irrelevants. The mean RTs in the CM condition (554 ms) were numerically slower than 
those in the CK condition (538 ms), but not significantly so. There was a trend for the 
RTs to irrelevants (but not probes) to be slower in the CM than in the CK condition, 
t(19) = 1.77, p < 0.1 (Figure 5-1). 
The same analyses were carried out for error rates (ERs). The ANOVA including 
the CK and NK conditions (Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1b) showed only a significant 
interaction between condition and item type. Follow-up t-tests showed a trend for larger 
ERs for the probe than the irrelevants in the CK condition, t(19) = 1.85, p = .079, but 
not in the NK condition. The ANOVA including the CM and NK conditions (Table 5-1 
and Figure 5-1b) showed no significant effects. Finally, the ANOVA comparing the CK 
and CM conditions (Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1b) showed only a main effect of item type, 
with higher ERs for the probe then the irrelevants. 
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Table 5-1  
ANOVAs comparing response times (RTs) and error rates (ERs) for the probe and the 
irrelevants in all pairs of conditions. For the NK condition, the probe was only 
nominally defined because participants had no concealed information. 
            Conditions         
 
 
CK / NK 
   
 
CM / NK 
   
 
CK / CM 
 
Source (RTs) F p    F p    F p  
Item 21.65 <0.005 0.4 
 
8.09 <0.01 0.30 
 
23.28 <0.001 0.55 
Condition 4.16 0.055 0.18 
 
5.59 <0.05 0.23 
 
1.14 0.30 0.06 
I x C 22.03 <0.001 0.54  5.46 <0.05 0.22  1.95 0.18 0.09 
Source (ERs)            
Item 0.75 0.4 0.04 
 
0.19 0.67 0.01 
 
5.73 <0.05 0.23 
Condition 2.64 0.12 0.12 
 
5.59 0.56 0.01 
 
0.71 0.41 0.04 
I x C 5.72 <0.05 0.23  2.1 0.16 0.10  0.48 0.50 0.03 
Note. Degrees of freedom: 1, 19.  
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Figure 5-1.  (a) Reaction times and (b) error rate for the probe and irrelevants in the 
NK, CK and CM conditions.  
(a)  
(b)  
 
fMRI: Univariate whole brain analyses 
 Figure 5-2 shows the results of the whole brain analyses whereas Table 5-2 lists 
the peak coordinates and minimal t values from the paired t-tests comparing brain 
activation between the probe and the irrelevants in the NK, CK and CM conditions. In 
the NK condition, this comparison yielded no significant activation clusters as expected, 
since participants did not have knowledge of the probe and so it was just another 
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irrelevant. In contrast, in the CK condition, significantly stronger brain activation for the 
probe then the irrelevants was present in the middle/anterior cingulate cortex and medial 
frontal gyrus, the bilateral inferior frontal gyri and insula, the right precuneus, the right 
inferior parietal lobule, and the right caudate nucleus. Finally, in the CM condition the 
activation was larger for the probe than the irrelevants in the right supramarginal gyrus 
whereas the opposite pattern was found in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (see Table 5-2, 
Irrelevants > Probe).  
Comparing directly the CK and NK conditions yielded essentially the same regions 
that were found in the CK condition (Table 5-3), confirming that the effects found in the 
CK condition were not due to stimulus peculiarities, as these would have been evident 
also in the NK condition. In contrast, comparing the CM and NK conditions and the CK 
and CM conditions yield no significant differences.  
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Figure 5-2. Whole brain map in the contrast of Probe minus Irrelevants in the (a) CK 
and (b) CM conditions (Top to bottom: left, left-medial, right, right-medial) (Note that 
for the NK condition, no significant region was found)  
 
 
Figure 2. Whole brain map in the contrast of Probe minus Irrelevants in the (a) CK and (b) 
CM conditions (Top to b ttom: left, left-medial, right, right-medial) (Note that for the NK 
condition, no significant region was found) 
        
       
         
         
 
  (a) CK                                  (b) CM 
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Table 5-2  
Peak MNI coordinates with Brodmann’s Area (BA) and minimal t-statistic of brain 
regions with significant positive and negative responses in the contrast of Probe minus 
Irrelevants in the NK, CK and CM conditions. Note that for the NK condition, the probe 
was only nominally defined because participants had no concealed information. 
Condition Regions 
BA 
MNI Coordinates  
x y z t 
Probe > Irrelevants 
NK       
 - - - - - - 
CK       
 R Middle Cingulate Cortex  24 4 21 37 6.98 
 R Anterior Cingulate Cortex 32 6 40 16 5.46 
 L Superior Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 -2 26 57 5.24 
 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus Pars Orbitalis 48 -46 15 -3 6.63 
 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus Pars Triangularis  47 -34 26 -2 4.74 
 L Insula 47 -27 21 -3 4.31 
 R Precuneus 7 10 -66 36 6.39 
 R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 50 -45 48 5.63 
 R Angular Gyrus 39 44 -55 39 5.61 
 R Supramarginal Gyrus 48 51 -39 24 5.56 
 R Caudate - 9 3 3 5.43 
 R Pallidum  - 15 -3 -2 5.20 
 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus Pars Triangularis 45 52 22 9 5.06 
 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus Pars Orbitalis 47 48 27 -8 4.86 
CM       
 R Supramarginal Gyrus 48 63 -42 27 5.40 
 R Supramarginal Gyrus 48 52 -42 25 3.90 
Irrelevants > Probe 
NK       
 - - - - - - 
CK       
 - - - - - - 
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CM       
 R Gyrus Rectus/Medial Orbitofrontal 
Cortex  
11 2 42 -18 4.75 
Note: Significance at all regions for each contrast was tested by a one-sample t-test at p 
< 0.001 at the voxel level (uncorrected), with a significance of p < 0.05 (FWE-corrected) 
at the cluster level.  
BA, Brodmann’s area; L, Left Hemisphere; R, Right Hemisphere.  
 
Table 5-3 
Peak MNI coordinates and minimal t-statistic of brain regions showing significantly 
larger probe-irrelevants between conditions (CK/NK, CM/NK, and CK/CM) 
Condition Regions BA 
MNI Coordinates  
x y z t 
CK - NK       
 L Insula 48 -36 17 4 7.04 
 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus Pars Orbitalis 48 -45 15 -5 6.63 
 L Inferior Frontal Gyrus Pars Oercularis 48 -50 11 1 3.97 
 L Superior Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 2 24 45 6.49 
 R Inferior Frontal Gyrus Pars Triangularis  45 48 21 9 5.63 
 R Superior Frontal Gyrus 10 33 51 10 5.55 
 R Pallidum  - 18 -1 0 5.49 
 R Caudate - 15 12 6 4.31 
 R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 48 -45 48 5.44 
CM - NK       
 - - - - - - 
CK - CM       
 - - - - - - 
Note: Significance was tested with a one-sample t-test at p < 0.001 at the voxel level 
(uncorrected), with p < 0.05 (FWE-corrected) at the cluster level.  
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BA, Brodmann’s area; L, Left Hemisphere; R, Right Hemisphere.  
 
fMRI: Univariate ROI analyses  
 ROI analyses were used to complement the whole brain analyses. We created 
seven ROIs by defining 12 mm spheres around the center of mass of the ROIs reported 
in Ganis et al. (2011). These ROIs were used for both the univariate and the multivariate 
analyses. Figure 5-3 shows the brain activation for the probe effect across all 7 ROIs in 
the CK, CM and NK conditions.  
 
ANOVAs. We conducted three ANOVAs using the within-subject factors of item type 
(probe vs. irrelevants), condition (CK vs NK, CM vs NK, and CK vs CM) and ROI 
(LGFi, LLPi, GC, RGFi, RLPi, Thal, and GFd).  
The first ANOVA including the CK and NK conditions showed a main effect of 
item type and condition (Table 5-4). An interaction between item type and condition 
indicated that the difference between the probe and irrelevants was larger in the CK 
than in the NK condition.  
The second analysis comparing the CM and NK conditions also showed a main 
effect of item type and condition (Table 5-4). The interaction between item type and 
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condition indicated that the difference between probes and irrelevants was larger in the 
CM than in the NK condition.  
Finally, the analysis comparing the CK and CM conditions showed a main effect 
of item type (Table 5-4). Importantly, an interaction between item type and condition 
indicated that the difference between the probe and the irrelevants was larger in the CK 
than in the CM condition. Separate follow-up ANOVAs were conducted on the probe 
and irrelevants separately to unpack the interaction. A main effect of condition revealed 
that activation to the probe was smaller in the CM than in the CK condition, 
F(1,19)=5.19, p < 0.05, 𝜂!!= 0.21. In contrast, although activation to the irrelevants was 
numerically larger in the CM than in the CK condition, there were no significant effects 
of condition in the analysis on the irrelevants.   
In sum, engaging in countermeasures reduced the size of the probe effect and this 
was due mostly to a reduced activation to the probe. 
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Figure 5-3. Brain activation for the probe effect across all 7 ROIs in the CK, CM and 
NK conditions.  
 
 
Table 5-4 
ANOVAs comparing activation for the probe and the irrelevants across all 7 ROIs and 
in all pairs of conditions (CK/NK, CM/NK, and CK/CM). Only significant effects 
involving the factors of interest Condition and Item are shown. Note that for the NK 
condition, the probe was only nominally defined because participants had no concealed 
information.  
                  Conditions     
 
CK / NK 
 
CM / NK 
 
CK /CM 
Source F p    F p    F p  
Item 14.28 <0.001 0.43 
 
4.89 <0.05 0.21 
 
26.26 <0.001 0.58 
Condition 14.88 <0.001 0.44 
 
7.71 <0.05 0.29 
 
2.99 0.1 0.14 
I x C 21.99 <0.001 0.54 
 
6.36 <0.05 0.25 
 
6.08 <0.05 0.24 
Note. Degrees of freedom: Item: 1,19; Condition: 1,19; IxC: 1,19  
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Countermeasures and creativity  
Individuals who scored high on the CAQ art domain showed a smaller probe effect 
in the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) ROI identified in the CM condition than 
individuals who scored low 1.24 vs 4.35, respectively, t(14) = 2.64, p = .019. In other 
words, more creative individuals had a smaller probe effect in the CM condition. No 
effect was found for the science domain, 2.05 vs 1.73, t(13) = 0.25, p = .807, and the 
ATTA, 2.07 vs 3.39, t(14) = 1.07, p = .302. 
 
Potential evidence of countermeasure use 
 In the CM condition, we instructed participants to associate the irrelevants with 
stored autobiographical memories. Thus, we predicted that brain regions involved in 
memory retrieval would exhibit more activation when processing irrelevants than the 
probe in the CM condition (reverse effect). To this aim, we carried out an exploratory 
analysis (i.e., p < .001 at the voxel level with an extent threshold of 10 voxels) to 
investigate whether irrelevants activated memory-related brain regions more than 
probes. This contrast revealed greater brain activations in a left parahippocampal gyrus 
(PHG) cluster (-28, -30 -17) with an extent of 45 voxels. A nearly identical region, left 
Hippocampal gyrus/PHG (-24, -33, -17), was also identified in a previous meta-analysis 
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on autobiographical event memory studies (McDermott, Szpunar, & Christ, 2009). In 
order to examine whether this reverse effect only existed in the CM condition, we also 
extracted the response estimate from the standard CK condition to compare the 
difference. The result showed that the reversed effect for the PHG was higher in the CM 
(M = 1.06, SD = 0.46) than the CK (M = -0.34, SD = 0.40) condition, t(19) = 2.493, p 
< .05, d = 0.56. 
 
Validity 
Univariate ROI analyses. It was possible to discriminate above chance between CK and 
NK cases using the average activation from any of the seven ROIs (Table 5-5). The 
AUC varied among ROIs, and it was highest for the left inferior frontal gyrus (0.85), 
and lowest for the thalamus (0.73). In contrast, it was possible to discriminate CM and 
NK cases above chance only using activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus, the right 
inferior parietal lobule, and the left inferior frontal gyrus (0.74, 0.71, and 0.69, 
respectively). The countermeasures resulted in significantly smaller AUC values for the 
left inferior frontal gyrus, the middle cingulate gyrus, the thalamus, and the medial 
frontal gyrus.  
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The same analyses carried out on the average of the seven ROIs (after score 
normalization) showed an AUC of 0.86 for discriminating CK versus NK cases, 
significantly larger than the AUC of 0.71 found for discriminating CM versus NK cases 
(J. A. Hanley & McNeil, 1983).  
 
Table 5-5 
Area under the curve (AUC) for the comparisons CK vs NK and CM vs NK for 7 ROIs 
 
Note: LGFi: left inferior frontal gyrus/insula, LLPi: left inferior parietal 
lobule/supramarginal gyrus, GC: middle cingulate gyrus, RGFi: right inferior frontal 
gyrus/insula, RLPi: right inferior parietal lobule/supramarginal gyrus, Thal: 
thalamus/caudate nucleus/lenticular nucleus, GFd: medial frontal gyrus/superior frontal 
gyrus. AUC numbers in bold indicate values above chance (0.5). The asterisks indicate 
a significant difference between the CK/NK and CM/NK AUCs: * p<.05, ** p<.005. 
 
Multiaverage ROI analyses. In this analysis, average activation in each of the seven 
ROIs used in the univariate analyses was employed as a feature for a linear SVM 
classifier. The AUC for discriminating CK and NK cases was 0.85. The AUC for 
        
 
ROI  
Comparison LGFi LLPi GC RGFi RLPi Thal GFd Mean 
CK vs NK 0.85* 0.76 0.74* 0.82 0.81 0.73* 0.83** 0.86* 
CM vs NK 0.69 0.66 0.57 0.74 0.71 0.56 0.61 0.71 
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discriminating CM and NK cases was significantly smaller, 0.63, and not statistically 
different from chance.  
 
Multivoxel ROI analyses. In this analysis, activation in a total of 1069 voxels from the 7 
ROIs (unsmoothed data) was used as input to a linear SVM classifier. The AUC for 
discriminating CK and NK cases was 0.83, whereas that for discriminating CM and NK 
cases was significantly smaller, 0.63, and not statistically different from chance.  
 
Multivoxel whole brain analyses. In this analysis, activation in a total of 26452 gray 
matter voxels (unsmoothed data) was used as input to a linear SVM classifier. The AUC 
for discriminating CK and NK cases was 0.80, whereas that for discriminating CM and 
NK cases was 0.79.  
 
Generalization analyses 
In these analyses a classifier was trained to discriminate NK and CK cases and 
then tested on discriminating left-out CK/NK and CM/NK cases. 
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Multivariate ROI analyses. The AUC for discriminating CK and NK cases was 
significantly larger than for discriminating CM and NK cases, 0.84 and 0.73, 
respectively. Both AUCs were significantly different from chance. At a fixed false 
alarm rate of 20%, the countermeasures reduced hit rates from 80% to 61%.  
 
Multivoxel ROI analyses. The AUC for discriminating CK and NK cases was 
significantly larger than for discriminating CM and NK cases, 0.84 and 0.68, 
respectively. Both AUCs were significantly different from chance. At a fixed false 
alarm rate of 20%, the countermeasures reduced hit rates from 75% to 37%.  
 
Multivoxel whole-brain analyses. The AUCs for discriminating CK versus NK cases 
and CM versus NK cases were 0.79 and 0.72, respectively. Both AUCs were 
significantly different from chance, but they were not different from each other. At a 
fixed false alarm rate of 20%, the countermeasures reduced hit rates from 65% to 42%.  
 
Discussion 
This study found that activation in a set of prefrontal, parietal and subcortical 
regions differentiated between the probe and irrelevants in a concealed knowledge 
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condition, confirming and extending the results of previous CIT work (Ganis et al., 
2011; Peth et al., 2015). Such differences were still present when comparing them to a 
matched no-knowledge condition, ensuring that they were not due to stimulus 
peculiarities . Critically, the mental countermeasures tested in this study reduced the 
size of the probe effect and decreased classification accuracy, extending the 
countermeasure findings of previous fMRI work (Ganis et al., 2011). 
 
Brain regions involved in the probe effect 
The pattern of brain activation for the probe effect was comparable to that found in 
previous fMRI CIT studies (Ganis et al., 2011; Peth et al., 2015), as discussed next.  
First, the probe engaged the VLPFC (bilaterally) and the adjacent anterior insula 
(in the left hemisphere) more than the irrelevants. The substantial heterogeneity in the 
functional organization of these frontal regions, along both the rostro-caudal and the 
laterality dimensions, has made it difficult to determine their precise role in cognition 
(Levy & Wagner, 2011). One proposal is that the VLPFC and adjacent insula are 
involved in reflexive orienting of attention to behaviorally relevant changes in the 
environment. Indeed, these regions, together with parts of the medial prefrontal cortex, 
have been considered a key component of a salience network (Seeley et al., 2007) and 
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they have also been conceptualized as the frontal nodes in a largely right-lateralized 
ventral attentional network that includes the right inferior parietal cortex as well 
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Another proposal has focused instead on the role of these 
frontal regions in motor inhibition processes (Aron et al., 2004; Swick, Ashley, & 
Turken, 2008), as they are consistently engaged for instance by Go/No-Go tasks. 
Meta-analytic approaches have shown that different subregions of the ventrolateral 
prefrontal and adjacent insular cortex tend to respond differently to tasks that tap into 
attentional reorienting and motor inhibition processes, though the segregation is not 
clear-cut (Chang, Yarkoni, Khaw, & Sanfey, 2013; Levy & Wagner, 2011). For 
instance, the pars opercularis of the right inferior frontal gyrus tends to be engaged by 
motor inhibition but not attentional reorienting tasks whereas the inferior frontal 
junction and the anterior insula tend to be engaged bilaterally (but with a right 
hemisphere bias) by both attentional reorienting and motor inhibition tasks (Change et 
al., 2013; Levy & Wagner, 2011). In addition to attention reorienting and motor 
inhibition tasks, the VLPFC is usually engaged by several other classes of tasks as well. 
Especially relevant for the CIT are the potential roles of the VLPFC in memory 
processes such as encoding and retrieval (e.g., Fletcher et al., 2002; Iidaka, Sadato, 
Yamada, & Yonekura, 2000) and in social cognitive processes such as action imitation 
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(e.g., Levy & Wagner, 2011; Molnar-Szakacs, Iacoboni, Koski, & Mazziotta, 2005). 
One or more of these processes could account for the concealed knowledge probe 
effect in VLPFC and the insula in CITs. Indeed, the probe is more salient than the 
irrelevants (since the probe is the only item associated with the crime episode and it is 
presented infrequently) and lying to the probe is likely to require inhibiting a prepotent 
truthful response (Verschueure, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011). Furthermore, the probe 
in the CK condition should engage retrieval processes more strongly than irrelevants 
because it is associated with a pre-experimental episode. Finally, it is also likely that the 
probe engages social cognitive processes more strongly than the irrelevants because 
deception only occurs for the probe and often instructions mention that a judge would 
try to detect deception based on various deception cues.  
The CIT literature has been mixed about the interpretation of the role of the 
VLPFC. This is in large part because CIT paradigms usually engage more than one of 
the processes just discussed and designing paradigms that isolate individual processes 
has proven to be very difficult. For instance, an fMRI study that attempted to eliminate 
response competition processes in the CIT interpreted VLPFC activation as reflecting 
memory-related processes (Gamer, Klimecki, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2012). 
Results from more recent work, however, have been interpreted as indicating that 
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response competition processes are critical for VLPFC activation (Suchotzki, 
Verschuere, et al., 2015). A detailed discussion of why such discrepancies might exist 
goes beyond the scope of this paper, but the main point is that they are probably due to 
the difficulty in isolating individual processes in CIT paradigms. 
Second, the probe engaged medial prefrontal cortical regions more than the 
irrelevants, including parts of the middle and anterior cingulate and the superior 
portions of the medial frontal gyrus. Portions of these medial prefrontal regions are 
activated by the same attentional and response inhibition tasks that engage the VLPFC 
and have been implicated in monitoring the conflict between competing responses 
(Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & 
Bannerman, 2004).  
Third, portions of the right inferior parietal lobule, angular gyrus, and 
supramarginal gyrus were also recruited more strongly by the probe than the irrelevants. 
These regions overlap in large part with the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), which 
has been implicated in attentional reorienting in a number of domains (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Shomstein, 2012). More recently, the TPJ (bilaterally) has been 
suggested to be involved in contextual updating, that is in updating an internal model of 
the physical and social environment in order to revise expectations and responses after 
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detecting a change in the environment (Geng & Vossel, 2013). Note that in previous 
CIT work the laterality of activation in the inferior parietal lobule has varied, with some 
studies reporting only activation in the right hemisphere (e.g., Gamer et al., 2012; Peth 
et al., 2015) and others in both hemispheres (e.g., Cui et al., 2014; Ganis et al., 2011), 
probably due to differences in stimuli and paradigms. 
Fourth, there was also a region that has not been reported in previous CIT studies, 
the right precuneus. Using these coordinates in the Neurosynth database (Yarkoni, 
Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011) suggests a link with successful retrieval, 
which would make sense for the probe. Also, it makes sense that it is not as active in 
CM because the probe countermeasure attempts to make retrieval less likely. However, 
since this region was not found in previous CIT studies, we could not use it as an apriori 
region for the classification analyses.  
 
Classification accuracy (CK vs NK) 
With the exception of the precuneus, the pattern of activation corresponds closely 
to that found in our previous study (Ganis et al., 2011). Thus, the 7 ROIs identified in 
that study were used to test the accuracy of single participant classification in the 
current study. Results showed that the average activation in each of the 7 ROIs could be 
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used to classify CK and NK cases (activation difference between the probe and the 
irrelevants) well above chance in the current study. As found in the previous study, the 
ROIs with the highest accuracy were the left and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(AUC = 0.85 and 0.82, respectively), and the medial frontal cortex (AUC = 0.83). 
However, the accuracy rates were lower than in our previous study in which an AUC of 
1 was found (Ganis et al., 2011). This may be due to a number of factors. First, a 1.5T 
scanner at a different site was used in this study, which most likely produced data with a 
lower signal to noise ratio. Second, the stimuli used in this study (single digits) were 
much less salient than those used in the previous study (one’s date of birth). Third, the 
analyses were different, as this study used beta values rather than number of significant 
voxels within a region, as input to the classifiers. Fourth, the population used in this 
study (University of Padova students and affiliates) was more varied than that used in 
the previous study (Harvard University undergraduates), which may have increased the 
variance in the data.  
The univariate ROI accuracy rates found in this study are similar to those found in 
the study by Peth and collaborators (Peth et al., 2015), where they varied between .66 
and .87, depending on the compared conditions. Similar accuracy rates were also found 
with the multivariate ROI analyses. Note, however, that the results of these two studies 
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are not directly comparable because our study did not classify the probe and irrelevants 
in various conditions (Peth et al., 2015), but rather it classified the probe effect (the 
difference between the probe and the irrelevants for each participant) between 
conditions (NK, CK, and CM). Classifying the probe effect across conditions should 
help reduce potential individual differences in brain responses by subtracting activation 
to irrelevants from that to the probe.   
A recent study used multivariate analyses with linear SVMs on data from a CIT 
paradigm and reported an AUC of .98 for classifying probes in a concealed knowledge 
group and irrelevants in a no-knowledge group by employing 125,570 grey matter 
voxels (whole brain data) without any data reduction (Peth et al., 2015). Interestingly, 
classification accuracy using whole brain data was not consistently high because the 
AUC for classifying the probe and irrelevants in a guilty intention group was only 0.71, 
numerically lower than with univariate ROI analyses, and not significantly different 
from chance. This suggests that idiosyncracies in the datasets may play an important 
role in the results. Furthermore, between-cell statistics were not reported to show that 
whole brain analyses were significantly more accurate than the corresponding univariate 
or multivariate ROI analyses. For example, the AUC for univariate analyses using 
combined ROIs was .87 (Guilty Action probe versus Guilty Intention irrelevants), 
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which is probably not significantly higher than the AUC of .90 found for the 
corresponding whole-brain multi-voxel analysis (Peth et al., 2015).  
In the current study, whole brain multivoxel analyses did not improve 
classification accuracy of CK versus NK cases compared to multivoxel ROI analyses, 
but rather they slightly decreased it, from .83 to .80, a statistically non-significant 
difference. A potential explanation for this is that the 7 ROIs already included voxels 
that maximally discriminated between the CK and NK conditions (given that they were 
defined in a previous study contrasting these two conditions) and so including other 
voxels added more noise than additional information useful for the classification, 
resulting in a slightly degraded performance. 
 
Effect of countermeasures  
The VLPFC, insula, and medial prefrontal regions discussed earlier have very high 
base rates, which means that they are engaged by many different tasks (Yarkoni, 
Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). An important consequence of this is 
that CIT methods that rely on activation in these regions are likely to be vulnerable to 
mental countermeasures because many cognitive processes unrelated to concealed 
information can be used to modulate neural responses in these regions. Indeed, the 
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physical countermeasures used in the previous study (Ganis et al., 2011) substantially 
reduced classification accuracy using mean activation within ROIs. In this study, 
mental/attentional countermeasures reduced the size of the probe effect across the 
7ROIs reported in Ganis et al., (2011), relative to the CK condition, mostly by 
decreasing activation elicited by the probe. This shows that the probe countermeasure 
was successful at reducing the saliency of the probe. Activation to irrelevants became 
numerically larger as a result of the corresponding countermeasure, but not significantly 
so. This may be due in part to the nature of saliency itself, which is inversely related to 
frequency of occurrence. It is possible that the countermeasure on the one hand made 
each irrelevant more salient by virtue of the associated memory, but on the other hand, 
in trying to make all irrelevants more salient, it results in a net decrease in saliency for 
all irrelevants. It is worth noting that although the stimuli (Ganis et al., 2011 used dates) 
and population used were different, the brain regions involved in the probe effect 
corresponded with each other. This shows that it is promising to use CIT paradigm as a 
lie-detection tool as similar neural activities are generated regardless of the stimuli and 
population.    
The countermeasures strongly affected classification rates, relative to CK/NK 
classification, in both univariate and multivariate ROI analyses. For the univariate 
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analyses, accuracy decreased from .86 to .71 when combining ROIs. For the 
multiaverage ROI analyses, accuracy decreased from .85 to .63, whereas for the 
multivoxel ROI analyses it decreased from .83 to .63. However, relative to CK/NK 
classification, the countermeasures had virtually no effect on the AUC based on 
whole-brain multivoxel analyses, 0.8 and 0.79, respectively. In contrast, relative to 
multivoxel ROI analyses, multivoxel whole-brain analyses improved classification 
accuracy for countermeasures, from .63 to .79. This result, and the opposite pattern 
described earlier for CK/NK classification, may be explained by two observations: i) the 
7 ROIs already included voxels that maximally discriminated between the CK and NK 
conditions (given that they were defined in a previous study contrasting these two 
conditions) and so including other voxels added more noise than additional information 
useful for the classification, resulting in a slightly degraded performance, and ii) voxels 
that maximally discriminated between CM and NK cases were not included in the 7 
ROIs, and so adding other regions improved classification accuracy for CM/NK 
classification.  
To test this idea, we ran a batch of multivoxel analyses that included the 7 original 
ROIs and gradually added more and more spherical ROIs (up to 200, radius = 12mm) 
centered at random locations. Results showed that, as the number of additional ROIs 
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grew to 200, CK/NK classification accuracy slightly declined (gradually going from .83 
to .80), whereas CM/NK classification accuracy gradually increased from .63 to .79. 
This suggests that most information useful for the CK/NK classification is already 
available within the original ROIs, whereas additional information about the CM/NK 
classification is distributed across voxels outside the original ROIs.  
This interpretation was also confirmed by a multivoxel analysis carried out on all 
voxels not included in the 7 ROIs (radius = 20 mm). Results showed that, compared to 
using only the 7 ROIs, CK/NK classification accuracy decreased from .83 to .74 
whereas CM/NK classification accuracy increased from .63 to .70. In other words, 
collectively, there was more information useful for the CM/NK classification in voxels 
outside than inside the 7 ROIs, whereas the reverse was true for the CK/NK 
classification. 
 With regard to the reverse effect (irrelevants > probe), the activation in the 
parahippocampal gyrus (PHG) is consistent with the idea that this region was engaged 
in episodic retrieval and that participants were performing the countermeasure as 
instructed. Uncapher et al. (2015) used a similar cognitive countermeasure in an fMRI 
study where participants were asked to focus on perceptual aspects of previously seen 
faces, “old” faces, (the equivalent of the countermeasure applied to the probe item in the 
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current study) and to prevent memories for such faces from coming to mind; conversely, 
for new faces participants were instructed to bring to mind a known individual that 
resembled those faces and relive any memories associated with the individual (the 
equivalent of the countermeasure applied to the irrelevant items). The reverse effect was 
also found in their study where bilateral hippocampus and left angular gyrus (AnG), 
typically engaged during memory retrieval, showed greater activity for new than old 
faces. Both studies show that cognitive strategies can greatly affect the ability of 
fMRI-based classifiers to detect memories. It is also worth noting that Uncapher et al. 
(2015) instructed participants to apply countermeasures for entire 10-second trial 
whereas, in the current study participants were only instructed to carry out 
countermeasures for the duration of each stimulus (750 ms). Even this brief 
countermeasure, however, was enough to interfere with fMRI-based detection of 
concealed knowledge.  
 
Countermeasures and creativity  
 Neural activity in the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) identified in the CM 
condition was found to be associated with creativity. The result demonstrated that 
higher creative individuals tended to implement countermeasures more effectively by 
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showing a smaller probe effect. As hypothesized, more creative individuals were better 
at implementing this type of attentional countermeasure due to more flexible cognitive 
control as found in Zabelina and Robinson (2010). Flexible cognitive control is defined 
in terms of a smaller target congruency effect after incongruent primes and a larger 
target congruency effect after congruent primes (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). 
Zabelina and Robinson (2010) assessed individual differences in flexible cognitive 
control in a basic color-word Stroop task and found that more creative individuals 
displayed greater modulation of the cognitive control system across trials. The 
instructions of the CM condition required participants to apply the countermeasures to 
probe and irrelevants differently; thus, participants had to switch rapidly between these 
two processing modes. In line with the previous study, the current result demonstrated 
that higher creative individuals were more capable of switching attention rapidly by 
showing a smaller probe effect in the CM condition.    
 With regard to the rSMG, it has been found to be involved in attentional 
reorienting along with neighboring regions, i.e., inferior parietal lobule, angular gyrus 
and TPJ (see the earlier discussion). Furthermore, previous fMRI studies have shown a 
negative link between parietal brain activity and creativity. For example, Berkowitz and 
Ansari (2010) found that musicians deactivated the right TPJ during melodic 
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improvisation while non-musicians showed no change of activity in this region. They 
suggested that the deactivation of the rTPJ might allow the experienced musicians to 
enter a more focused attentional state. Also, the deactivation of the right TPJ, including 
SMG, has been postulated to occur in response to top-down modulation during 
goal-driven behavior in order to inhibit attentional deviation (Corbetta, Patel, & 
Shulman, 2008; Shulman et al., 2003; Todd, Fougnie, & Marois, 2005). Taken together, 
we proposed that smaller probe effect in the rSMG when applying countermeasures was 
associated with attentional switching and its activity was modulated by creative 
thinking.  
 
Potential limitations  
This study has a number of limitations. First, the paradigm and stimuli were 
intentionally minimalistic in order to reduce potential perceptual difference between 
stimuli that can be problematic for the interpretation of CIT results (Ganis et al., 2016). 
This approach was justified here because: i) the main goal of the study was to determine 
whether the accuracy of 3S CIT paradigms is affected by attentional countermeasures, 
regardless of actual accuracy rates in the field, and ii) even elaborate mock crime 
scenarios are generally far from ecologically valid situations because participants still 
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know that the entire situation is fictitious, they are just following instructions, and the 
items employed in the scenarios don’t usually have any intrinsic value to the 
participants.  
Second, the tasks were administered in a within-participant manner, as in our 
previous study (Ganis et al., 2011). To eliminate the effect of potential within-subject 
correlations during testing, in the classification analyses we always used test cases from 
participants that had been excluded from the training set. For example, if the case NK 
for a participant was used for testing, also the CK and CM cases for that participant 
were excluded from training. The analyses were repeated by removing this constraint as 
well, but the results were comparable.  
Third, although the number of cases (20 per condition) was comparable to that 
used in previous studies, this is still a relatively small number to assess classification 
accuracy, especially given the large number of features used in the multivariate 
classification analyses. 
 
Conclusions 
 Together with Study 3, memory and attentional countermeasures were shown to be 
effective in reducing the probe effect in neuroimaging-based CIT paradigms. These two 
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studies provide evidence that further research is needed before neuroimaging methods 
are sufficiently robust to be used to detect concealed information accurately in the real 
situation. Given these results, the lack of a difference between the activation of probes 
and irrelevants in a typical CIT paradigm does not imply that participants have no 
knowledge about the probe. Indeed, the result could be a false negative because of 
countermeasures applied by suspects who have actually committed the crime. These 
two studies also support the general point that the vulnerability of the neuroimaging 
methods for lie detection is due to poor specificity. The lack of distinct neural activity 
patterns that are selective for deception makes it relatively easy to alter such patterns 
using countermeasures. 
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Summary of Findings 
These four studies advance our understanding of deception by examining the 
underlying cognitive processes and neural mechanisms and the validity of the lie 
detection paradigms. The first behavioural study determined whether creative cognition 
contributes to the individual differences in deceptive abilities within a socially 
interactive setting. Results of a multiple regression analysis showed that the ability to 
generate lies was predicted by higher creative cognition and by the number of uncued 
lies told when given a choice. This result provides the first evidence for a link between 
deceptive abilities and creative cognition. This study also provided evidence that lie 
generation and detection are independent abilities by showing no correlations between 
them and a different pattern of correlation with creative cognition. A second ERP study 
investigated the neural mechanisms underlying the generation of uncued lies using a 
novel bluffing paradigm. Results showed response-locked ERP differences just before 
the response between uncued lies and truths, but no stimulus-locked differences. This 
study suggests the engagement of additional cognitive processes during lying, related to 
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holding both lies and truths in working memory and to moral conflict. Finally, parallel 
fMRI and ERP studies examined the validity of the CIT paradigm when mental 
countermeasures were applied and determined the role of creativity in using this type of 
countermeasures. Results showed that this type of countermeasures requiring attentional 
switch degraded the neural signatures of deception (i.e., hiding information) and the 
fMRI study found that this effect was modulated by creative cognition. These two 
parallel studies suggest that more research is needed for developing the lie detection 
methods before they can be applied to real life situations. 
 
The Difference in P300 between the Bluffing and CIT Paradigms 
The amplitude of stimulus-locked P300 was measured in both bluffing (Study 2) 
and CIT (Study 3) paradigms. However, the amplitude of the P300 associated with 
lying showed an opposite pattern in these two paradigms. In the bluffing paradigm, 
although there was no P300 difference between uncued lie and uncued truth, a 
decreased P300 for lying was found compared with cued truth. This is consistent with 
previous studies using cued conditions (Hu et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2003, 2005; 
Pfister et al., 2014; Suchotzki et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2009), and the result was 
interpreted as an indication of the dual task character of lying: lying requires higher 
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cognitive load in order to keep the truth active, monitored and inhibited at the same time. 
In contrast, the ERP study using the CIT paradigm observed a larger P300 for lying (i.e., 
the probe) compared with truth-telling (i.e., the irrelevants). This P300 is elicited by rare 
stimuli (16.7%) embedded within a series of standard stimuli (66.7%), and its amplitude 
is inversely related to the subjective frequency of the eliciting stimulus (Donchin & 
Coles, 1988), and increases with the level of significance of the stimulus (Berlad & 
Pratt, 1995; Johnston et al., 1986). The unequal proportion of lying and truth-telling 
trials makes the oddball effect override the cognitive load effect of deception in the CIT 
paradigm. This difference of P300 results between these two deception paradigms also 
demonstrated that no specific neural activity pattern is associated with lying; instead, 
neural activities vary depending on paradigm design. This supports the general point 
that the neuroimaging methods for lie detection lack specificity and paradigm designs 
should carefully be considered when interpretating the results.  
 
Countermeasure Effects with ERP and fMRI Methods 
The same mental countermeasures were applied in the ERP (Study 3) and fMRI 
(Study 4) studies using the same CIT paradigm. Both results showed that the 
countermeasures successfully reduced the probe effect and the accuracy to discriminate 
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between guilty and innocent cases was lower. However, when we examined the effect 
on the probe and irrelevants separately, the results were not fully consistent with each 
other. The fMRI study showed that the activation to the probe was significantly smaller 
in the condition where countermeasures (i.e., the CM condition) were applied than in 
the standard CIT condition (i.e., the CK condition), whereas activation to the irrelevants 
was not significantly larger in the CM than in the CK condition. Thus, the smaller size 
of the probe effect was due mostly to reduced activation to the probe. On the other hand, 
although the same activation pattern was found in the ERP study (i.e., smaller activation 
to the probe and larger activation to the irrelevants in the CM than in the CK condition), 
only the difference for the irrelevants approached significance (p = .072). In other 
words, reducing the size of the probe effect was due more to an enhanced activation to 
the irrelevants in the ERP study. This inconsistency may be due to some reasons. 
 First, the data acquisition time frame is different between ERP and fMRI methods. 
ERPs measure the electrical activity of the brain and can detect changes with 
millisecond temporal resolution: ERP results reflect brain activity occurring within a 
second after a stimulus or a response. On the other hand, fMRI measures brain activity 
based on much slower BOLD activity, which reflect changes in regional cerebral blood 
flow. The hemodynamic response lasts over 10 seconds and peaks at 4 to 6 seconds. 
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FMRI results capture brain activity over a few seconds after a stimulus or a response. It 
is possible that when seeing the probe, it took some time for top-down modulation (i.e., 
focus on the physical features of the stimulus) to inhibit bottom-up processes (i.e., 
stimulus-driven response). Thus, fMRI results showed the activation to the probe was 
significantly smaller in the CM than in the CK condition, but not ERP results.  
Second, the size of the P300 probe effect in the ERP study relies on the saliency of 
the probe. Participants were instructed to make the irrelevants more salient by 
associating the items with meaningful memories. Due to the characteristic of the P300, 
it may be easier to capture the initial saliency upon seeing the irrelevants. Thus, stronger 
activation to the irrelevants in the CM than in the CK condition approached significance. 
In contrast, fMRI results captured brain activation for a few seconds, and it required 
participants' constant effort to make the memory associations. Participants might not be 
able to focus attention on doing this countermeasure consistently for each irrelevant 
item throughout the task, resulting in no significant difference of the activation to the 
irrelevants between the CM and CK conditions in the fMRI study.  
Third, the factors just mentioned may be further amplified by the timing 
differences in stimulus presentation in the ERP and fMRI studies. Indeed, stimuli were 
presented much more slowly and with much higher temporal variability during the 
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fMRI than the ERP study in order to enable proper deconvolution analyses. It is 
possible that such differences in presentation rate regimes may have affected the 
implementation of the countermeasures used for the probe and the irrelevants.  
Given that countermeasures affect the validity of each neuroimaging method in a 
slightly different way, it is important to examine different types of countermeasures 
with various methods in order to understand the whole picture of how such 
countermeasures affect the validity of these methods. With such knowledge, we will be 
more likely to detect if participants apply any countermeasures in a real scenario. On the 
other hand, Johnson (2014) suggests that a promising direction in the future may be to 
incorporate multiple, simultaneously and sequentially obtained behavioural and 
different brain-based measures to capture the whole picture of deception-related 
processes from different angles. With multiple measures, the classification between 
guilty and innocent individuals would be more accurate. 
 
Limitations and future work 
The work conducted in this thesis has some limitations. First, an ideal plan was to 
conduct the ERP study (Study 2) that could examine the neural processes underlying 
real-life deception in a similar interactive deception setting to the first behavioural study 
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(Study 1). For example, provide a circumstance for participants to justify their claims or 
to describe their previous events and feelings instead of only allowing them to speak 
one word as a response. By doing so, we would be better at characterizing the 
behavior-brain relationships by bridging these two studies. Also, we might be able to 
replicate the behavioral results, e.g., creative cognition can facilitate the ability to 
generate lies. However, due to the constraints of using EEG caps and electrodes, we had 
to compromise on the paradigm and adapt it to an ERP-friendly design. Future research 
may use fMRI methods to investigate the lie generation process similarly to the setting 
used in Study 1. That would provide more information about how brain regions are 
involved in the lie generation process and how creative cognition modulates the brain 
activity to enhance this ability.  
 Second, the same countermeasures were applied in a typical concealed information 
paradigm but using ERP and fMRI methods in Study 3 and Study 4, respectively. 
Although both studies revealed the same conclusion that these mental countermeasures 
were efficient in decreasing the validity of the test, using different groups of participants 
limited our ability to compare the two parallel studies. A within-subject design might 
enable to address the following questions. First, can a participant who successfully 
misleads one method (e.g., ERP) also mislead another (e.g., fMRI)? This can also 
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answer whether the outcomes from these two neuroimaging-based methods are 
consistent or not. Second, are there any individual differences in the ability to apply the 
countermeasure to the probe or to the irrelevants, respectively? It is possible that some 
people are better at applying the “probe countermeasure” and some people are better at 
applying the “irrelevants countermeasures”. We could test this by observing whether 
participants are consistently doing better at one particular countermeasure in these two 
studies and whether it is associated with any cognitive abilities, e.g., working memory 
span, inhibition, attention, etc. Third, do multivariate analysis combing ERP and fMRI 
results achieve better accuracy rate to discriminate guilty and innocent cases? If the 
same group of participants took part in both ERP and fMRI studies, we would be able to 
incorporate the data from these two methods and conduct validity analyses. By doing so, 
we could examine whether this combined classifier is better than any single 
neuroimaging method. However, due to the lack of access to the MRI facility in the 
University of Plymouth, this ideal plan could not be carried out. Future research can 
address this idea. 
Conclusions 
 This thesis advances understanding of deception from both theoretical and applied 
angles by investigating the cognitive processes and neural mechanisms underlying 
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deception using various behavioural and neuroimaging methodologies and examining 
the cognitive strategies that can compromise the validity of neuroimaging-based 
classifiers to detect deception. Overall, this series of studies demonstrates a new 
approach to investigate the individual differences in deceptive communication by 
showing the association with creativity, and suggests that the paradigm design is crucial 
to study real-life deception in a laboratory setting. Furthermore, it shows that 
neuroimaging methods to detect deception are vulnerable to mental countermeasures 
due to poor specificity. Thus various countermeasures need to be assessed before the 
neuroimaging methods can be used in applied settings. 
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APPENDIX 2A  
Subject information and consent form for Study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET  
 
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before we start, it is important to understand 
what it will involve. Take time to read the information carefully. Ask us if there is anything 
that is not clear or if you would like more information. You are free to withdraw at any time 
and without giving a reason. Everything you do during this study will be anonymous and will 
only be identified by a code.  
 
What is the purpose and format of the study? 
We are interested in the traits of good liars and how they interact with people in a group. 
There will be three tasks in this study and everyone will have the chance to lie or tell the truth 
(sender) in front of the other four people (receivers). Senders will be video recorded 
throughout the experimental session.  
 
Before this experiment starts, you have already filled out two questionnaires of your own 
opinions about several controversial topics and several memory questions about yourself. We 
are going to use these questions as stimuli and you have to lie or tell the truth for each 
question, according to a cue. In addition, several emotion-eliciting photos will be used as 
stimuli in one task. The goal is to appear as credible as possible regardless of whether 
you are telling a lie or the truth. After each question, both sender and receivers have to fill 
in a judgement and self-evaluation table before the next question.  
 
How long will the study last? 
Your participation would involve about two hours today and another one hour on the other 
day (experimenter will arrange the time with you). You are going to complete three tasks 
with other four people today and you will come back to fill in several questionnaires on the 
next arranged day. You will receive 2 points (or 8 pounds) / hour for taking part. 
 
What are the possible rewards of taking part? 
In the end of experiment, we will prepare six PRIZES (Amazon coupons) for the best three 
liars and the best three lie-detectors. (£30 for the first place; £20 for the second place; £10 
for the third place) Therefore, please try to make your speech clear and convincing and 
attempt to detect lies!! 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by your participation in this study, there are no special compensation 
arrangements but you will be covered by the University’s standard indemnity policy. If you 
have any cause to complain, please in the first instance contact Dr. Giorgio Ganis 
(+441752584812; giorgio.ganis@plymouth.ac.uk). If you feel the problem has not been 
resolved please contact the secretary to the Faculty of Health and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee: Mrs Sarah C. Jones 01752 585339 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Any identifying information will be held in strict confidence and not disclosed to anyone 
outside the project.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
We intend to publish the results of the study in scientific journals and present it at scientific 
conferences. In order to pursue the aim of this research project, some of the videoclips in 
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which you appear may be used as stimuli in future studies, as mentioned when we first 
contacted you.  
Who is organizing and conducting the research? 
This research is being undertaken by Ms Chun-Wei Hsu as part of her postgraduate degree. 
She is a CogNovo Research Fellow at the Plymouth University. Dr. Giorgio Ganis is the 
Principal Investigator of the study and will oversee all aspects of the project.  
 
Who has ethically reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the Plymouth University, Faculty of Health and Human 
Sciences Ethics Committee.  
 
Contact for further information 
Dr. Giorgio Ganis: +441752584812; giorgio.ganis@plymouth.ac.uk 
Ms Chun-Wei Hsu: chun-wei.hsu@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
If you wish to continue please fill in the following form. 
 
 
 
   Please 
Tick 
• The objectives of the research have been explained to me    
• I have had the chance to ask any questions before the start of the study.   
• I know what my part will be in the study and I know how long it will 
take.  
 
• I understand that personal information is strictly confidential   
• I freely consent to be a participant in the study. No one has put pressure 
on me.  
 
• I know that I can stop taking part in the study at any time and that I can 
ask for my data to be destroyed if I wish  
 
• Refusal to take part will make no difference to my university studies  
• I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have 
attempted, as far as possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and 
health risks will have been separately assessed by appropriate authorities 
(e.g. under COSSH regulations)   
 
 
• I know that if there are any problems I can contact 
            Name: Giorgio Ganis 
 
 
Your signature: ……………………………………               
 
Date:……………………………………  
 
Your name (Please print)………………………….. 
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APPENDIX 2B  
Opinion survey and episodic memory items used in Study 1 
 
Opinion survey 
 Practice: 
  1. Do you support immigration?  
  2. Do you support legalizing prostitution? 
 Real task: 
  1. Should we stop doing medical experiments on animals? 
  2. Should GM food be banned? 
  3. Should people have right to die? 
  4. Should cosmetic surgery be covered by NHS? 
  5.  Should obese people pay more for plane tickets? 
  6. Is it ethical to take pills to make people smarter? 
  7. Should smokers pay more for health services? 
  8. Is it ethical to have a child outside of marriage? 
  9. Should condoms be distributed freely in high schools? 
  10. Does God exist? 
 
Episodic memory  
 Practice: 
  1. Please describe the best trip you have ever had. 
  2. Please describe your best friend. 
 Real task: 
  1. What did you do last weekend? 
  2. How did you spend your last birthday? 
  3. Where did you travel during your summer vacation? 
  4. What did you do last night? 
  5. Please describe your hometown? 
  6. How did you spend your last Christmas? 
  7. Please describe the most recent restaurant you ate at. 
  8. What did you do yesterday morning? 
  9. Please describe the most recent movie you saw. 
  10. How did you spend your New Year’s Eve? 
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APPENDIX 3A  
Subject information and consent form for Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET  
 
You are invited to take part in a research study. Before we start, it is important to understand 
what it will involve. Take time to read the information carefully. Ask us if there is anything 
that is not clear or if you would like more information. You are free to withdraw at any time 
and without giving a reason. Everything you do during this study will be anonymous and will 
only be identified by a code.  
 
What is the purpose and format of the study? 
There will be three games in the study. Participants will wear on an electroencephalogram 
(EEG) cap and brain waves will be recorded during the experiment. 
 
The first game is a simple observation game. You are going to be shown a series of video 
clips and press “Yes” button when you see the target/behaviour, and otherwise press “No” 
button.  
The second game is loosely based on the popular card game of cheat. The objective is for the 
participants to deceive the judge in order to win as much money as possible. How much 
money they have won for the trial and total amount of money will be presented at the end of 
each trial. Participants will be awarded this amount of money in cash. The goal is to appear 
as credible as possible regardless of whether you are telling a lie or the truth.  
Participants will be filmed for the duration of the task —a live stream will be presented to the 
Judge.  
The final game is for participants to become a Judge and to detect whether the player in the 
clips is lying or not. In each trial to participants will be presented with a short clip, in which 
the player in the clip is playing the same bluffing game as you just played. The mission is to 
judge the player is telling a lie or the truth. Please try your best to detect lies in the player! 
 
How long will the study last? 
Your participation would involve about 2 hours today and another 1.5 hours on the other day. 
You will receive 2 points (or 8 pounds) / hour for taking part. 
 
What are the rewards of taking part? 
At the end of the experiment, participants will be presented with the final amount they have 
won and will then be awarded this amount in cash alongside payment for participating in the 
experiment.  
 
What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by your participation in this study, there are no special compensation 
arrangements but you will be covered by the University’s standard indemnity policy. If you 
have any cause to complain, please in the first instance contact Dr. Giorgio Ganis 
(+441752584812; giorgio.ganis@plymouth.ac.uk). If you feel the problem has not been 
resolved please contact the secretary to the Faculty of Health and Human Sciences Ethics 
Committee: Mrs Sarah C. Jones 01752 585339 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Any identifying information will be held in strict confidence and not disclosed to anyone 
outside the project.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
We intend to publish the results of the study in scientific journals and present it at scientific 
conferences. In order to pursue the aim of this research project, some of the videoclips in 
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which you appear may be used as stimuli in future studies, as mentioned when we first 
contacted you.  
 
Who is organizing and conducting the research? 
This research is being undertaken by Ms Chun-Wei Hsu as part of her postgraduate degree. 
She is a CogNovo Research Fellow at the Plymouth University. Dr. Giorgio Ganis is the 
Principal Investigator of the study and will oversee all aspects of the project.  
 
Who has ethically reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the Plymouth University, Faculty of Health and Human 
Sciences Ethics Committee.  
 
Contact for further information 
Dr. Giorgio Ganis: +441752584812; giorgio.ganis@plymouth.ac.uk 
Ms Chun-Wei Hsu: chun-wei.hsu@plymouth.ac.uk 
Ms Sarah Hounsell: sarah.hounsell@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
If you wish to continue please fill in the following form. 
 
   Please 
Tick 
• The objectives of the research have been explained to me    
• I have had the chance to ask any questions before the start of the study.   
• I know what my part will be in the study and I know how long it will take.   
• I understand that personal information is strictly confidential   
• I freely consent to be a participant in the study. No one has put pressure on me.   
• I know that I can stop taking part in the study at any time and that I can ask for 
my data to be destroyed if I wish  
 
• Refusal to take part will make no difference to my university studies  
• I understand that the Principal Investigator of this work will have attempted, as 
far as possible, to avoid any risks, and that safety and health risks will have 
been separately assessed by appropriate authorities (e.g. under COSSH 
regulations)   
 
 
• I know that if there are any problems I can contact 
            Name: Giorgio Ganis or Chun-Wei Hsu 
 
 
Your signature: ……………………………………               
 
Date:……………………………………  
 
Your name (Please print)………………………….. 
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APPENDIX 3B  
Follow-up questions for Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS 
 
Thank you for taking part in the first session of our study. 
Please complete the following two questions related to the experiment you just did.  
For bluffing game: 
 Did you find any difficulties in understanding the rules of the game? If yes, please describe 
it 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Please write down any strategies you used to tell convincing lies.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Did you find the bluffing game interesting? Could you concentrate on the game all the time 
through the experiment?  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
For detection game: 
Please write down all strategies you used to judge if the player was lying.   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Did you find the detection game interesting? Could you concentrate on the game all the time 
through the experiment?  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Once again thank you for taking part in our study.  
 
Subject no.: 
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APPENDIX 3C  
Supplementary results for Study 2 
 
1. Method 
1.1 Bluffing game 
For the bluffing game, Repeated-measures of ANOVAs were conducted on the 
mean amplitude of the average ERPs of interest for the comparison between Cued truths 
and Small lies and the comparison between Uncued truths and Small lies, respectively. 
For the N200 and the P300, “midline” ANOVAs were carried out on midline electrodes 
using 2 factors: Response (Cued/Uncued truth, Small lie) and Site (Fz, Cz, Pz and Oz). 
To assess the overall pattern of results, “lateral” ANOVAs were also carried out on 
lateral electrodes (14 pairs) using three factors: Response, Site, and Hemisphere. For the 
MFN and the PRP, ANOVAs were carried out using 2 factors: Response (Cued/Uncued 
truth, Small lie) and Site (Fz, F3, F4, FC1, FC2 and Cz). For the LPC, the ANOVAs 
were carried out using 2 factors: Response (Cued/Uncued truth, Small lie) and Site (Pz, 
P3, P4, CP1 and CP2). A diagram showing the sites analysed for the MFN, PRP and 
LPC components is shown in Figure 3-3. For the BP, ANOVAs were carried out using 
3 factors: Response (Cued/Uncued truth, Small lie), Time window (-800 to -600 ms, 
-600 to -400 ms) and Site (Fz, Cz).  
Another comparison between Cued truth and Uncued truth conditions was also 
conducted to examine whether Uncued truths would require additional cognitive effort 
compared to Cued truths, even though both involved truth-telling. This comparison 
could also provide further evidence about whether differences in the ERPs of interest 
were driven by deception processes or more general decision-making processes.  
Since 20 participants (out of 36) had less than 10 valid trials in the Big lie 
condition, the current ERP results only included Small lies in analyses. Nevertheless, 
we also carried out a weighted average to combine Small lie and Big lie into a “Total lie” 
category and performed the same analyses as above. These results are only shown in the 
tables. 
 
1.2 Lie detection 
 Repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out on these components using 3 
factors: Group (good, bad), Stimulus (truth, lie) and Judgement (truth, lie). In addition 
to the analyses of specific visual ERPs, the overall pattern of results was explored using 
time windows every 100 ms between 0 and 900 ms at five different regions of the scalp: 
(i) The midline region included four electrode sites (Fz, Cz, Pz and Oz); (ii) the lateral 
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regions included frontal (Fp1/Fp2, AF3/AF4, F7/F8, F3/F4), central (FC1/FC2, C3/C4, 
CP1/CP2), temporal (FC5/FC6, T7/T8, CP5/CP6) and posterior (P3.P4, P7/P8, 
PO3/PO4, O1/O2) sites. The analysis of the midline region was conducted separately 
from the four lateral regions. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were carried out using 4 
factors: Group (good, bad), Regions (frontal, central, temporal, posterior), Stimulus 
(truth, lie) and Judgement (truth, lie). The analysis of the midline region only included 
the factors of Group, Stimulus and Judgement. 
In addition to the onset of the clip, we also locked to the onset of the speaking cue 
(i.e., audio onset). We performed the same regional analyses on the audio onset to 
demonstrate the overall pattern of ERP waveforms.  
Because of the risk of false-positive effects in the multiple comparisons in the 
regional analyses, results were considered significant only if there were at least two 
successive time bins significant in a given region (effects lasting more than ≥ 200 ms) 
(Nobre, Rao, & Chelazzi, 2006). 
 
1.3 Lie detection and Head movement  
To assess potential ERP differences between judging if a person was lying or 
telling the truth and judging a physical feature (i.e., head motion), the same analyses 
were carried out as in the lie detection task but using the factor Task (detection, head 
movement), instead of Group.  
 
All p values for ERP results were adjusted with the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon 
correction (reported if smaller than 1) for nonsphericity when necessary. Effect sizes 
(partial eta squared [η2]) are reported, with 0.01, 0.06 and 0.14 considered small, 
medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. Cohen’s d was calculated as effect size for 
paired data, with 0.20, 0.50 and 0.80 considered small, medium and large effect sizes. 
For all analyses, only significant effects are reported, unless otherwise specified. Finally, 
trends at .05 < p < .1 are reported when relevant. All statistical analyses were carried 
out using IBM SPSS Statistics (Version 23). 
 
2. Results 
2.1  Bluffing game 
  2.1.1  N200 (250-350 ms, Stimulus-locked) 
 The aggregated grand average waveform from trials revealed an N200 around 300 
ms after the stimulus at fronto-central electrodes (Figure 3-4b). The two midline 
ANOVAs (Cued truth vs. Small lie and Uncued truth vs. Small lie) showed no main 
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effect of response and no interaction between response and site. The lateral ANOVAs 
also revealed neither a main effect of response nor an interaction between response and 
site (Table 3C-A1). There was an interaction between response and hemisphere when 
comparing Cued truths and Small lies. Planned focal analyses showed a larger N200 on 
the left than right hemisphere in both Cued truth and Small lie conditions, and the 
difference between hemispheres was bigger in the Cued truth condition. Since we 
focused on the frontal N200, this interaction between response and hemisphere will not 
be further discussed.  
Additional the midline ANOVA comparing Cued truths and Uncued truths 
showed neither a main effect of response nor an interaction. The lateral ANOVA 
revealed an interaction between response and site, but not a main effect of response 
(Table 3C-A1). To further examine the interaction, Uncued truths showed a trend for a 
larger N200 compared with Cued truths at most of sites, but a few occipito-parietal sites 
showed an opposite trend with a smaller N200 for Uncued truths compared with Cued 
truths. Since planned focal analyses showed no site with a significant difference 
between Cued truths and Uncued truths, this interaction will not be further discussed.  
 In summary, these results showed no frontal N200 effects for lying compared with 
Cued or Uncued truths. Also, no frontal N200 differences were found between Cued 
truths and Uncued truths. 
 
  2.1.2  P300 (450-650 ms, Stimulus-locked) 
 The aggregated grand average waveform from trials revealed a P300 around 550 
ms after the stimulus at parietal electrodes (Figure 3-4c). For the first midline ANOVA 
comparing Cued truth and Small lie conditions, a main effect of response showed that 
lying was associated with a smaller P300 compared with the cued truth. The interaction 
between response and site was also significant. Planned focal analyses showed a 
decreased P300 for lying compared with cued truth at Pz (t[35] = 4.76, p < .001, d = 
0.79, 95% CI [1.51, 3.77]), and Cz (t[35] = 3.45, p < 0.01, d = 0.58, 95% CI [0.77, 2.97]. 
In contrast, the midline ANOVA comparing Uncued truths and Small lies showed 
neither a main effect of response nor an interaction between response and site (Table 
3C-A1).  
Similarly, the lateral ANOVAs revealed a main effect of response and an 
interaction between response and site only in the comparison between Cued truth and 
Small lie conditions (Table 3C-A1).  
 An additional midline ANOVA comparing Cued truths and Uncued truths showed 
a main effect of response and an interaction between response and site. Planned focal 
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analyses showed a decreased P300 for Uncued truths compared with Cued truths at Pz 
(t[35] = 5.17, p < 0.001, d = 0.86, 95% CI [1.49, 3.41]), Cz (t[35] = 4.48, p < 0.001, d = 
0.75, 95% CI [1.09, 2.89]) and Fz (t[35] = 2.44, p < 0.05, d = 0.41, 95% CI [0.22, 2.42]). 
The lateral ANOVA also revealed a main effect of response where Uncued truths were 
associated with a smaller P300. The interaction between response and site was also 
significant (Table 3C-A1). 
 In summary, a smaller P300 for lying was found compared with Cued truths but 
not Uncued truths. In addition, the P300 for Uncued truths was smaller compared to that 
for cued truth.  
A weighted average was carried out to combine Small and Big lies into a “Total lie” 
category. The comparison between “Truth” and “Total lie” is shown in Table 3C-A2, 
and the results are comparable to those in the Small lie condition. 
 
  2.1.3  MFN (0, 100 ms, Response-locked) 
The aggregated grand average waveform from trials revealed that the MFN peaked 
around 50 ms after the response at fronto-central electrodes (Figure 3-5c). The first 
ANOVA comparing Cued truths and Small lies revealed an interaction between 
response and site but no main effect of response (Table 3C-B1). Planned focal analyses 
showed a larger MFN for Small lies compared to Cued truths at FC1 (t[35] = 2.16, p < 
0.05, d = 0.36, 95% CI [0.10, 3.31]), FC2 (t[35] = 2.58, p < 0.05, d = 0.43, 95% CI 
[0.50, 4.19]) and Cz (t[35] = 2.39, p < 0.05, d = 0.40, 95% CI [0.32, 3.90]). The second 
ANOVA comparing Uncued truths and Small lies revealed neither a main effect of 
response nor an interaction between response and site (Table 3C-B1).  
An additional ANOVA comparing Cued and Uncued truths showed neither a main 
effect of response nor an interaction between response and site (Table 3C-B1).  
In summary, a larger MFN for lying was found compared with the Cued truths but 
not with the Uncued truths. In addition, no MFN difference was found between Cued 
truths and Uncued truths.  
 
  2.1.4  PRP (-200, 0 ms, Response-locked) 
The aggregated grand average waveform from trials revealed the PRP around 200 
ms before the response at fronto-central electrodes (Figure 3-5c). The first ANOVA 
comparing the Cued truth and Small lie conditions revealed an interaction between 
response and site but no main effect of response (Table 3C-B1). Planned focal analyses 
showed a smaller PRP for lying compared to cued truth at FC1 (t[35] = 2.29, p < 0.05, d 
= 0.38, 95% CI [0.16, 2.72]), FC2 (t[35] = 3.03, p < .01, d = 0.51, 95% CI [0.73, 3.68]) 
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and Cz (t[35] = 3.21, p < .01, d = 0.54, 95% CI [0.87, 3.87]). Similarly, the second 
ANOVA comparing the Uncued truth and Small lie condition revealed an interaction 
between response and site but no main effect of response (Table 3C-B1). However, 
planned focal analyses showed no site with significant difference between lying and 
uncued truth.  
An additional ANOVA comparing the Cued truth and Uncued truth conditions 
showed a marginal main effect of response and an interaction between response and site 
(Table 3C-B1). Planned focal analyses showed a smaller PRP for uncued truth 
compared with cued truth at FC1 (t[35] = 2.35, p < 0.05, d = 0.39, 95% CI [0.21, 2.94]), 
FC2 (t[35] = 2.46, p < 0.05, d = 0.41, 95% CI [0.34, 3.53]) and Cz (t[35] = 2.28, p < 
0.05, d = 0.38, 95% CI [0.19, 3.22]). 
In summary, a smaller PRP for lying was found compared with Cued truths but not 
Uncued truths. In addition, Uncued truths showed a smaller PRP compared with Cued 
truths. 
 
  2.1.5  LPC (-250, 0 ms, Response-locked) 
The aggregated grand average waveform from trials revealed the LPC around 250 
ms before the response at central-parietal electrodes (Figure 3-5d). For the first 
ANOVA comparing the Cued truth and Small lie condition, showed a main effect of 
response indicating that lying reduced LPC amplitude compared to cued truth, as well 
as an interaction between response and site (Table 3C-B1). Planned focal analyses 
showed a smaller LPC for lying compared with cued truth at Pz (t[35] = 4.38, p < .001, 
d = 0.73, 95% CI [1.80, 4.92]), P3 (t[35] = 2.67, p < 0.05, d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.49, 3.59], 
P4 (t[35] = 3.52, p < .01, d = 0.59, 95% CI [1.13, 4.20], CP1 (t[35] = 2.65, p < 0.05, d = 
0.44, 95% CI [0.48, 3.61] and CP2 (t[35] = 3.12, p < .01, d = 0.52, 95% CI [0.77, 3.67]. 
The second ANOVA comparing Uncued truth and Small lie condition revealed an 
interaction between response and site, but no main effect of response (Table 3C-B1). 
Planned focal analyses showed a decreased LPC for lying compared with uncued truth 
at Pz (t[35] = 2.34, p < .05, d = 0.39, 95% CI [0.15, 2.17]).  
An additional ANOVA comparing the Cued truth and Uncued truth conditions 
showed a main effect of response and an interaction between response and site (Table 
3C-B1). Planned focal analyses showed a smaller LPC for uncued truth compared to 
cued truth at Pz (t[35] = 3.09, p < 0.01, d = 0.52, 95% CI [0.76, 3.64]), P3 (t[35] = 3.16, 
p < 0.01, d = 0.53, 95% CI [0.71, 3.26], P4 (t[35] = 2.57, p < 0.05, d = 0.43, 95% CI 
[0.37, 3.13], CP1 (t[35] = 2.07, p < 0.05, d = 0.35, 95% CI [0.03, 2.73] and CP2 (t[35] =  
2.17, p < 0.05, d = 0.36, 95% CI [0.10, 2.91]. 
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To summarize, a smaller LPC for lying was found compared with cued truth and 
uncued truth. In addition, uncued truths showed a smaller LPC than the cued truths. 
 
  2.1.6  Bereitschaftspotential (BP, Response-locked) 
 The first ANOVA comparing Cued truth and Small lie conditions revealed an 
interaction between response and time window (F[1,35] = 24.38, η2 = 0.41, p < .001). 
Further analyses indicated that between 600 and 400 ms prior to the response, the BP 
amplitude was smaller for lying compared with cued truth (F[1,35] = 6.88, η2 = 0.16, p 
< .05). Similarly, the second ANOVA comparing the Uncued truth and Small lie 
conditions revealed a smaller BP for lying compared to uncued truth between 600 and 
400 ms prior to the response (F[1,35] = 5.30, η2 = 0.13, p < .05) (see Figure 3-5b). 
An additional ANOVA comparing the Cued truth and Uncued truth conditions 
showed no interaction between response and time window (F[1,35] = 1.86, η2 = 0.05, p 
= .18) and there was no difference in BP amplitude between these two response types 
between 600 and 400 ms prior to the response (F[1,35] = 0.88, η2 = 0.03, p = .35).  
 In summary, a smaller BP for lying compared with both Cued truths and Uncued 
truths was found and there was no difference between Cued truths and Uncued truths. 
A weighted average was carried out to combine Small lies and Big lies into a 
“Total lies” category. The comparison between “Truth” and “Total lie” is shown in 
Table 3C-B2, and the results are comparable to those in the Small lie condition. 
 
2.2  Lie detection 
Clip onset 
For the regional analyses, the midline ANOVA showed an interaction between 
group and judgement during 500 – 700 ms (F[1,17] = 8.95, η2 = 0.35, p < 0.01 for 500 – 
600 ms; F[1,17] = 10.21, η2 = 0.38, p < 0.01 for 600 – 700 ms). The mean amplitudes 
were averaged across stimuli for follow-up analyses. Planned focal analyses showed 
that “true” judgements were more positive than “lie” judgements for the “good” group 
(all t[17] > 3.09, p < 0.01), but not for “bad” group (all t[17] < 1.40, p > .179).  
The four-way lateral ANOVA showed an interaction between group and judgement 
between 500 and 700 ms (F[1,17] = 7.47, η2 = 0.31, p < 0.05 between 500 and 600 ms; 
F[1,17] = 8.27, η2 = 0.33, p = 0.01 between 600 and 700 ms). There was a significant 
main effect of region between 100 and 900 ms (all F[3,51] > 6.64, η2 > 0.28, p < 0.01). 
Follow-up three-way ANOVAs (group, stimulus and judgement) analyses were carried 
out for each region. The central region revealed an interaction between group and 
judgment between 300 and 700 ms (all F[1,17] > 4.90, η2 > 0.22, p < 0.05) and the 
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posterior region also revealed an interaction between group and judgment between 500 
and 700 ms (all F[1,17] > 6.65, η2 > 0.28, p < 0.05). In contrast, the frontal and 
temporal regions showed no such interaction. No other effects were found. The mean 
amplitudes were averaged across stimuli in central and posterior region for follow-up 
analyses. Analyses showed that that “true” judgments were more positive than “lie” 
judgments for the “good” group at both central (all t[17] > 2.65, p < 0.05) and posterior 
region (all t[17] > 2.78, p < 0.05), but not for “bad” group (all t[17] < 1.34, p > .199) 
(see Figure 3C-A). 
 
Audio onset 
For the regional analyses, the midline ANOVA revealed neither main effects nor 
interactions in any time windows from 0 to 900 ms. The four-way lateral ANOVA 
showed a main effect of region between 600 and 900 ms (all F[3,51] > 6.97, η2 > 0.29, 
p < 0.01). No other main effect or interaction was found. Follow-up three-way 
ANOVAs (group, stimulus and judgement) carried out for each region showed neither a 
main effect nor interactions.  
In summary, the amplitude of visual components P1 and N1 showed no differences 
between groups. The regional analyses showed an interaction between group and 
judgement between 500 and 700 ms at midline, central and posterior regions. This 
interaction was driven by the difference of mean amplitude between “truth” and “lie” 
judgement (collapsing stimuli) in the “good” group. Finally, no differences were found 
between the two groups using ERP time-locked to audio onset. 
 
2.3  Comparison between the lie detection and head movement tasks 
Clip onset 
The mean amplitude for the P1 and N1 were analysed with repeated-measures 
ANOVAs using 2 factors: Task (lie detection, head movement) and Stimulus (truth, lie). 
The main effect of task was significant for the N1 (F[1,35] = 16.56, η2 = 0.32, p < 0.001) 
with the head movement task showing a larger N1 than the lie detection task. The main 
effect of task was nearly significant for the P1 (F[1,35] = 3.77, η2 = 0.10, p = 0.06) with 
the lie detection task showing a larger P1 than the head movement task. There was no 
main effect of stimulus and no interaction between task and stimuli. 
For the regional analyses, the midline ANOVA showed a main effect of task 
between 100 and 900 ms (all F[1,35] > 5.84, η2 = 0.14, p < 0.05) where the mean 
amplitude was more negative for the head movement task than the detection task. There 
was no main effect of stimulus and no interaction between task and stimulus. 
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 The three-way lateral ANOVA (factors: task, region and stimulus) showed an 
interaction between task and region between 400 and 600 ms (F[3,105] = 6.88, η2 = 
0.16, p < 0.01 between 400 and 500 ms; F[3,105] = 4.47, η2 = 0.11, p = 0.05 between 
500 and 600 ms).The significant main effect of task persisted between 100 and 900 ms 
(all F[1,35] > 4.63, η2 = 0.12, p < 0.05) where the mean amplitude was more negative 
for the head movement task than the detection task. There was a main effect of region in 
all time windows (all F[3,105] > 11.18, η2 = 0.24, p < 0.001). Follow-up two-way 
ANOVAs (task and stimulus) were carried out for each region. The first difference was 
a main effect of task between 100 and 300 ms in the posterior region (all F[1,35] > 8.64, 
η2 = 0.20, p < 0.01) and reflected the modulation of visual components (i.e., P1 and N1) 
with the head movement task showing a more negative mean amplitude than the lie 
detection task. No main effect of task was found in later time windows in the posterior 
region. For central and temporal regions, the main effect of task persisted between 100 
and 900 ms (all F[1,35] > 4.73, η2 = 0.12, p < 0.05, except for the central region 
between 700 and 800 ms showing a nearly significant difference, F[1,35] = 3.94, η2 = 
0.10, p = 0.055) with the head movement task consistently showing more negative mean 
amplitude than the lie detection task. The frontal region only showed a main effect of 
task between 300 and 700 ms (all F[1,35] > 5.40, η2 = 0.13, p < 0.05) with more 
negative amplitude for the head movement task. From the pattern of lateral ANOVA 
result, it appeared that the difference of mean amplitude between two tasks shifted from 
posterior to anterior region through the epoch time (see Figure 3-6c&d). 
 
Audio onset 
For the regional analyses, the midline ANOVA showed a main effect of task 
between 500 and 700 ms (F[1,35] = 4.42, η2 = 0.11, p < 0.05 between 500 and 600 ms; 
F[1,35] = 4.32, η2 = 0.11, p < 0.05 between 600 and 700 ms) where the mean amplitude 
was more negative for the lie detection than the head movement task. There was no 
main effect of stimulus and no interaction between task and stimulus.  
The three-way lateral ANOVA showed an interaction between task and region 
between 200 and 600 ms (all F[3,105] > 4.42, η2 = 0.11, p < 0.05). A significant main 
effect of region persisted between 200 and 900 ms (all F[3,105] > 4.35, η2 = 0.11, p < 
0.05). Follow-up two-way ANOVAs (task and stimulus) were carried out for each 
region. The significant main effect of task was only found in the posterior region 
between 400 and 700 ms (all F[1,35] > 4.27, η2 = 0.11, p < 0.05) where the mean 
amplitude was more negative for the lie detection than the head movement task (see 
Figure 3C-B). No other significant effects were found in any other regional analyses.  
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To summarise, the head movement task showed a larger N1 than the lie detection 
task. The regional analyses suggested that the difference of amplitudes shifted from 
posterior to anterior region along the epoch time. In addition, no main effect of stimuli 
was found for both clip and audio onset. 
 
Figure 3C-A. ERPs at (a) central and (b) posterior regions for trials judged as truthful 
and deceptive for both Good-judge and Bad-judge groups 
(a)   
(b)  
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Figure 3C-B. Topographic map showing the difference between the Lie detection and 
Head movement tasks between 400 and 700 ms (audio onset)  
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Table 3C-A1 
                Lateral (Lat) and Midline (Mid) ANOVAs on N200 (250, 350 ms) and P300 (450, 650 
ms) amplitude comparing Cued Truth and Small Lie, Uncued Truth and Small Lie, and 
Cued Truth and Uncued Truth.  
ERP  N200 
 
P300 
  Lat 
 
Mid 
 
Lat   Mid 
Source F p 𝜂!! 
 
F p 𝜂!! 
 
F p 𝜂!!   F p 𝜂!! 
Cued Truth vs Small Lie 
Response 0.08 .78 .00 
 
0.35 .56 .01 
 
4.55 <.05 .12 
 
9.37 <.01 .21 
R x Site 2.24 .07  .06 
 
0.97 .38 .03 
 
5.54 =.001 .14 
 
7.87 <.001 .18 
R x Hemi 5.80 .02 .14 
     
0.03 .86 .00 
    R x S x H 1.90 .08 .05 1.93 .07 .05 
Uncued Truth vs Small Lie 
Response 1.72 .20 .05 
 
0.62 .44 .02 
 
0.20 .66 .01 
 
0.01 .92 .00 
R x S 1.75 .15 .05 
 
0.60 .57 .02 
 
0.84 .47 .02 
 
1.42 .25 .04 
R x H 1.15 .29 .03 
     
0.32 .57 .01 
    R x S x H 0.94 .48 .03 0.90 .51 .03 
Cued Truth vs Uncued Truth 
Response 1.29 .26 .04 
 
2.55 .12 .07 
 
8.69 <.01 .20 
 
15.98 <.001 .31 
R x S 2.90 .03 .08 
 
1.40 .25 .04 
 
6.73 <.001 .16 
 
7.94 <.001 .19 
R x H 0.90 .35 .03 
     
0.67 .42 .02 
    R x S x H 1.72 .10 .05 1.83 .08 .05 
 
Note. Degrees of freedom: Response, Response x Hemisphere: 1, 35; Response x Site 
(Mid): 3, 105; Response x Site (Lat), Response x Hemisphere x Site: 13, 455. F values 
are with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
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Table 3C-A2 
                Lateral (Lat) and Midline (Mid) ANOVAs on N200 (250, 350 ms) and P300 (450, 650 
ms) amplitude comparing Cued Truth and Total Lie, and Uncued Truth and Total Lie.  
ERP  N200 
 
P300 
  Lat 
 
Mid 
 
Lat   Mid 
Source F p 𝜂!! 
 
F p 𝜂!! 
 
F p 𝜂!!   F p 𝜂!! 
Cued Truth vs Total Lie 
Response 0.33 .57 .01 
 
0.06 .82 .00 
 
3.26 .08 .09 
 
7.64 <.01 .18 
R x Site 1.54 .20  .04 
 
0.47 .62 .01 
 
4.60 <.01 .12 
 
6.98 <.01 .17 
R x Hemi 3.67 .06 .10 
     
0.03 .87 .00 
    R x S x H 1.86 .08 .05 1.99 .06 .05 
Uncued Truth vs Total Lie 
Response 2.79 .10 .07 
 
1.78 .19 .05 
 
0.67 .42 .02 
 
0.26 .61 .01 
R x S 1.05 .37 .03 
 
0.39 .69 .01 
 
0.72 .53 .02 
 
1.08 .35 .03 
R x H 0.39 .54 .01 
     
0.39 .54 .01 
    R x S x H 1.23 .29 .03 1.16 .33 .03 
 
Note. Degrees of freedom: Response, Response x Hemisphere: 1, 35; Response x Site 
(Mid): 3, 105; Response x Site (Lat), Response x Hemisphere x Site: 13, 455. F values 
are with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
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Table 3C-B1 
                Lateral (Lat) and Midline (Mid) ANOVAs on MFN (0, 100 ms), PRP (-200, 0 ms) and 
LPC (-250, 0 ms) amplitude comparing between Cued Truth and Small Lie, Uncued 
Truth and Small Lie, and Cued Truth and Uncued Truth. The site factor includes Fz, F3, 
F4, FC1, FC2, Cz for MFN and PRP; Pz, P3, P4, CP1, CP2 for LPC.  
ERP MFN  PRP  LPC 
Source F p 𝜂!!  F p 𝜂!!  F p 𝜂!! 
Cued Truth vs Small Lie 
Response 3.51 .07 .09  4.02 .05 .10  11.58 <.01 .25 
R x Site 3.02 <.05 .08  5.71 =.001 .14  5.67 =.001 .14 
Uncued Truth vs Small Lie 
Response 0.06 .81 .00  0.00 .96 .00  2.13 .15 .06 
R x Site 1.77 .14 .05  3.06 <.05 .08  2.76 <.05 .07 
Cued Truth vs Uncued Truth 
Response 2.80 .10 .07  4.09 .05 .11  7.32 =.01 .17 
R x Site 2.34 .07 .06  3.84 <.05 .10  2.80 <.05 .07 
 
Note. Degrees of freedom: Response: 1, 35; Response x Site (MFN&PRP): 5, 175; 
Response x Site (LPC): 4, 140. F values are with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
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Table 3C-B2 
Lateral (Lat) and Midline (Mid) ANOVAs on MFN (0, 100 ms), PRP (-200, 0 ms) and 
LPC (-250, 0 ms) amplitude comparing Cued Truth and Total Lie, and Uncued Truth 
and Total Lie. The site factor includes Fz, F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Cz for MFN and PRP; Pz, 
P3, P4, CP1, CP2 for LPC.  
ERP MFN  PRP  LPC 
Source F p 𝜂!!  F p 𝜂!!  F p 𝜂!! 
Cued Truth vs Total Lie 
Response 2.02 .16 .06  3.17 .08 .08  9.78 <.01 .22 
R x Site 3.09 <.05 .08  6.23 =.001 .15  6.04 =.001 .15 
Uncued Truth vs Total Lie 
Response 1.18 .28 .03  0.21 .65 .01  1.46 .24 .04 
R x Site 2.05 .11 .06  3.94 <.01 .10  3.13 <.05 .08 
 
Note. Degrees of freedom: Response: 1, 35; Response x Site (MFN&PRP): 5, 175; 
Response x Site (LPC): 4, 140. F values are with Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
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APPENDIX 5A  
Subject information and consent form for Study 4 
 
 
 
 
DICHIARAZIONE DI CONSENSO INFORMATO   
                                    
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA  
DIPARTIMENTO DI PSICOLOGIA GENERALE 
________________________________________________________ 
CORRELATI NEURALI DEL DECISION-MAIKING 
Il/La sottoscritto/a ___________________________ dichiara:  
  -  di essere stato/a messo/a a conoscenza delle procedure sperimentali 
relative all’indagine scientifica alla quale liberamente partecipa come 
volontario, al fine di contribuire all’avanzamento delle conoscenze nel 
campo delle funzioni cerebrali;   
  -  di essere stato informato circa la possibilità di ritirarsi dalla ricerca in 
qualsiasi momento, senza motivazione, senza incorrere in alcuna 
penalizzazione ed ottenendo il non utilizzo dei suoi dati;   
  -  di essere stato/a informato/a riguardo alle finalità e agli obiettivi della 
ricerca in questione;   
  -  di aver preso visione diretta dell’ambiente in cui avverranno i rilievi 
sperimentali e degli  apparati che saranno utilizzati a tale scopo;   
  -  di essere stato messo a conoscenza che i risultati di tale ricerca, 
mantenendo l’anonimato  dei soggetti partecipanti, potranno eventualmente 
essere comunicati ad altri ricercatori in  occasione di congressi o riunioni 
scientifiche;   
  -  di aver ricevuto soddisfacenti informazioni relativamente al principio di 
mantenimento della  riservatezza delle informazioni relative e/o scaturite 
dall’esame della propria persona;   
  -  di essere stato informato che le immagini verranno acquisite senza alcuna 
finalità diagnostica e di poter richiedere copia delle immagini in formato 
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grezzo, per la cui  interpretazione clinica potrò rivolgermi ad uno specialista 
di mia fiducia.   
     Si informa che tutti i dati personali a Lei relativi verranno trattati in 
conformità al Decreto Legislativo 30 giugno 2003 n. 196 “Codice in materia 
di protezione dei dati personali”. Si informa inoltre che tutti i risultati 
ottenuti dalle analisi connesse alle attività di ricerca o sperimentazione, così 
come ogni altro atto medico, sono da considerarsi strettamente confidenziali 
e sottoposti al vincolo del segreto professionale e della legislazione vigente 
in materia.   
Padova, lì ________________________  
Firma ____________________________  
Firma dello sperimentatore che ha raccolto consenso _______________________. 
  
Nel caso in cui il personale medico rilevasse informazioni di potenziale interesse 
per il mio stato di salute  
 DESIDERO                           NON DESIDERO  
essere contattato. In caso affermativo chiedo di essere contattato ai seguenti 
recapiti  
TELEFONO.............................   EMAIL...................................  
LUOGO........................................ DATA..........................................  
NOME/COGNOME (STAMPATELLO).............................................  
FIRMA....................................................................................  
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACC Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
AI Agreement Index 
ALE Activation Likelihood Estimate 
AnG Angular Gyrus 
ANS Autonomic Nervous System 
ATTA Abbreviate Torrance Test for Adults 
AUC Area Under the Curve 
BA Brodmann’s Area 
BOLD Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent 
BP Bereitschaftspotential 
CAQ Creativity Achievement Questionnaire  
CIT Concealed Information Test 
CK Concealed Knowledge 
CM Countermeasure 
CNV Contingent Negative-going Variation 
CRN Correct Response Negativity 
DeceIT Deceptive Interaction Task 
DLPFC Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
EEG Electroencephalogram 
EMS Episodic Memory Survey 
EPD Emotional Photos Description 
ER Error Rate 
ERP Event-Related Potential 
fMRI functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
FWHM Full-width at Half-maximum 
GC Middle Cingulate Gyrus 
GFd Medial/superior Frontal Gyrus 
GKT Guilty Knowledge Test 
GLM General Linear Models 
HRF Hemodynamic Response Function 
ICA Independent Component Analysis 
IPL Inferior Parietal Lobule 
IRI Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
ITI Inter-Trial Interval 
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LGFi Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
LGsm Left Supramarginal Gyrus 
LLPi Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 
LPC Later Positive Component 
MCSD Marlowe Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
MFN Medial Frontal Negativity 
MNI Montreal Neurological Institute 
NK No Knowledge 
OP Opponent 
OR Orienting Reflex 
OS Opinion Survey 
PHG Parahippocampal Gyrus 
PRP Pre-response Positivity  
RAT Remote Associate Test 
RGFi Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
rIFG right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
RLPi Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 
ROC Receiver Operating Characteristics  
ROI Region of Interest 
rSMG right Supramarginal Gyrus 
RT Response time 
SCR Skin Conductance Response 
SDT Signal Detection Theory 
STS Superior Temporal Sulcus 
SVM Support Vector Machine 
TAS Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
Thal Thalamus  
ToM Theory of Mind 
TP Temporal Pole 
TPJ Temporo-Parietal Junction 
VLPFC Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
WASI 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence  
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